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ABSTRACT
Catastrophic disasters are different than routine disasters and managing them requires the
mobilization of inter-organizational, inter-governmental, cross-sectoral and international
humanitarian support. The role of the international community through International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), and multi-lateral organizations such as the United Nations
(UN) becomes imperative when the scale of the disaster is unprecedented and difficult for a
country to manage on its own. The initial response and relief phase of managing disasters is one
in which many agencies with different expertise, capacities, working mandates, resources, skills,
working cultures and norms come together to coordinate and collaborate to provide timely
response and relief services. Thus, the terrain of managing catastrophic disasters is complex and
requires a deeper study to understand and delineate the factors shaping and facilitating
collaborative response and relief efforts.
This study examines the multi-level and multi-layered collaborative response networks
present at the national-international level, provincial and district/local level of disaster response
and interactions. In this research the nature and effectiveness of collaboration is being studied
through a relevant case study of a catastrophic natural disaster, the 2010 Pakistan Floods. The
phase of immediate response is explored primarily through Network Theory perspectives
including supportive theoretical perspectives such as Social Capital, Resource Dependency, and
Institutional Collective Action Theory perspectives that help to explain collaborative interactions
in disaster response networks. This study explores and describes factors that influence (either
facilitate or hinder) collaboration is disaster response networks.
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The key research questions for this study are: What factors facilitate and impede
collaborative response to catastrophic disasters at the local, provincial, national and international
levels? What are the differences and similarities in response systems at different levels?
Additional questions address how leadership support (attributed to government and political
leaders and organizations), institutional support (in the form of plans, international appeals of
response, and development of relief funds to manage aid), network capacity of different
organizations (programmatic and relational), nature of resource dependencies between
responding agencies, and structural configurations of response systems impact the collaborative
response in disasters.
A case study method has been applied in this research. The 2010 Pakistan Floods
response network/system is identified through content analysis of various newspapers, situation
reports and after-action reports using the Social Network Analysis (SNA) method via UCINET
Software 6.1. The actual response network is analyzed and compared with existing national
disaster response plans to examine the effectiveness of collaborative response through centrality
measures, clique analysis and visual display. This approach is supplemented with semistructured interviews of key institutional representatives that responded to the 2010 Floods.
These organizations and institutions were primarily identified through the networks formulated
via SNA.
Findings and results from the analysis reflect that the response networks at each level of
analysis differ both in structural aspects and also in functional aspects. The nature of the
international-national response system is focused on mobilizing donor support and receiving and
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managing aid, both in-kind and cash. Also a major role at the international and national level is
to mobilize the UN cluster approach and focus on broader aims of response such as providing
shelter and food to affected areas. Some of the factors identified as facilitating collaborative
response were leadership of both national and international leaders, and availability of donor
support and funds.
At the provincial level of analysis, the Chief Minister of Punjab is playing a central and
influential role and is partnering closely with the Armed Forces and local district administration.
Interviews conducted of provincial level officials help to support the hypotheses concerning
leadership support’s influence on collaborative response and also the role of institutional support
in the form of creation of plans, and policies that help to mobilize quick funds and resources for
relief. At the local level of response, networks are highly influenced by local conditions and local
capacities of the district administration. Thus, there are diverse factors impacting each level of
collaborative disaster response. All in all, leadership support, institutional support and network
structural aspects are important variables that impact the effectiveness of collaborative response.
Today policy makers are trying to figure out ways to collaborate successfully across
sector boundaries for better and effective service delivery, both in the mundane operational tasks
and in uncertain and complex situations such as disasters and catastrophic events. Thus, this
research helps in expanding the literature on collaborative public management, collaborative
emergency management, and network management. Also the frequency of natural disasters
throughout the world demonstrate the need to study and examine factors that contribute to or
hinder the effectiveness of inter-organizational response in disasters.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Managing catastrophic disasters is not the job of the government or the public sector
alone. Catastrophic disasters are different than routine disasters due to the sheer size and scale of
impact and the enormous destruction caused to the existing emergency response system (Kapucu
& Van Wart, 2006). Today a myriad of organizations from the private sector, the nonprofit
sector, and faith-based agencies along with traditional emergency management government and
public sector response agencies play an integral role in responding to disasters and the needs of
affected civilians and survivors. The role of the international community through International
Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), and multi-lateral organizations such as the United
Nations (UN) also becomes imperative when the scale of the disaster is unprecedented and
difficult for a country to manage on its own. Thus, the initial response and relief phase of
managing disasters is one in which many agencies with different expertise, capacities, working
mandates, resources, skills, working cultures, and norms come together to coordinate and
collaborate to provide response and relief services. Thus, the terrain of managing catastrophic
disasters is complex and requires a deeper study to understand and delineate the factors shaping
and facilitating collaborative response and relief efforts.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
Interdependence and interconnectedness characterize the intergovernmental and
interorganizational environment of disaster management. According to McGuire and Silvia
(2010), “emergency management is an ideal context within which to examine the general forces
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of intergovernmental collaboration” (p. 280). Interorganizational collaboration and partnerships
are a direct result of operating in and adapting to a complex organizational environment. When
organizations have to operate in dynamic and uncertain environments and face wicked problems
(Kettl, 2006), they resort to spanning boundaries and building external relationships that take the
shape of collaborative networks. Intergovernmental and inter-sector collaboration becomes
imperative since no single organization, nor a jurisdiction, has the complete resources and
capacity to deal with disasters and catastrophes (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Moynihan, 2005).
Thus, the greater the severity and impact of disaster, the greater the need for a collaborative
response (McGuire & Silvia, 2010).
Collaborative governance and networks are essential to managing crises and disasters.
However, functioning in a network of interdependencies and complex relationships through
collaboration and cooperation is not the simplest of tasks. As Kapucu (2008) states, “organizing
a cooperative effort, though, is almost as difficult as the problems that the initiative is created to
address” (p. 256). Uncertainty of roles and responsibilities and a lack of coordination between
responding players within disaster management networks is a main reason why response
operations are weak and often fail to accomplish the set out goals. Also many policies and plans
dealing with disasters approach emergency management and disaster response through a topdown management style expecting an effective response.
The example of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the US
government post September 11, 2011, to address communication and coordination failures in
disaster response (Schafer, Carroll, Haynes, & Abrams, 2008), and the popular top-down ‘cluster
approach’ adopted by the UN to improve coordination between responding agencies during
2

international disasters (Thomas & Rendon, 2010), are just few examples of the traditional topdown approach of managing disasters. However, leveraging various resources effectively from
different levels of the government, different countries, and different sectors requires more than a
top-down initiative. It requires intra- and inter-agency collaboration (Schafer et al., 2008). Thus,
collaborative response and collaborative disaster management may be effective when preexisting relationships and protocols have been developed between different organizations, when
operating staff and response teams are well trained and equipped with the capacity to
communicate with each other, and when leadership support and the political will of elected
officials exists to make collaborative response effective (Kapucu, 2008, 2005). Thus, it is
important to explore the conditions that influence the structure and functioning of a collaborative
system.
Networks are important sources of resource sharing, mutual discovery and knowledge
sharing (Agranoff, 2006). In disaster response networks or in other informal networks where
organizations are not legally bind to work together, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) ask an
important question: Why would organizations decide to work together and solve problems?
According to the authors, literature suggests reasons such as “trust, common purpose, mutual
dependency, resource availability, catalytic actors, and managerial ability” play a crucial role in
determining why agencies work together and collaborate (2001, p. 312). A myriad of factors help
to determine whether networks function successfully and effectively. The actual networks that
develop in disasters are a result of both formal and mandated disaster management plans and also
the emerging contextual nature of the disaster that requires the mobilization of resources and
strategies outside the existing plans, operating procedures, and protocols. Many scholars suggest
3

that decentralization and improvisation is important for coordination in complex environments
(Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Mendonca & Fiedrich, 2004).
A well-functioning, coordinated and collaborative response network also constitutes of
multiple layers and levels of response. If a response system is analyzed in a complete manner it
will comprise of inter-governmental exchanges, inter-sector transactions, multi-lateral and bilateral links and these transactions will be most likely arranged in clusters around certain
response functions such as: distribution of food items, search and rescue operations. It is
important to understand that collaborative response in disasters is a multi-level (Maldonado,
Maitland, & Tapia, 2010) and multi-layered function (Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006).
Response to disasters is a layered function and involves complex operations by different sectors
and organizations. Telford et al. (2006) describe two main components of response activities as:
the local and national component and the international component. The local and national
component usually is tasked to bring in context-based knowledge while the international
component brings in technical expertise, financial aid, and resources. Other studies also
categorize the different levels as: local, state/provincial, national/central and international. This
study explores interorganizational response networks at different layers by identifying which
factors influence collaborative response at each level identified in the multi-layered response
system. The multi-layered response system in this study is divided into three levels: the
international-national response system; the provincial response system; and the local/district
level response system.
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1.2 Research Questions
This research will focus on studying the interorganizational and multi-layered network
response at the national-international level, the provincial level and the district level. The main
goal of this study is to explore factors that facilitate or hinder effective and successful interorganizational collaborative response at these levels using the 2010 Pakistan Floods as a case
study.
The research questions for this study are:
Q1: What factors facilitate and impede interorganizational collaborative response to
catastrophic disasters at the local, provincial, national, and international levels?
Q2: What are the differences and similarities in the response systems at different levels?
What response functions/operations are important at different levels of response?
Q3. How does leadership support in response systems impact interorganizational
collaborative response to disasters?
Q4. How does institutional support (in the form of formal and informal structures such as
plans, international appeals for response, etc) facilitate collaborative response in disasters?
Q5. How does the network capacity of different organizations responding in disasters
influence and impact collaborative response?
Q6. How does the level and nature of resource dependencies between different
organizations influence collaborative response in disasters?
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Q7. Which structural configurations in networks hinder or/and facilitate collaborative
response in disasters? Is decentralization superior to a centralized structure of the response
system?
Most studies have discussed the antecedents of collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone,
2006) rather than exploring the effectiveness of collaboration. In this research, the nature and
effectiveness of collaboration is being studied through a rich case study of a catastrophic natural
disaster, the 2010 Pakistan Floods. The phase of immediate response is explored primarily
through Network Theory perspectives including supportive theories such as Resource
Dependency, and Institutional Collective Action Theory that help to explain collaborative
interactions in disaster response networks. This study explores and describes factors that
influence collaboration is disaster response networks.
1.3 Significance of the Study
This research is significant and timely due to the nature of the study problem. Today
policy makers are trying to figure out ways to collaborate successfully across sector boundaries
for better and effective service delivery, both in the mundane operational tasks and in uncertain
and complex situations such as disasters and catastrophic events. Thus, this research helps in
expanding the literature on collaborative public management, collaborative emergency
management, and network management. Also in recent years, one observes a drastic increase is
catastrophic disasters across the globe. Thus, it is imperative that the response to disasters is
studied in more detail to highlight factors that contribute to or hinder the effectiveness of interorganizational response and relief efforts. This study is a first attempt to come up with a
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comprehensive list of factors that influence inter-organizational collaborative disaster response at
different levels of governance. Only recently have other scholars such as Ngamassi, Maitland,
and Tapia (2013) studied network effectiveness in the humanitarian relief field using Social
Network Analysis (SNA) tools. The nature of disasters is usually such that a specific area or
region is impacted. The case of the 2010 Floods was different and unprecedented since the whole
country was impacted and all provinces were facing a natural calamity. Thus the scale of the
disaster in terms of the impact, destruction and subsequently, the humanitarian response warrants
this as an important case to study. The findings from this research contribute to improving
disaster policies and plans across different countries and the international arena for improving
disaster risk reduction and mitigation efforts. Factors found to facilitate a successful response in
disasters should be addressed in the mainstream disaster literature and also in professional circles
so that better future policies are designed and implemented for disaster management around the
world.
1.4 Context of the Study
The frequency of natural disasters throughout the world demonstrate the need to study
how different levels of government, sectors, agencies come together and collaborate in ways that
response is effective and timely so that lives are saved and destruction from the disaster can be
minimized. All phases of disaster management, namely, mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery are interconnected and impact how disasters can be managed in effective ways.
However, the focus of this study is on the response stage of managing disasters since this is the
most complex stage in which different agencies are expected to work collaboratively and make
decisions in a timely manner in a state where there is a high level of uncertainty, stress, chaos,
7

and overburdening on existing structures, capabilities and resources (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007;
Paton, 2003; Ritchie, 2004; Benini, 1997). It is at the response stage of a disaster where a single
event leads to cascade-like chain reactions (Helbing, Ammoser, & Käuhnert, 2005). For example
in the case of the Pakistan Floods of 2010, flash flooding in the northern parts of the country led
to cascading events involving blocking of roads, complete destruction of infrastructure such as
bridges, communication disruptions, destruction of crops, and spread of waterborne diseases.
To explore the complexities and challenges of effective disaster response it is important
to study a huge recent disaster. In 2010 the Haiti Earthquake and the Pakistan Floods stood out as
catastrophic events and were referred to as mega-disasters as around 95% of funding by
international agencies in 2010 went to these two events alone (Ferris & Petz, 2011). For this
study the Pakistan Floods of 2010 was chosen as the case study since this disaster was referred to
as the worst disaster in the history of the country (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2010).
Moreover, the UN Secretary General upon visiting the country declared that this disaster was
larger than the accumulated impact of major disasters such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, the 2005
Kashmir Earthquake, the 2008 Nargis Cyclone and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Solberg, 2010).
Moreover, Pakistan is the country where the UN cluster approach was first piloted in 2005 in the
Kashmir Earthquake. It was again applied in the 2010 Floods. The implementation of a UN
response plan in the Pakistan Floods reflects the importance of the role of international
humanitarian and Multi-lateral agencies (MLAs) in response and relief operations. Thus, in order
to understand the multi-layered and multi-level response and governance system in disasters it is
imperative to study a case where the international role is integral.
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1.5 Analytical Approaches
A case study method has been applied in this research. The 2010 Pakistan floods
response network/system is identified through content analysis of various newspapers, situation
reports, and after-action reports using the Social Network Analysis (SNA) tool via UCINET
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The actual response network is analyzed and compared
with existing plans such as the National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) of 2010 by the National
Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in Pakistan and also the UN Initial Response Plan for
the Pakistan Floods that follows the UN inter-agency cluster approach. This analysis is carried
out by developing planned networks through the existing plans and SOPs of responding agencies
included in the NDRP of 2010. The effectiveness is gauged by comparing the actual network
with the existing response plans and also through various network analysis measures such as
relationship measures including centrality measures (Knoke & Yang, 2008), clique analysis, and
visual display. This approach is supplemented with semi-structured interviews of key
institutional representatives that responded to the 2010 Floods. These organizational
representatives and institutions were primarily identified through the networks formulated via
SNA.
1.6 Organization of the Study
This dissertation comprises of six chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction to this
research and includes the statement of the problem, the significance of the study, the research
questions this research sets out to answer, a brief description of the background and context of
the study, and the analytical approach utilized in this research.
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Chapter II describes the theoretical framework applied in this research. This section also
presents a review of the literature on the multi-level nature of disaster response and outlines key
theoretical perspectives utilized in this study. The conceptual model is also developed and
discussed in detail.
Chapter III discusses the context of the study. The risks and vulnerabilities in Pakistan
are briefly discussed along with the disaster management system in the country and the roles and
responsibilities of key responding agencies at the federal, provincial, and district levels. The UN
cluster approach is also discussed. This section also describes the background information on the
Pakistan Floods of 2010 in terms of its impact, devastation and importance.
Chapter IV discusses the methods used in conducting this research. The data collection
methods and the justification of the research methods used are provided in this section. This
chapter discusses the SNA tool and it’s various measures utilized to analyze the response
systems and networks.
Chapter V focuses on the analysis, discussions and key findings of the research. This
section details the results from SNA along with the results of document analysis (reports and
disaster management plans). Alongside this section highlights some results and insights from the
semi-structured interviews.
Chapter VI, the concluding chapter provides an overview of the key findings from the
research, followed by a discussion on the various policy and methodlogical implications of the
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study. The chapter concludes with some recommendations to improve the current system for
responding to disasters in Pakistan and limitations of the current study.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
The previous chapter introduced the problem statement, the research questions, and the
significance and contributions of this research, along with the analytical approach applied in this
research. This chapter provides the literature review and theoretical framework for the research
study. The literature review is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the general
background and literature pertaining to the multi-level structure and collaborative nature of
disaster response. The second section of the literature review discusses the theoretical
perspectives that are applicable to this research and guide the development of the conceptual
framework for this study. The theoretical perspectives applied in this research are focused on
network theory perspectives. The theories used in this research to support network perspectives
are: Resource Dependency Theory, Institutional Collective Action Theory, and Social Capital
Theory. Network perspectives pertaining to the structural aspects of studying and analyzing
networks are also applied. These theoretical perspectives are linked to the multi-level
collaborative response in disasters and propositions and hypotheses for the study are developed.
The last part of the chapter integrates the propositions and hypotheses through a conceptual
framework that guides this study.
2.1 Multi-level Governance and Collaborative Disaster Response
Disasters provide an avenue for “a litmus test for federal, state, and local governments’
effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in managing disasters” (Moe, 2010, p. 330). In
addition to testing the efficiency of different levels of government, disasters also test the capacity
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of non-government players. Disaster response is not restricted to intergovernmental collaboration
and governmental layers but includes cross-sector organizations and international humanitarian
agencies and international governments. The relationships between governance structures are
complex areas to study as relationships span boundaries and sectors (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill,
2000). The concept of multi-level governance can be applied to disaster management. Multilevel governance is defined as a decision-making process that involves the competencies of
multiple players rather than the government or state alone and often extends beyond national
boundaries and includes international or transnational players (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996).
The multi-level governance concept has been applied to economic development and sustainable
development practices and policy formulation. It has been widely applied to the European
integration and development of the European Union indicating the move away from state-centric
governance to multi-level and supranational governance (Marks et al., 1996). More recently,
multi-level modes of decision-making processes are being applied to develop and adopt
mitigation strategies for climate change. The development and adaptation of these policies and
decisions require the coordination at different governance levels (Katherine et al., 2011).
The multi-level governance model emphasizes negotiated and integrated institutional
exchanges that are replacing the hierarchical exchanges in intergovernmental relationships
(Peters & Pierre, 2000). Some critics view this as an approach that would weaken national and
state governments (Marks et al., 1996). However, the complexity of issues and nature of
problems warrants this mode of governance and integrated decision-making. This concept is
applied to describe the multi-level nature of response and the multi-level governance structure
required to address challenges relating to immediate relief and response during disasters. The
13

nature of collaboration in the context of disasters is explored as a multi-level, layered function in
the review of literature provided below. The multi-level response is divided into three layers: the
local/district level, the state/provincial and national level, and the international level of response.
2.1.1 Local/District-Level Collaborative Response
Local and community-level response incorporates local vulnerabilities and local
capacities and capabilities. It also reflects the collective perceptions about risks in the community
and how they collectively deal with emergencies. The community response depends on the
nature of risk and vulnerabilities, the social construction of perceived risks which is based on
shared and collective experience of the community, and the local collaborative and interactive
capacity to work with organizations. Moreover the way in which a community perceives risks
and threats influences the way they mitigate or address those threats (Flint & Luloff, 2005).
The efficiency/effectiveness of disaster response is influenced by the severity of disaster,
type and quantity of resources available, number of organizations and jurisdictions involved, and
the multifaceted response strategies involved. Research shows that the number of jurisdictions
involved is actually positively related to efficiency in response (Comfort, Ko, & Zagorecki,
2004). Local intergovernmental collaboration varies from place to place depending on problem
severity, capacity of management, and structural factors (McGuire & Silvia, 2010). Local
resource capabilities for local disaster management are a function of “institutional resources,
human resources, policy for effective implementation, financial, and technical resources and
leadership” (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui, 2010, p. 441). A study by McGuire and Silvia
(2010) on local emergency management networks covering data of over 400 county level
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disaster management agencies shows that public managers that perceive “problems as severe…
lead high-capacity organizations, and operate in less complex agency structures collaborate more
often and more effectively across governmental boundaries” (p. 279). The study results also
show that a higher level of external collaboration and its effectiveness will result when
organizations responding are lead by managers that not only possess the managerial capacity and
skills to facilitate effective interaction between organizations and players in a network, but are
also involved in external collaboration and partnerships in meeting their organizational mission
and goals (McGuire & Silvia, 2010).
Crisis leadership is an important factor to consider in collaborative response. Successful
response by leaders turns them into heroes and statesmen, while unsuccessful and ineffective
response makes leaders easy scapegoats to bash (Boin &‘t Hart, 2003). Thus, leadership within a
network also influences collaborative response at the local disaster management level. A study
by Choi and Kim (2007) shows that networks in disaster response that identify clear leadership
are effective since participants have a clearer picture of communication flows and leadership
concerns. According to Van Wart and Kapucu (2011) the set of leadership competencies needed
in crisis response situations by senior emergency managers and administrative leaders is fairly
different than leadership competencies in routine situations. According to their findings there is
need for calm but strong leadership that is willing to assume responsibility, exhibits strong
communication skills and the need for a leader who is adept at making decisions during time and
resource constraints. Moreover, to ensure effective response the leader needs to be able to
cultivate a sense of team effort, needs to be able to network and partnership with other entities
and enjoy strong social and communication skills.
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Political or elected leadership has a crucial role to play before and during disasters.
During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there were a lot of coordination problems and confusion
between political players. However, when Hurricane Katrina is compared with the 2004
hurricane season, one observes leadership support for pre-existing mutual aid agreements
between agencies and open communication lines between various local jurisdictions (Kapucu,
2008).
At the community and local level, existing disaster management plans, policies, and
protocols help to guide disaster response. Many scholars suggest that learning can be
institutionalized in the form of plans and policies that are formed after disaster events.
Theoretically pre-planning will improve collaborative results as plans help to define roles and
allow better and quick response in crucial times. Roles and resources do not have to be
determined and negotiated at run-time. Existing plans and policies help to determine
communication and information channels as well (Carley & Harrald, 1997). To ensure
collaborative effectiveness in response, it is important to explore the embedded relationships
between organizations. According to Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) a history of cooperation
between organizations increases the chances of future cooperation and strategic alliances with
each other. Hicklin et al. (2009) study collaborative public management in school districts in
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Their study shows that prior networking and established
collaborating patterns and styles of managers in organizations may influence collaborative
response in uncertain and dynamic situations. These prior collaborative and networking patterns
by managers represent the development of social networking capital, that helps in paying
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“dividends on collaboration in the future, and in particular during unexpected crisis periods” (p.
21).
Misperceptions and misunderstandings about the intergovernmental roles and
responsibilities during disaster response can cause a lot of destruction and chaos during disaster
events. Response in Hurricane Katrina shows that the intergovernmental response was weak
since organizations and entities involved in responding lacked the understanding of their tasks
and roles in the overall response (Schneider, 2008). Thus, effectiveness of response is a function
of intergovernmental cooperation and communication (Comfort, 2007). For an effective
response, relief organizations and officials need to understand their roles and responsibilities and
their links to others involved in the emergency management process. It is also imperative that
they are aware of their roles in typical disasters and also in huge catastrophic disasters
(Schneider, 2008). In theory, and according to plans, the response system may be well-developed
and well-coordinated. However, during actual events, organizations and officials may not restrict
their roles to the pre-established and pre-assigned responsibilities (Schneider, 2008).
Kapucu et al. (2010) discuss that interoperability is key when different organizations are
responding and sharing a large number of different resources amongst them. Interoperability
according to the authors involves an operational and a technical element. The technical element
which is technology-driven supports interoperable operations and fails to function successfully
without the operational structure and culture of sharing and mobilizing resources between
organizations working together. Technical equipment and resources such as GIS maps can aid
effectiveness of response. GIS maps are used in disasters to map power outages and flooding
routes that aid first responders in their operations (Kapucu, 2008). Along with interoperability
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and technical support, Kapucu et al. (2010) also highlight the importance of interpersonal
communication. For successful collaboration, mutual understanding between organizations,
strong interpersonal relations between managers and staff and pre-existing mutual aid
agreements and memorandums of association are important.
Mostly in disasters when plans and protocols break down and demands for resources
increase, emerging and voluntary groups surface to provide disaster response and relief. These
emergent groups operate locally and contain members of relief missions, private organizations
and the civil society (Majchrzak et al., 2007). Thus, structural factors such as pre-existing
coordination plans and national disaster plans, along with non-structural factors such as
adaptability, flexibility and innovation are important factors for a successful collaborative
response to disasters. Thus both discipline and agility have to be incorporated in disaster
response (Harrald, 2006), which makes the task even more challenging.
2.1.2 Provincial/State and National/Central-Level Collaborative Response
Crises are periods of “high threat, high uncertainty, and high politics that disrupt a wide
range of social, political, and organizational processes” (Boin &‘t Hart, 2003, p. 546). True
governance structures reflect power sharing between different entities including political leaders,
government officers, nonprofit managers and civil society groups (Boin &‘t Hart, 2003). Thus, at
the state-level power flows both upwards and downwards. It flows to the local level when plans
are mandated and funds and relief goods are distributed via state level government agencies and
coordination boards. The power and resources flow to the federal level in terms of information
and communication exchange pertaining to updates on operations and relief efforts at the local
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level. Feedback on transparency, accountability and relief goods and funds distribution will also
flow to the federal level via the state level and provincial officers. Thus, the role of states and
provincial level officers is to coordinate and overlook ground response and relief operations.
State level collaboration mostly deals with providing the link between federal/national sources,
plans and funding and the local regions where those resources need to be mobilized and used.
The role of states and provinces are more clearly delineated in developed countries like the US.
For instance, in Australia the state governments have developed emergency management plans
and arrangements that are defined through legislation. Also states provide support by providing
emergency services such as police, fire and health. States are additionally responsible to ensure
that plans and policies are in place to deal with disasters (Abrahams, 2001). However, in
developing countries such as Pakistan, disaster impacts may be largely handled and addresses by
provincial level organizations rather than local level organizations due to a lack of capacity at
local levels (Ainuddin & Routray, 2012).
It is very difficult to separate politics from disaster response (Moe, 2010), in the context
of state-level and federal-level response. At the national level presidential leadership plays an
important role in determining the effectiveness of collaborative disaster response. Presidential
leadership support and President’s communication with disaster relief agencies at the state level
and with governors can expedite disaster relief efforts (Kapucu, 2009). President’s actions and
activities regarding disaster relief requests, presidential declarations and presidential addresses to
the general public in times of crisis are closely monitored by the general public and media
agencies. Thus, presidential and political leadership’s responsibility should not be overlooked in
leading response and relief efforts. By and large, federal level agencies and national disaster
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management agencies are expected to play a leadership role in coordinating response and relief
efforts.
2.1.3 International-Level Collaborative Response
Developing countries rely heavily on international humanitarian organizations and their
leadership during crises events. The United Nations’ ‘cluster system’ is a popular response and
relief approach that is used in huge disasters through which relief agencies coordinate their
efforts in clusters and sectors. The main goal of the cluster system is to provide timely and
coordinated response in disasters. Each cluster is guided by a specific humanitarian service and
is assigned a lead agency to oversee and coordinate efforts and also individuals that are referred
to as cluster coordinators. The ‘cluster approach’ is a top-down, UN centered initiative that aims
to offer timely and effective response and improve coordination between various responding
agencies and actors in huge disasters (Thomas & Rendon, 2010).
Although theoretically this system is an ideal collaborative governance arrangement or
network, practically it is weak. Even though there has been ample structural and organizational
reform in the humanitarian system in recent years, the UN cluster approach continues to lack
effective disaster response capacity (Kapucu, 2011). According to Hicks and Pappas (2006), the
UN system has not been “uniformly successful in ensuring delivery of an effective, reliable, and
well-coordinated response” in humanitarian assistance in disasters (p.42).
The cluster system works to organize relief according to functional operations within
different sectors with a predefined and predetermined leadership. This approach was developed
and implemented with the aim to improve and increase overall efficiency and effectiveness in a
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number of areas such as: global capacity for responding to existing and future crises; predictable
leadership at both the global and local levels; strong partnerships between responding agencies
such as UN agencies, international NGOs and local agencies; accountability and transparency in
relief operations; and strategic prioritization and coordination in implementing various clusters
during emergencies (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] , 2007).
This approach was first implemented and tested in the South Asian Earthquake/Kashmir
Earthquake in October 2005. The challenges identified were: “the lack of a clear geographic and
thematic division of roles and responsibilities, poor inter and intra-cluster communication, weak
cluster leadership, and duplication of efforts” (Hicks & Pappas, 2006, p. 44). After 5 years, the
UN cluster approach was implemented again in Pakistan during the 2010 Pakistan floods.
However, the UN cluster system according to reports was still “ill-prepared, uncoordinated and
under-resourced” (Thomas & Renden, 2010, p. 5). Even after few years of implementation, the
cluster system faces challenges. Some of the key challenges are listed and discussed below.
The Under Capacity of Cluster leads. Cluster leads are responsible for both central level
and local capacity building through various activities such as building personnel rosters,
stockpiling relief goods, and training personnel. Also, the lead agencies work as the ‘provider of
the last resort’ implying that if no other agency in the cluster has the capacity or resources to
provide needed services and relief functions, then the cluster lead is automatically considered
responsible for delivering the service. This is essentially challenging since not all cluster leads
have the capacity nor the expertise and resources to fulfill this commitment in some huge
humanitarian crises (Jahre & Jensen, 2010).
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Cluster leads not only require a certain level of technical proficiency to carry out
coordination tasks effectively but they also need to ensure that all players are operating
according to the roles assigned and delivering in timely and effective manner. This requires
follow up and transparency in the process. There may be a level of conflict between agency
agendas and cluster agendas.
Weak Inter-cluster coordination. Previous evaluations and reports have identified weak
inter-cluster coordination in disasters. Jahre and Jensen’s (2010) evaluation on the logistics
cluster shows that this particular cluster depends on other clusters for information and
transportation. Thus, inter-cluster coordination is very important to ensure an effective response.
The strong emphasis on within cluster coordination between organizations can adversely impact
the development of efficient and effective supply chains that require strong inter-cluster
collaboration during disasters. Internal horizontal coordination has been the focus of
improvements, ignoring the need for and improvements in inter-cluster horizontal coordination
and vertical coordination. Moreover, previous reports and analysis show that some clusters have
performed better than others and this is a direct result of leadership within these clusters. Strong
operational capacity of lead agencies has resulted in better performance of certain clusters. Some
clusters performing well while other not jeopardizes overall inter-cluster coordination.
Reservations by host country governments. There have been instances and events in
which the UN leadership requested the implementation of the cluster approach in certain
countries but the governments of the countries refused to implement the approach. However, the
UN suggests that in case of reservations to implement the approach by host countries it will be
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difficult to arrange for donor support and funding through the UN. The cluster system was
essentially implemented and developed to reduce the fragmented response and lack of
coordination in disaster response. However, this approach has reduced the role of the host
governments in overall response and this threatens governments and its traditional forefront role
in disaster response (Fagen, 2008).
Moreover, while this system is designed to increase predictability, one dilemma that is
faced is the need and urge to develop flexibility in the system that helps clusters adapt to national
and local situations (Mister, 2006). Thus, the integration of national and local actors in the
cluster approach will help to address the flexibility concern as well. Despite the current systems’
weakness, the UN centric international response forms the core response strategy in many
developing nations that do not have the capacity, capabilities, resources and skills to respond
effectively.
The International response to disasters also comprises of response by different countries
and their governments. Humanitarian aid and disaster assistance forms a major part of disaster
response at the international level. Drury et al. (2005) explore the link between disaster
assistance and humanitarian aid, with politics and political influences. There are three major
political connections to disaster assistance decisions: US foreign policy concerns about the
disaster-stricken state, domestic US policies and political climate, and domestic politics within
the disaster struck country. If the disaster struck country is inefficient, corrupt, then
accountability concerns will arise and hinder the smooth flow of funds and aid (Drury et al.,
2005). Cherniak et al. (2010) view relief coordination through an economic frame and suggest
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that international financial stakeholders, such as G8 members will invest a lot in disaster fund
relief efforts but will also want a transparent and accountable process of relief fund distribution.
Another important factor to consider in international response and humanitarian
assistance is the level of media attention the disaster event has managed to attract. The more
salient and critical the disaster is portrayed in the media, the more international assistance and
aid will flow to the disaster-stricken country (Drury et al., 2005). Drury et al. (2005) find that
one New York Times article brings in more disaster aid than the impact 1,500 fatalities would
bring. Thus, the role of media coverage and salience should not be undermined.
The multi-level governance theory proposed and developed by political scientists
(Maldanado et al., 2010) might provide some insight for multi-level governance in response to
disasters. Maldanado et al. (2010) explain the multi-level governance perspective as one that
‘integrates governance issues in the context of both multiple international organizations and
power differentials between the high income nations of headquarters and the low income nations
of field offices’ (p. 10). Literature also suggests ‘the complex, and sometimes contradictory,
authority structures found in multi-level, multi-organizational contexts’ (p. 10). The multilevel
governance concept, which has its roots in the political science field, has been applied to
development agencies and also the international disaster relief organizations. The multi-level
governance concept is important since its value lies in appreciating the complexity and links
between different governance levels.
The decision-making authority in disaster contexts is dispersed through layers. The multigovernance theory had two parts: the vertical dimension which concerns links with higher and
lower government levels and the horizontal dimension which reflects cooperation and
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coordination amongst regional bodies (Maldanado et al., 2010). In developing countries, where
local capacity of managing disasters is weak, local organizations depend on INGOs and other
International humanitarian relief organizations and their services (Moore et al., 2003). Thus the
flow of resources from higher levels to the lower levels in the multi-governance framework is the
most important and crucial factor that binds collaborative organizations together (Maldanado et
al., 2010). Resources can be in the form of financial resources, humanitarian aid, relief teams,
personnel and local project managers to ensure accountability and transparency in relief
provision and goods distributions (Moore et al., 2003).
The development of disaster management systems in lower income countries are marred
by multi-level governance since the systems are defined by many rules and protocols through
which projects and programs are controlled and operated. Mandates flow from higher levels of
government and through International organizations for collaboration. Headquarter-mandated
efforts may translate from coercive pressures to effective and sustainable collaboration in
disaster response and humanitarian relief efforts. According to Maldanado et al., (2010),
“coercion may serve to prime the collaborative pump, bringing local NGOs together, outside of
their inward-looking day-to-day activities, forcing them to think strategically across
organizations to solve big problems” (p. 25 ). Moreover, the political environment for the
coordination of disaster relief continues to be UN-centric. According to Cherniak et al. (2010),
the UN enjoys monopolistic power and decision-making authority in relief efforts. Moreover,
International NGOs seem to be the most central organizations during humanitarian aid response
and operations, especially in developing countries. The 2000 Mozambique Floods response
reflects a hierarchical model of resource allocation as national agencies and local agencies
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depend on the resources and expertise of INGOs. Also INGOs seem to be better positioned to
lead flow of information and coordinate disaster response and relief efforts. However, it would
be naïve to assume that dependence relationships between government organizations and NGOs
and international NGOs and local organizations will be smooth. According to Moore et al.’s
(2003) research conclusion, it was identified that coordination and collaboration was better in the
immediate response stage when the INGOs presence was huge, while coordination weakened in
the recovery period.
The literature identifies that to explore the multiple-level dependencies between
organizations and their varying roles and power structures within collaborative response, we
need to explore collaborative response as a multi-level response and layered function. Multilevel collaborative response explores and identifies different elements and factors that facilitate
or hinder effective collaborative response. Through the literature review we see different
dynamics in play at all three levels explored. There are some consistent themes in each layer of
disaster response such as leadership (political, governmental, and organizational), institutional
support (in the form of mandates and rules, pre-existing plans, protocols and procedures), and the
need for strong networking and partnership avenues. The literature also suggests that during
disaster response resources at all levels are being exchanged both vertically and horizontally
between different entities. These resources are in the form of relief goods and services,
informational exchange, financial resources and grants, technical resources ensuring
interoperability, and human resources involving teams and leaders guiding disaster response.
Moreover, the literature also highlights the importance of pre-existing trust between different
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layers of government agencies both horizontally and vertically that leads to effective response
and recovery in disasters (Kapucu, 2006; Kettl, 2005).
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Collaborative Networks in Response to Disasters
Networks and collaborative settings are being studied in disaster research but do not
qualify to be covered under standard organizational theory due to their dynamic and unique
nature. This has forced disaster researchers to adopt innovative approaches of combing theories
and developing new conceptualizations and using open systems theories (Quarentelli & Dynes,
1977). Interorganizational networks and operational response plans have been studied through
the complex adaptive systems theory perspectives (Kapucu, 2009a; Comfort et al., 2004), theory
of sense-making and organizational learning theory (Kapucu, 2009a). This research uses network
Theory Perspectives which include Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), Social Capital Theory
(SCT), and Institutional Collective Action Theory (ICAT) as they provide a strong foundation to
understand the interdependence of organizations at different layers of disaster response and
relief. These theories discuss resource mobilization and dependencies, institutional support and
networks which can be directly linked to the multi-layered, inter-organizational response in
disasters and provide a strong foundation for understanding the interdependence of organizations
at different layers of disaster response and relief.
2.2.1 Network Theory Perspectives
Collaboration and network management have grown as fields of management as
knowledge has become highly distributed and institutional capacity and frameworks have
become interdependent and complex (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Networks are multi-organizational
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arrangements for addressing issues that cannot be tackled by single organizations. Networks
function in ways and facilitate functions in a manner that lies somewhere in between ‘the
openness of the market and the rigidity of the hierarchy’ (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, p. 305).
According to Jones et al. (1997) the network form of governance will thrive and emerge when
certain conditions exist. Two of the conditions that fit into the disaster management context are:
‘complex tasks under time pressure’ and ‘frequent exchanges among parties comprising the
network’ (p. 918) especially in the response stage of emergency management.
Powell (1990) describes networks as exhibiting “reciprocal patterns of communication
and exchange” (p. 295). The element of exchange in the form of distinctive competencies (skills
and knowledge), and in the form of resources seems to be integral to network structures. Brass et
al. (2004) define a network as “a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship,
or lack of relationship, between the nodes” (p. 795).

Network research focuses on studying the relationships and ties between actors and their
structured patterns of interaction in a network (Krebs & Holley, 2002). Ties in network research
can depict relationships that are based on different attributes and functions such as
communication, friendship, exchange, collaboration (Katz & Lazer, n.d.). Members of a network
maybe be tied with one another through resource sharing, information flows, financial resources,
services and these connections can be both formal (legal or contractual) and informal (trustbased) (Provan et al., 2007). Moreover, relations can be directional (flowing from one node to
the other) or non-directional (that implies a mutual sharing of resources or simply working
together) (Krebs & Holley, 2002). The interactions and relationships taking place within the
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network and the overall network structure can be analyzed through many dimensions such as
centrality, connectivity, network size, brokerage.

There is no single complete network theory ( Galaskiewicz, 2007), but in fact it is
combination of different theories some of which are Resource Dependency Theory, Institutional
Collective Action Theory, and Social Capital Theory.

2.2.1.1 Resource Dependence Theory
The Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) is an open systems theory that applies to
organizations and their behaviors. According to this theory organizations are not self-sufficient
and require resources from other organizations and external sources in order to operate and
survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In 1978 Pfeffer and Salancik wrote a book on the ‘External
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective’, in which they introduced the
RDT. Since their publication, the RDT has been applied to various fields to understand and
explain organizational behavior (Hillman et al., 2009). RDT emphasizes the importance of
resources – “resource needs, resource scarcity, and resource exchange among organizations”
(Johnson, 1995, p. 20). Organizations are involved in dynamic interactions and evolving
interorganizational relations while they manage their resource dependencies (Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer& Salancik, 2003; Hughes, 2003). The theory’s fundamental idea is that
‘organizational survival hinges on the ability to procure critical resources from the external
environment’ (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 167), and that organizations are constrained by a network
of interdependencies with other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). According to Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978) the connections and interdependencies between organizations are
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maintained through associations, legal and institutional rules and tools, supplier relationships and
competitive behaviors.
RDT is used to explain how organizations reduce uncertainty and interdependence in
their environments (Hillman et al., 2009). Organizations are involved in reforming their
dependencies on needed resources by using tools and tactics to reduce uncertainties in the
environment (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Johnson (1995) mentions two strategies that are used
by organizations to reduce uncertainty in their environments and address resource dependence
concerns. These two are: buffering and bridging. Buffering involves protecting an organization’s
boundaries by stockpiling resources. While bridging on the other hand involves changing
organizational boundaries via boundary spanning. This involves building strong alliances and
partnerships with exchange organizations and suppliers and regulators. Interorganizational
relationships such as alliances and agreements and joint ventures lead to “partial absorption of
the interdependencies” (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 4).
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) find the original RDT marred with ambiguities and they
propose changes to the Pfeffer and Salancik’s classic work on RDT. They come up with two
dimensions of resource dependency: power imbalance and mutual dependence which were
paired together in the original theory under interdependence. They argue that these two
dimensions actually work in opposite directions, implying that mutual dependence actually helps
to lead to inter-organizational action and collaboration, while power imbalance hinders mergers
and collaboration.
Proposition 1: Mutual resource dependencies between organizations facilitate
collaborative response.
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Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) also recommend that the study of embeddedness of
relationships between different entities is also important for interorganizational research. The
authors suggest that patterns of interorganizational exchanges can be explained by resource
dependencies and social-structural factors as well, and the use of social capital theory along with
resource dependence will help to achieve this end.
Lin (2002) explores inter-organizational relationships from a resource dependence
perspective in the context of crisis events. Ties have features such as: purpose, direction, content
and strength. In crisis situations the purpose is to access resources. Directions will vary
depending on the flow of resources, however, exchange of resources is involved but this
exchange and the direction of exchange may not by symmetrical. Content of ties reflects the type
of resource and nature of exchange, such as providing personnel or funds or information. The
strength of a tie will be reflected through the frequency of interaction and close connection
between entities (Lin, 2002). If viewed from the individual organizations perspective, when
organizations face huge demands for resources, they rely on closer and stronger ties compared to
their weak ties - this is in line with the bounded rationality view (Lin, 2002).
The idea of inherent power differentials caused due to unequal resource dependencies is
important in the RDT (Hill & Jones, 1992). Power, rather than rationality and efficiency, and
asymmetrical exchange, is used to explain resource dependency in organizations (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003; Johnson, 1995), especially in the context of collaborative disaster response. It
would be interesting to explore power and politics and how they influence interorganizational
collaboration and ties in crisis situations (Lin, 2002).
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A study by Choi and Kim (2007) study five bases of power and apply them to the local
disaster management level, which are: structural power, resource power, actor power, cognitive
power, and political power to understand the power dynamics within emergency management
networks. Structural power relates to formal and informal positions. Informal power, as the
authors describe it, comes from the interactions of actors with other actors in the network while
formal structural power is derived from the hierarchical position one holds in the organization.
The idea of resource-based power is directly in line with the resource-dependency theory and
reflects the organizational and inter-organizational resource dependencies for survival and
functioning of the organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Both power and control are closely
linked in the resource dependence ideas as explained earlier. With important resources, an
organization can both gain power and control of other organizations (Choi & Kim, 2007). Actorbased power reflects the management and coordination skills of managers and coordinators.
Organizations which are focal in managing and coordinating the network and influencing its
direction have actor-based power. Cognitive-based power is a collective process that builds
internal legitimacy. Political-based power reflects organizational politics and the knowledge of
where decision-making and negotiation power lies and which interactions are important to
influence the network. There is interdependence and overlap within these power bases as well
(Choi & Kim, 2007).
In terms of resource dependencies and resource exchanges, disaster response networks
comprise of organizations from different sectors and levels of the government that rely on each
other when faced with capacity constraints. From a vertical response perspective, local
governments rely on the state government when they are unable to cope with disaster response
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and relief. While, state level organizations rely on national and international sources of help
when their capacity to respond is limited. At the horizontal level, a multitude of organizations
from different sectors collaborate and pool resources to provide effective relief to disaster
victims.
Proposition 2: Power imbalances between organizations can both facilitate or hinder
collaborative response
RDT has not been able to fully explore inter-organizational relationships. RDT alone
cannot explain the dynamic nature of power and dependencies in interorganizational relations
and networks (Hillman et al., 2009). Other theories such as collective action and social capital
theories contribute positively to a deeper understanding in the context of disaster response.
2.2.1.2. Institutional Collective Action Theory
The capacity for engaging in solving collective problems depends on the ability to
resolve conflicts and arrive at integrative solutions when ideas and preferences of actors diverge
(Kwon & Feiock, 2010). Cooperation and collaboration between entities takes place when the
potential benefits from cooperating are high and the transaction costs are low. Transaction costs
are costs that prevent institutional players to coordinate and cooperate to reach better decisions
(Feiock & Scholz, 2010). Transaction costs are costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a
cooperative alliance or agreement (Feiock, 2005). According to Feiock et al. (2005) transaction
problems and costs which are a function of community characteristics, political institutions and
inter-organizational networks, hinder inter-local collaboration.
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Proposition 3: High transaction costs such as negotiating between entities and
monitoring agreements hinders inter-local collaboration.
The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework is a helpful tool to understand how
different governments and entities cooperate and compete in decentralized governance systems
(Feiock & Park, 2005). The institutional actors can be collective entities such as the local and
state governments which if acting together can lead to beneficial outcomes that are preferred
over individual institutional outcomes and results (Feiock & Scholz, 2010). According to the
ICA Framework there are four factors which are important to understand costs and benefits of
cooperative arrangements between local players. These four factors are: transaction costs for a
good or service, the contextual characteristics such as demographics and social relationships of a
community, the types of political processes and institutions in the community, and the structure
of inter-local policy networks (Feiock, 2005).
The first factor deals with the characteristics of the good or service for which local
players will coordinate. Cooperative results are easier to measure for services that are measurable
such as water, whereas results are difficult to measure for police and fire services (Feiock, 2005).
The second factor deals with a community’s social, economic and political features that mold
and signal the types of services and goods preferred through cooperation and the gains and costs
of cooperation. Thus, players that enjoy similar community characteristics will have a common
position of mutual dependence. Homogeneity of preferences between intra-jurisdictional players
and different local agencies will increase opportunities for cooperation. The geographical
distance between organizations also plays an integral role in determining whether agencies will
be involved in repeat play and will develop strong interdependencies or not (Feiock, 2005).
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The third factor which is political institutions is very important in determining the
structure of incentives that would encourage local players to be involved in cooperative ventures
(Feiock, 2005; Kwon & Feiock, 2010). For instance, local mandates, regulations and incentives
by local administrators and officials will help in encouraging alliances and partnerships between
diverse local players (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009). According to Feiock and Park (2005), “the
circulation of information on the benefits of joint action reduces uncertainty” (p.13) and will
encourage cooperation between entities. Lack of information costs will also act as an impediment
to achieve collective and collaborative solutions. According to Kwon and Feiock (2010)
information costs include “costs of obtaining information on the range of possible institutional
solutions, the resources of other actors, and the preferences of participants over the possible
outcomes” (p. 878). Thus incomplete information obstructs the realization of benefits and gains
from collaborative action.
Proposition 4: Strong political institutions/mandates that encourage cooperative behavior
lead to a stronger collaborative response.
The ICA framework hypothesizes that the network between local agencies and
organizations plays an integral role in the successful development of local alliances and
partnerships (Feiock et al., 2005). Networks between entities are formed due to repeated
interactions between different government units and departments (Feiock, 2005). In collective
action problems these network structures will help to “facilitate efforts to overcome information
negotiation and enforcement problems and facilitate inter-organizational learning” (Feiock,
2005, p. 27).
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Scholz et al. (2005) describes the role of inter-local networks in solving collective action
problems. They describe two types of network relationships. The first type are ‘credibility
clustering’ relationships that are strong-tie relationships between organizations that increases the
credibility of commitment of network players. The other type is referred to as ‘informationbridging’ and relies on weak ties and relationships between different organizations that share
information to solve the collective action problems. Similarly, there are two conflicting views on
how informal relationships will enhance chances of collaboration. The first view focuses on
closure and embeddedness of relationships between players that share similar ideas and views
(Burt 2000; Coleman 1988). The other view is based on networks and the structural holes theory
(Burt, 2004).
According to the first, traditional view, cohesive ties and network closure helps to
develop and sustain social capital through trust building, relationship-building and cooperative
exchanges. Network closure is believed to sustain relationships and decrease uncertainty of
dependencies and exchanges (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Transaction costs can diminish
because of social capital (Feiock et al., 2005). Pre-existing cooperative relationships between
entities builds social norms and develops social capital which makes joint action easier (Kwon &
Feiock, 2010). According to Ostrom (1998) trust amongst local government leaders and a shared
identity reduces the costs of a collective action problem. Overtime, repeated interactions
between players will increase the credibility of their commitments and will develop a reciprocal
and trusting relationship between entities which will hinder chances of deflection and
opportunism (Feiock, 2005). These repeated relationships will also reduce uncertainty and
transaction costs (Ostrom, 1998).
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Structural hole theory (Burt, 1997), on the other hand, proposes another relationship
between social capital and network structures. The theory proposes that the diversity in players
and information within a network actually contributes to brokerage opportunities since there are
weak links between clusters of organization within a non-cohesive network. Thus, embeddedness
in networks will actually hinder organizational coordination and cohesive ties will pressurize
manages to reciprocate exchange of resources. The high level of cohesive ties and familiarity
with partners decreases availed opportunities of forming newer relationships that address
uncertainties in the environment in better ways. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) refer to this as
‘relational inertia’. Thus, the lack of structural holes hinders flexibility and agility required to
respond to uncertainties in the environment.
Scholz et al. (2008) suggest and hypothesize that an actor will prefer dense and
embedded relationships when credibility of commitment acts as a major obstruction to
collaboration. This will help to reduce enforcement costs and solve problems of credibility.
Whereas an actor will prefer centrally located positions when searching for collaborative
ventures and opportunities serves as a major obstruction to successful collaboration. Figure 1
compares the two types of relationships.
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Figure 1 High Density vs. High Centrality Scenario (Scholz et al., 2008, p. 395).
The application of the ICA framework is common to inter-local and regional agreements
and economic development partnerships (Feiock, 2005; 2009; Feiock et al., 2005; Feiock &
Park, 2005), but is fairly uncommon to disaster and emergency management. However, its
relevance and application to collaborative disaster response should not be overlooked and needs
to be explored.
Effective collaborative response in disasters demands high performance from diverse
actors operating at the local level and poses a clear collective action problem. Research on
creating local capacity to manage disasters and creating resilient communities, proposes that
local organizations should cooperate and collaborate. However, in order to realize the gains to
cooperation and collaboration, these organizations are faced with collective action problems.
Even if organizations enter into agreements, there is opportunity to deflect and become
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complacent. Building capacity for collective action in disasters and in regions vulnerable to
threats involves strong social organizational support and technical investment (Comfort & Haase,
2006).
Nested institutions, local resources and governance networks and institutions are all
important in developing an effective local response (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009). Also since
local agencies and governments have uneven capacities and capabilities and disaster events
create uncertain conditions, networks are needed to ensure collaboration and cooperation
between multiple entities (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). However, these networks and
partnerships between agencies are not free from political and institutional influences, as
discussed by the ICA framework.
2.2.1.3 Social Capital Theory
The study of social capital provides theoretical insights that explain behavior such as
human actions especially collaboration in terms of trust, networks, and norms (Bartkus & Davis,
2009). From a theoretical perspective, social capital can be applied to different levels and units
of analysis such as individuals, organizations, and communities. It can also be applied to the
study of interrelationships between these different levels of analysis (Nahapiet, 2009). This
particular research focuses on the organizational and network level of analysis as collaborative
response of organizations and disaster networks are being studied.
According to Bartkus and Davis (2009), “social capital represents the resources that arise
from relationships and that can accrue to either the individual or the collective” (p. 2). Nahapiet
and Ghoshal (1998) define social capital as ‘the aggregate of resources embedded within,
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available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or
organization’ (p. 243). Ostrom (2009) defines social capital as a ‘set of relationships among
members of a group and the values that they share that enable them to solve collective problems’
(p. 21). There are a multitude of definitions of social capital that exist across various disciplines
and according to Ostrom (2009) most of them emphasize two assumptions: “social capital is a
resource that is available to members of a social network, and social structure is often the type of
capital that all members of a group can access to promote their interests” (p. 17).
Most researchers define and conceptualize social capital in two ways: relationships
structure and relationship content. The structural aspect deals with the network size, the density
of relationships, etc and the content aspect deals with the value-laden side of relationships
involving norms and institutional values. Thus, it is important to explore both aspects for
realizing the full impact of social capital (Bartkus & Davis, 2009). Social capital is not a onedimensional concept. The structural dimension of social capital is the most well researched area.
The structural pattern of ties and relationships are studied in terms of bridging and bonding
behavior and closure and brokerage strategies along with network centrality measures. Many
studies show that actors in central positions within networks will be able to access external
resources (Nahapiet, 2009). The relational dimension of social capital focuses on trust and the
conditions it creates foster cooperation (Nahapiet, 2009; McEvily et al., 2003). Moreover, social
capital and its types do not have a universal definition, they have to be tailored to the context and
nature of the problem which is being tackled (Ostrom, 2009). Thus, when social capital is being
explained in terms of norms and institutions, it needs to be tailored to the collective-action
problem and context at hand.
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Many scholars apply social capital theory to the study of social networks. In fact newer
definitions of social capital incorporate the role of social networks and approach the issue from
the networks perspective (Brass, 2009). According to Helliwell et al. (2009), social capital is
defined as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate
cooperation within or among groups” (p. 87). Thus, focus seems to be more on the network of
relationships and their patterns and content rather than the attributes of the actors (Brass, 2009).
Two strategies through which social networks develop social capital are brokerage and
closure. These both may also be referred to as network forms of social capital (Burt, 2009; Brass,
2009). “Brokerage involves building connections across groups to increase exposure to diverse
opinion and practice”, while “closure involves strengthening connections within a group to focus
the group on a limited set of opinions or practice” (Burt, 2009, p. 39).
The brokerage form of social capital deals with the advantages network players and
entities will be exposed to when they build relationships across structural holes. Thus brokerage
will be measured by coordinating avenues and opportunities provided by structural holes in a
network. Network brokers are those that connect players across structural holes. Thus, brokers
would be those entities within a network that have relations with distinct groups and help to
bridge those distinct and disconnected groups to develop opportunities to enhance performance
or solve collective-action problems (Burt, 2009). Brokerage as a viable strategy is relevant to
extreme situations or situations with a high degree of uncertainty, where new relationships have
to be developed and explored to solve problems.
Closure, as a form of social capital is measured by the “extent to which everyone in a
network is connected to everyone else” (Burt, 2009, p. 46). This kind of network is relevant for
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coordinating work. Embedded ties between entities fosters’ trust and sets expectations for
reciprocal behavior which increases cooperation and sharing of resources (Nahapiet, 2009). In
social capital literature, reciprocity is the governing principle of exchange and is closely linked
to trust (Nahapiet, 2009).
Proposition 5: Organizations that have embedded and pre-existing relationships with
each other and enjoy a high level of trust tend to collaborate together effectively and timely.
Therefore, according to Burt (2009), “social capital is an intersection of two functionally
distinct networks: a ‘differentiating’ network in which people are distinguished by skills and
resources, and an ‘embedding’ network in which people with complementary skills…to better
pursue their interest” (p. 60). Burt’s work is important as it covers the structural aspects of
network connections (Fishman, 2009). However, it is imperative to analyze social ties not solely
from their location in network structures but also through their relational content and value
(Fishman, 2009).
It is interesting to note that many social capital researchers utilize the collective-action
framework to structure and outline their study problems (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Ostrom and Ahn
(2003) also utilize and understand the important links between social capital and collective
action theory and propose three forms of social capital that are important to explore when
studying collective action. These three forms of social capital are: 1) trustworthiness, (2)
networks, and (3) formal and informal rules or institutions. These forms of social capital help to
determine the success and effectiveness of the collective action.
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The intrinsic values of trust and reciprocity are important for behaving collaboratively
and cooperatively for collective action. Networks, as discussed earlier, both in the context of the
collective action theory and social capital theory are relevant and viable forms of social capital.
Institutions as a form of social capital help to foster cooperation by enhancing shared norms of
trust and reciprocity (Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1998, 2009).
Institutional rules can influence ‘behavior directly by establishing mechanisms of rewards
and punishment or indirectly to help individuals govern themselves by providing information,
technical advice, alternative conflict resolution mechanisms, and so forth’ (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003,
p. xviii). Formal and informal rules both come under institutions. According to Grootaert (1998)
social capital includes formal institutions, the rule of law, governments, courts, etc. Some
scholars suggest that formal institutional forms may not be effective methods or tools to resolve
collective action problems. However, Ostrom, and Ahn (2003) suggest that formal institutions
such as a well-structured government, government officials and agents, courts and rule of law are
important sources that help to deal with collective problems. Values of trust and reciprocity will
be influenced by the type of rules within a group of organizations and within a community that
may be set by a polity (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). However, literature does show that informal rules
and working rules that are developed and formed by participants in a self-governing network or
system seem to be more effective and sustainable.
Proposition 6: Strong institutional support (both formal and informal) that encourage
cooperative behavior lead to a stronger collaborative response.
All in all social capital theory is becoming a valuable theory of cooperation as it provides
insights about collaboration and networking advantages. Researchers are now beginning to
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realize social capital’s potential and application to complex and situations marred by uncertainty
(Nahapiet, 2009). Research and theoretical views have arrived at the view that social capital is a
valuable collective resource which is developed or contained in social connections and social
networks that connect interdependent players together (Kramer, 2009).
2.2.1.4. Network Structure
Network analysis is a popular tool that is being used to study structural relationships
between organizations within networks. Although many studies have explored the structural
aspects and measures of networks, very few studies have aimed to link them to overall
effectiveness of the network (Milward & Provan, 1998). Network analysis helps to identify the
structure of the network, the communication lines and information flows, identify central players
and peripheral players and also helps to explore the weak links and strong links within the
network. It helps to identify the density of relations and preferred cliques and subgroups within
a network as well. However, the challenge of connecting the various measures and analytic
results to network effectiveness remains a difficult terrain to explore (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011).

There are some structural aspects that help to examine networks at the organizational or
egocentric level, and there are some that depict network-level qualities and outcomes. Centrality
measures reflect organizational and egocentric qualities in the network (Provan et al., 2007) and
are valuable measures that explain how much social capital exists, flows and develops within a
network (Furst et al., 2001). Popular centrality measures utilized in research are explained below:

Degree Centrality: The measure of degree centrality shows the number of direct links an
organization has with other organizations in the network. In-degree centrality measures links that
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flow to an organizations and out-degree measures the links being sent out to other organizations
(Provan et al., 2007). Degree centrality reflects how much social capital is directed to individual
nodes. An agency with high degree centrality reflects high level of embeddedness in the network
(Furst et al., 2001) and the higher the degree centrality of an actor the more powerful and
influential it is in the network (Analytic Technologies, 2008). Usually in emergency networks
the coordinator agency is the one with a high level of degree centrality and positional power
(Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). Players with a high level of degree centrality will have many
relations with other agencies and will have access to many resources and sources of information
(Rowley, 1997). These actors will be viewed as influential members of a network that mobilize
the overall network and its functioning but this requires a lot of energy, burden and capacity to
maintain the large number of ties (Prell et al., 2009).

Closeness Centrality: Closeness centrality considers the shortest path of connecting a
focal organization to any other organization within the network. Closeness centrality considers
indirect connections as valuable connections for exchange and flow of information and resources
(Provan et al., 2007). High closeness centrality shows that a player has the shortest aggregate
distance/path to all other actors within the network. This reflects low dependence on brokers and
intermediaries. Also high closeness reflects that an agency can spread information and send
resources quickly and easily throughout the network (Rowley, 1997).

Betweeness Centrality: Betweeness centrality depicts circular and closed relational
patterns (Furst et al., 2001). Betweenness centrality is also another very important structural
measure that shows how an organization’s/individuals position lies between others within the
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network. Intermediary and gatekeeper roles and agencies can be identified through this measure
(Provan et al., 2007). A high betweeness centrality score shows that all actors must go through
this organization to access resources and communicate as this organization will have a large
control over actors and resource flows (Rowley, 1997). According to Kapucu and Demiroz
(2011) a high mean measure of betweeness is not positive for emergency response networks as
there is a high chance of breakdown of communications between subgroups and different actors
of the network.

Examining and studying whole networks (multiple organizations with multilateral ties)
provides information about how networks have evolved, how they are managed and how
collective goals are reached. Thus, network-level structural aspects, measure the overall network
outcomes. Centralization or density of a whole network would influence network outcomes such
as overall sustainability of the network and the development of capacity of the network to
achieve its goals (Provan et al., 2007). The following structural measures are important in
influencing overall network effectiveness.

Network Density: Density of the network measures overall connectivity among agencies
in the network. What level of density is effective for achieving the goals of the network? Density
is measured as a ratio between the existing number of ties that link actors together and the total
number of possible ties when each node were tied to every other node within a network. As
density in the network increases, information exchanges and communication flows in the
network more efficiently. However, when density may be low a network will be sparsely
connected, containing isolates and cliques which will restrict overall communication flows and
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information and resource exchange within the whole network (Rowley, 1997). However, higher
density would put coordination strains on network members which may have varying capacities
to coordinate and collaborate (Provan et al., 2007). A density score of 1 shows that all actors in
the network are directly tied to each other and a density score of 0 shows a highly dispersed and
fully disconnected network (Prell et al., 2009).

Network Centralization: Centralization or decentralization reflects whether the network is
structured in a way that few organizations are centrally located (like a hub-and-spoke network)
or in a dispersed fashion where links are spread out more evenly throughout the network (Provan
et al., 2007). According to Furst et al. (2001) hierarchical networks with few central actors
having high social capital may prove to be less productive and innovative as they only have the
ability to combine limited resources from limited actors. Interpretation of centralization shows
that a score of 0 implies a fully connected network, where all actors are directly connected to
each other (Prell et al., 2009).

Network Power: The concept of network power is linked very closely with the concept of
network centralization. According to Agranoff and McGuire (2001) power in networks can both
inhibit and facilitate collaboration. They recommend studying the role of power in network
effectiveness. If some actors within a network do not have the capacity, status and resources to
contribute equally with other actors, then the network management process will be manipulated
or lead by stronger, more powerful, central actors (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

Structural Holes: Fragmentation and structural holes within the overall network will also
reflect important aspects of the overall network. Structural holes depict fragments of
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unconnected organizations and loose connections to clusters and cliques within the network
(Provan et al., 2007). Holes and weak ties are important since diverse information and new
innovative ideas flow through them and actors within the network can access diverse and varied
pools of information and resources (Prell et al., 2009).

Cliques: Cliques are clusters that show cohesive, strong ties between three or more
organizations. The overall clique structure of a network also helps to identify how many cliques
exist and which types of agencies are involved (Provan et al., 2007). Overlaps in cliques and
multiple subgroups need to be considered as they indicate the element of multiplexity that
promotes relationships of trust and stability (Furst et al., 2001). Multiplexity shows how one
organization may have multiple relationships and links with other partners and even if one link
breaks, the other links keep the relationship sustainable. Thus, both organizational level
measures and network level measures can be used to analyze whole networks and their
operations.

As suggested earlier, two types of measures can be used: ego and network measures. Similarly,
two types of different analysis will determine whether ego measures may be employed or whole
network measures are utilized. Thus, the type of research and variables being studied , as shown
in Figure 2, will determine what measures are appropriate for analysis. When studying network
governance and addressing collective problems, it is important to study both bilateral dyadic
relationships and multilateral ties that reflect whole networks (Moynihan et al., 2012).
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Table 1Typology of Interorganizational Network Research (Source: Provan et al., 2007, p. 483)
Dependent Variable/Outcome
Independent

Individual Organizations

Collectivities of
Organizations

Variable/Input
Organizational
variables
Relational or network
variables

Impact of organizations on other
organizations through dyadic
interactions
Impact of a network on individual
organizations

Impact of individual
organizations on a
network
Whole networks or
network-level
interactions

Robins et al (2011) analyze a networked governance system and propose certain
structural aspects of networks as preconditions for the effective governance and performance of
networks. According to their research relational and structural embeddedness and agreement of
goals and actions amongst network players are integral for effective network governance. They
argue that certain structural properties and configurations of networks can lead to, inadequate
and sub-optimal performance and results. They claim that the right structure of a network is a
necessary condition for effective performance. The next section deals with network performance
and effectiveness.

2.2.1.5 Network Effectiveness
Interorganizational networks have become commonplace for delivering and managing
services, however the assessment and evaluation of effectiveness remains to be a difficult
endeavor. Provan and Milward (2001) suggest that evaluation should be a multi-tiered process
and should contain three levels of analysis: community, network and organization/participant
levels. At the community level indicators such as cost to community, developing social capital,
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public perceptions should be considered as effectiveness criteria. At the network level
membership growth, range and duplication of provision of services, multiplexity, sustainability
of the network should be considered. At the agency/organization level resource acquisition and
access, survival of agencies, cost to agencies, etc may be considered. Depending on the goal and
mission of the network, an appropriate effectiveness criteria can be developed at each level.

Proposition 7: Membership growth, range of services/diversity, duplication of provision
of services, and multiplexity of relationships affect overall network effectiveness/collaborative
effectiveness.

Effectiveness of networks has been operationalized in different ways by different
scholars. Very few studies have explained network structural properties and linked them to
effectiveness of networks (Provan & Sebastian, 1998). Different collaboration structures and the
nature of tasks are believed to contribute to the effectiveness of networks (Bryson et al., 2006).
Krebs and Holley (2002) define effective networks to have certain characteristics such as:
homophily exists within the network (common goals, common attributes, and shared governance
structures link nodes together); element of diversity is integral to develop and sustain
connections and links to diverse nodes and groups for innovative results; robustness of networks
exists (several paths between nodes exist) so that when information flows and communication
channels are disrupted between certain nodes, the network and communication channels still
exist and connect nodes; shorter average path lengths exist (quick and accurate processing of
information) in the network with the power of indirect connections and ties (the connection of
two nodes through more than one intermediary); and strong hubs (nodes with multiple direct
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connections for dispersing timely information), brokers (nodes that act as liaisons and connect
disconnected parts of a network) and boundary spanners (nodes connecting two or more
groups/clusters and essentially serving as bridges) exist in the network to make it functional,
growing and sustainable.

Similarly, Robins et al. (2011) also suggest that an effective network requires structures
that facilitate the development of trust and collaboration between entities and agreement on
shared goals. Informal ties and relationships are bound to develop around the formal network
structure that is prescribed through legal documents or mandates. They also suggest that
structural properties such as: “the presence of reciprocation in network exchanges, indicating
relational embeddedness; and the presence of triangulated exchanges, indicating structural
embeddedness” (p. 1297) are important preconditions for effective performance of networks.

Proposition 8: Structural features such as robustness within the network, shorter average
path lengths, strong hubs, brokers and boundary spanners contribute positively to overall
network effectiveness/collaborative effectiveness.

Some studies focusing on mental health policy networks reflect that networks centralized
around lead organizations are more effective compared to highly dense networks (Provan &
Milward, 1995), and another study concludes that strong cliques within networks play an
important role in achieving the overall goals of the network (Provan & Sebastian, 1998).
Kapucu and Demiroz (2011) evaluate the performance of emergency response networks by
exploring the structural aspects of the network. However, they suggest that this kind of analysis
is possible when a planned network structure for response exists with which the actual response
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network may be compared. Thus, it is important to explore which structural configurations
enhance effective collaborative response in disasters.

Visual assessment and analysis of networks helps to understand the pattern of
relationships between members of a network. Identifying central players within a network help to
see where information and decision-making power lies (Cross et al., 2002), and how that be
altered or enhanced to strengthen the effectiveness of response. Moreover, identifying peripheral
players within a network and developing ways to engage and connect them in better ways so that
expertise, skills and resources within the network are utilized in a better and effective way is also
very important. Also identifying points and nodes within a network that show functional and
operational fragmentation (through sub-groups) can provide important information about the
network and its performance. Thus, social network analysis can be used as a diagnostic tool for
identifying patterns of relationships in a network and how these relationships can be improved to
increase overall effectiveness of a network (Cross et al., 2002).
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2.3 Conceptual Framework

Network Structure (robustness,
shorter average path lengths, strong
hubs, brokers, boundary spanners,
Membership growth, diversity,
duplication of provision of services,
and multiplexity of relationships)

affect overall network
Network
effectiveness/collaborative
Capacity
(Network ties between
agencies,
effectiveness.

interoperable structures,)
connectedness, trust,
communication, new partnerships,
and relationship-building activities)
Leadership Support
(Managerial and political leaders
encourage and advocate
collaboration, leaders are active
collaborators, and have skills and
competencies for disasters)
Institutional Support
(Formal and informal rules for
supporting collaboration, low
transaction costs in partnerships
and agreements, incentives, plans
and policies to collaborate)

Collaborative
Response
Effectiveness
(High collaborative
activity through
cliques or closely
following existing
disaster response
plans)

Organizational Resource
Dependencies
(Partnerships to exchange
resources – personnel, financial,
technical, etc, reciprocal and
mutual resource exchanges)

Figure 2 Conceptual Map for Inter-organizational Collaborative Response in Disasters
The conceptual map in Figure 1 integrates the study hypotheses, the literature findings
and the theoretical views discussed in the previous section. The conceptual framework
hypothesizes that collaborative response effectiveness in disasters is a function of and is
influenced by the structure of a response network, networking capacity of responding
organizations, the leadership support provided by political and government leaders and
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organizational leaders to encourage and lead efforts that involve collaboration in disaster
response, the institutional support (both in the form of formal and informal processes and rules)
and the inter-organizational resource dependencies.
Network structure reflecting robustness, multiplexity, diversity and range of services
provided, and membership growth all influence overall collaborative effectiveness of the
network. Networking capacity is an important and major influential factor contributing to
collaboration and response effectiveness is derived from the Social Capital Theory and the
Institutional Collective Action Theory. Both theories emphasize the importance of trusting and
pre-existing relationships between stakeholders and organizations that will collaborate to solve
collective action problems. Institutional support as an important construct in the conceptual
framework is derived through the political institutions and their role in the Institutional
Collective Action (ICA) Theory and institutions as a form of social capital in the Social Capital
Theory. Organizational resource dependencies as an important and foundational construct has
been developed directly from the Resource Dependency Theory. Moreover, last but certainly not
the least, leadership support as an integral concept and construct in the study has been briefly
touched in the theoretical perspectives presented but is more pronounced in the disaster
management literature as reflected through this chapter.
2.4 Hypotheses
The hypotheses derived from the literature review and theoretical propositions are as
follows:
Hypothesis 1: Network structure influences overall effectiveness of response networks.
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There have been several studies that have studied the structure of individual teams and
have concluded that network structure helps or obstructs performance and effectiveness. Mostly
research has concluded that dense interpersonal ties and relationships help to achieve goals in a
better way (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006). Theoretically speaking, this conclusion makes sense but
does this translate in situations where the team or network is comprised of different players who
come together for a short span of time to meet specific goals and are faced with time constraints
and capacity constraints. What type of network structure is ideal for disaster response? A
cohesive network or one with structural holes, or simply a mix of both depending on the
functional and operational requirements of the network at a specific point in time. Some research
also suggests that the most resourceful and powerful players should employ central positions in
the network so performance can improve. However, this may be constrained by the absorptive
capacity or capabilities (Tsai, 2001) of the neighboring agencies in the response network.
Hypothesis 2: Networking capacity of organizations positively impacts collaborative
response effectiveness.
Collaborative capacity has been understood as the ability to successfully engage with
different agencies and has been driven by various factors such as the mind-set of those managers
involved in the collaborative process and the techniques and strategies applied in the process to
achieve ends (Weber & Khademian, 2008). Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) define levels of
collaborative capacity as a – member capacity, relational capacity, organizational capacity and
programmatic capacity. When operationalizing networking capacity, the element of interest in
this study is the relational capacity between agencies that is depicted through the strength of ties
between agencies, and according to social capital theory, the level of trust between agencies
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(Nahapiet, 2009). Both types of exchanges between members of the network and the level of
trust between them influences the collaborative capacity (Weber et al., 2007), or the networking
capacity of members. Programmatic collaborative capacity and achieving the goals of a
collaborative arrangement will also be influenced by the level of interoperability that exists
between agencies.
Hypothesis 3: Leadership support positively impacts collaborative response
effectiveness.
This hypothesis is developed through the literature on multi-level disaster response. All
three levels – National-International, Provincial, and local level response identify leadership –
either political or organizational as an important factor in mobilizing an effective response. Also
media pays a lot of attention to what roles prominent leaders are playing in the initial response.
Are UN leaders making the right kind of appeals? Are government leaders on board and actively
participating in ground relief operations? Thus, this is an important dimension to explore in the
study.
Hypothesis 4: Institutional support positively impacts collaborative response
effectiveness.
Through the literature and through the ICA framework it has been established that the
type and nature of institutional rules and policies can either facilitate response or make the
mobilization of effective relief and response more cumbersome and problematic. ICA theory
identified transaction costs in partnerships and agreements to play an important role in
determining the outcomes of collaborative activity. Thus, institutional support can take the form
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of formal plans and policies in place, the creation and effective management of appropriate funds
for quick mobilization of relief goods and services, arrangements such as relaxing visa
requirements for international relief teams all fall under the type of institutional support
available.
Hypothesis 5: Organizational resource dependencies positively impact collaborative
response effectiveness.
In terms of resource dependencies and resource exchanges, disaster response networks
comprise of organizations from different sectors and levels of the government that rely on each
other when faced with capacity constraints. From a vertical response perspective, local
governments rely on the state government when they are unable to cope with disaster response
and relief. While, state level organizations rely on national and international sources of help
when their capacity to respond is limited. At the horizontal level, a multitude of organizations
from different sectors collaborate and pool resources to provide effective relief to disaster
victims.

Proposition 7, 8 and 9 are integrated in Hypothesis 1 since they all deal with the
structural aspects of networks. Proposition 5 is reworded as Hypothesis 2 as networking capacity
is operationalized to depict the strength of ties between agencies, the level of trust between
agencies. Alongside proposition 5, the discussion on interoperability of systems in agencies in
the literature review section is also part of the Network capacity construct. Hypotheses 3 is
derived from the literature review of leadership in disasters literature. The theme and importance
of leadership and political support has been prevalent in all three stages of governance (local,
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state and national, and international). Thus, hypothesis 3 identifies leadership and political
support to positively impact collaborative response. Proposition 3, 4 and 5 are integrated in
Hypothesis 4 that hypothesizes the relationship between institutional support and collaborative
response. Last but the least, proposition 1 and 2 are integrated under hypothesis 5 that deals with
organizational resource dependencies.

2.5 Summary
A collaborative response ensures that services are delivered to disaster victims in a timely
and effective manner (Robinson et al., 2006). Coordination in response helps to avoid
duplication by pooling resources from different organizations and across sector boundaries
(Kapucu, 2008). Disaster management literature shows that a lot goes into ensuring that a
collaborative and effective response is achieved in disaster events. Pre-disaster plans and
policies, trust and pre-existing agreements and memorandums of understanding between
responding agencies across horizontal and vertical jurisdictions, the clarification and
understanding of roles and responsibilities, the sharing of resources and mutual exchange before
and during disasters, and strong interoperable communications and information exchange
between entities are some of the reasons found in literature that influence effectiveness of
disaster response. Moreover, the literature also highlights the importance of leadership both at
the higher political and elected level and the organizational and managerial level. Leadership is
an important dimension to explore in disasters and the next chapter will address this dimension
along with other dimensions in the context of the Pakistan Floods of 2010. The literature and the
theoretical framework developed through theories and study hypotheses shows that collaborative
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response effectiveness in disasters is a function of network structure, networking capacity of
responding organizations, institutional support, leadership support, and organizational resource
dependencies and exchanges. The following chapter will provide an overview of the disaster
management system in Pakistan along with the overview of the scale and consequences of the
Floods of 2010.
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
This chapter provides the background information on the case of the Pakistan Floods of
2010. 1 This chapter also describes the disaster management system in Pakistan and outlines its
path of development since Pakistan’s inception in 1947. The disaster management system
outlines the formation and leading role of NDMA and the important role MLAs such as the
United Nations (UN), through its cluster approach have played in recent disasters within the
country. The Armed Forces in Pakistan also play a forefront role in the disaster response and
relief landscape and this chapter provides a brief overview of their role in recent disasters in
Pakistan. The chapter also briefly discusses the development of the 2010 National Response Plan
and identifies key partners in managing disasters. While discussing the role of NDMA in overall
disaster management, the provincial and district disaster management structure in the province of
Punjab are also described.
3.1 Hazards and Vulnerabilities in Pakistan
Pakistan is a country that faces great threats posed by manmade and natural disasters.
Natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, drought, and cyclones
1

Part of this chapter is being published as a book chapter. The reference for the book chapter is: Khosa, S.

(2014). Re-development, recovery and mitigation after the 2010 catastrophic floods: The Pakistani
Experience. In N. Kapucu, & Tom, K. L (Eds.), Disaster & Development: Examining Global Issues and
Cases. New York, NY: Springer
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along with threats caused by civil conflicts, terrorism, health epidemics, oil spills, urban fires,
and challenges associated with a high number of internally displaced populations (IDPs) occur
quite frequently in the country. Pakistan lies on a seismic belt and as a result experiences
earthquakes pretty often but of small magnitude. Pakistan’s long coastline also increases its risks
to potential tsunamis and cyclones (Khan & Khan, 2008). Pakistan is also one of the top ten
countries in Asia that will suffer due to climate change (Amir, n.d.).
Khan and Khan (2008) suggest that floods are one major hazard “against which an
effective protection network of dykes and flood water regulatory infrastructure has been built
over the years” (p. 9). Prior to the large-scale, unprecedented devastation caused in the 2010
Floods, flood events of 1950, 1992, and 1998 have been massively destructive as well.
According to Khan and Khan (2008) floods have hit all provinces ranging from riverine
flooding to flash floods and landslides in both mountainous northern areas and flat areas in the
provinces of Sindh and Punjab. In Pakistan floods happen regularly in the monsoon months from
July to September. These floods originate from the Bay of Bengal and pass through lower central
India into the northern parts of Pakistan. The mountain ranges in the north of Pakistan help as a
recurrent source providing inflow to rivers (Khan & Khan, 2008). The next section lays out the
specifics of the existing disaster management system in the country.
3.2 Disaster Management System in Pakistan
In Pakistan the approach to managing disasters has largely been reactive. The long-term
vision of managing and mitigating disasters is not in place but rather a management style dealing
with quick-fixes is applied (Khan & Khan, 2008). After every disaster resources are utilized for
relief and recovery efforts rather than employing risk reduction and mitigation strategies. The
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disaster management system and the structure in Pakistan is three tiered - divided into
national/federal, provincial/state, and district/local levels.
3.2.1National-Level Disaster Management
In October 2005 Pakistan experienced one of its worst natural disasters – a 7.6 magnitude
earthquake that resulted in the death of 80,000 people and loss of 3.5 million of people’s
dwellings (Khan & Khan, 2008). Prior to the 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan, no single central
organization was responsible for overlooking and mobilizing disaster response and relief efforts.
By far the most important and pivotal institutional change came about after the massive
destruction caused by the 2005 Earthquake. The National Disaster Management Authority
(NDMA) was created in 2006 (Zaidi, 2012). Thus, the 2005 earthquake served as a ‘focusing
event’ for Pakistan and led to new legislation and the creation of a central body to manage
disasters. Ordinance No XL of 2006 was issued by the government which set up a body for
oversight and developing disaster management policies and plans called National Disaster
Commission. This body was chaired by the Prime Minister. Alongside, this ordinance also set up
the NDMA and its provincial branches to implement plans and policies and coordinate disaster
management and response efforts (Young et al., 2007).

The NDMA in Pakistan is the central body responsible for leading and coordinating
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts by different organizations which include
different government departments, international agencies and donors, and the military. NDMA is
also required to activate the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) during the response
phase of managing a disaster.
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NDMA is tasked to coordinate the response of the federal government and can request
any government department or agency to mobilize resources immediately. During response it is
required to provide information about the initial assessment and damages that have been caused
and issue situation reports to the Prime Minister, Provincial Disaster Management Authorities
(PDMAs), and Armed Forces. The NDMA plays an important role in coordinating activities with
the provinces as well. It is required to collect and gather information from the PDMAs on the
damages and needs assessments so it can quickly arrange for the required relief goods. The
agency is also tasked to provide a complete assessment of damages and needs for recovery and
reconstruction so that relevant multi and bilateral donors and agencies such as UN agencies and
INGOs can support response and relief efforts (National Disaster Management Authority
[NDMA], 2010).

Thus, NDMA, according to the National Disaster Response Plan of 2010, plays an
important role in a number of response operations and functions. The Figure 3 below depicts the
roles, links, interactions and partnerships of NDMA with other agencies. The NDMA plays a
leadership role in coordinating response and relief efforts and is tasked to develop working
relationships with line ministries and departments, international agencies, and provincial level
agencies and departments (NDMA, 2010).
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Figure 3 NDMA and Key Partners in the Planned Response System
In addition to NDMA, the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) is tasked to coordinate
humanitarian donations (Kronstadt, Sheikh, &Vaughn, 2010). There is also Federal Flood
Commission (FFC) which is responsible for flood risk management and for developing and
implementing a National Flood Protection Plan and providing timely forecasts and warnings in
case of a disaster. The policy creation organization for risk management is the National Disaster
Management Commission (NDMC) (ADB, 2010).
3.2.2 Provincial Disaster Management
Just like the disaster management structure in the United States has state and local level
emergency management organizations, in Pakistan there are Provincial Disaster Management
Authorities (PDMAs) at the state/provincial level and there are some District Disaster
Management Authorities (DDMAs) at the district/local. All provinces in the country have
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established PDMAs, but not all districts in the country have DDMAs. Only those districts have
established DDMAs that have local capacities and capabilities to develop and operate them
(ADB, 2010).
During the Floods of 2010 not all provinces had a fully functional PDMA as well. Punjab
had not developed a fully functional PDMA in line with the 2007 NDMA ordinance. It was
during and after the floods that the PDMA was fully developed and became functional. Although
PDMA was not formally established in the province, a Flood Relief Commission had been
established in the Punjab Province. The provincial government headed by Chief Ministers is
active in disaster response and relief efforts along with provincial departments such as Provincial
Departments of Health, Irrigation, and other relevant departments.
The PDMA, according to the 2010 National Disaster Response Plan is tasked to activate
the Provincial Emergency Operation Center (if one exists), or any appropriate regional
emergency operations center. The provincial agency is also tasked to provide early warnings to
relevant agencies and stakeholders along with launching an early response. The provincial body
is required to carry out situation and damage assessments and respond in a relevant manner
(NDMA, 2010).
The PDMA also plays a liaison role connecting the DDMA with the NDMA. It identifies
the needs and damages at the district level through DDMAs and shares this information with the
NDMA and plans accordingly to mobilize resources and relief goods. Apart from planning and
damage assessment, the agency plays the direct role of providing food and non -food items
(NFIs) to the impacted regions. It also coordinates closely with the provincial departments, the
NDMA, and the Armed Forces. The Authority also networks with the INGOs and NGOs, UN
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agencies, and charities to ensure quick response and relief. It is required to provide daily updates
and situation reports to the provincial Chief Minister, Governor, NDMA, and the Armed Forces
(NDMA, 2010). Thus, similar to the role of the NDMA at the federal level, the PDMA is also
playing multiple roles and is involved in a number of response functions such as damage and
situation analysis, mobilization of food and non-food items, and distribution of funds.

Figure 4 PDMA and Key Partners in the Planned Response System

3.2.3 District Disaster Management
At the district levels, most districts still lack the establishment of DDMAs and so District
Coordination Officers (DCOs) are tasked to play an important role along with local government
division Commissioners. On paper and through established plans the DDMAs are responsible
for, first and foremost, activating the District Emergency Operations Center (DEOC). The
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DDMA is tasked to inform all district level departments and relevant agencies in the case of a
disaster threat. It should also inform the NEOC and PEOC of a disaster situation. One of the key
response functions of the DMA is the evacuation of areas that might be disaster prone. After a
disaster strikes the DDMA should provide a damage assessment and needs assessment and share
it with PDMA and NDMA. It should also coordinate with the PDMA and NDMA to provide
appropriate relief resources (NDMA, 2010).
Apart from planning evacuation and carrying out needs assessments, the agency should
be involved in mobilizing resources for providing food and NFIs and medical assistance in
affected regions. It should also be involved in the deployment of relevant relief and rescue teams.
It is at the district level that the DDMA should coordinate and activate relief camps and mobilize
volunteers for relief operations. The DDMA needs to also partner with I/NGOs, UN agencies,
charity groups, and agencies to provide timely relief and response. Additionally it is required to
prepare and share situation reports with PDMA, NDMA, the Armed forces along with preparing
recovery plans and submitting them to the PDMA and NDMA (NDRP, 2010). It is interesting to
observe that according to the plans a DDMA is essentially run by the district government, and
not a separate official trained in emergency and disaster management. Also on a day-to-day
basis, it is fairly difficult to maintain DDMA as a fully functional agency.
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Figure 5 DDMA and Key Partners in the Planned Response System

3.2.4 Disaster Management Plans and Policies
Important legislation and existing structures include the West Pakistan National
Calamities Act 1958 that focuses on organizing relief and response operations. An Emergency
Relief Cell (ERC), a cabinet division cell was created in 1971 to coordinate and monitor disaster
response at the federal level and also provide financial resources to provincial governments
during a disaster and also to foreign countries experiencing major disasters (NDMA, 2010).
In 1974 the ERC developed a national disaster plan which outlined responding agencies
and the procedures for relief operations. However, this plan was never activated and put into
action (Zaidi, 2012). A National Disaster Risk Management Framework was published in 2007.
This framework was created to guide the development of disaster management plans and policies
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along with strengthening and building the capacity of existing disaster management institutions
in the next five years. This framework lists the UN under other key stakeholders and explicitly
states that the UN agencies have to work closely with the NDMA and work in accordance with
the policies set out by NDMA (Young et al., 2007).
Just before the devastating Floods of 2010, NDMA had created and published another
plan called the National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP). However this plan was new and its
execution was not possible with the existing apparatus and capacity of disaster management
organizations at the national, provincial and district levels (Zaidi, 2012). The 2010 NDRP aimed
at solving the issue of coordination difficulties in large-scale disaster response and at involving
all major stakeholders to the process of developing policies and plans in their respective areas of
jurisdiction (Dorosh et al., 2010). The NDRP document outlines the roles and responsibilities of
government bodies and other partnering agencies at every level of operation according to their
respective areas of jurisdictions. Standard operating procedures for various relief functions and
responding agencies is also described in the document (NDMA, 2010; Zaidi, 2012). The
institutional framework set out in NDRP is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 6 Disaster Management Framework (Source: NDMA, 2010, p. 18)
Acronyms: NDMC - National Disaster Management Commission, NDMA - National Disaster Management
Authority, ADMC - Army Disaster Management Cell, CDMC - Corps Disaster Management Cell, DDMC Division Disaster Management Cell, PDMA - Provincial Disaster Management Authority, SDMA - State Disaster
Management Authority, NADMA - Northern Area Disaster Management Authority, ICTDMA - Islamabad Capital
Territory Disaster Management Authority, and FATA DMA - Federal Administered Tribal Area Disaster
Management Authority

The framework reflects that NDMA is the focal organizations responsible for disaster
management. The NDMC is the planning and policy making body while NDMA is the
implementation body. NDMA works is close coordination with line ministries and divisions at
the federal level along with donor organizations. At the provincial level the PDMAs are
responsible for developing regional and state level risk reduction plans and implementing them
in accordance with the national level plans and policies. They are also responsible for ensuring
that district level plans have been made and are being implemented.
Although the new response plan and the recent experience with disasters has helped to
develop national and provincial disaster management authorities and offices there is need to
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develop the capacity of these institutions (Dorosh et al., 2010). Therefore in order to enhance
implementation of legislation and plans on disaster management and to increase the capacity of
responding agencies and offices at the district, provincial and federal level financial resources
must be provided (Zaidi, 2012).
The response capabilities to handle catastrophic disasters such as the 2005 Kashmir
Earthquake and the 2010 Floods are weak in Pakistan. The country relies heavily on the Army
and the humanitarian community for support and relief operations (Amir, n.d.).The Pakistan
Army plays a major role in providing immediate response through sear and rescue and
evacuation operations (Khan & Khan, 2008). It helps by providing relief good to calamity-struck
areas and regions that can be reached via helicopters and choppers only. The Flood Commission
also plays an integral role in monitoring the threat of floods by evaluating the water levels at
dams and barrages and by communicating closely with all provincial governments in case of
irregular and unusual discharge of water level. It also maintains contacts during and after the
floods (Khan & Khan, 2008). For the last few years the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) has proved to be a strong partner and leader
in many respects in managing disasters in Pakistan and in advocating the United Nations’ Cluster
system. UN OCHA helps in carrying out situation and needs assessments, plays a strong broker
role in coordinating with different agencies working in national, local and international
capacities, and helps to mobilize resources (Young et al., 2007). UN OCHA is a part of the UN
Secretariat and is responsible for coordinating humanitarian response in emergencies. The
section below describes the cluster approach.
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3.2.5 The United Nations Cluster Approach
The United Nations’ ‘cluster system’ is a popular response, relief and immediaterecovery approach that is used in huge disasters through which relief agencies coordinate their
efforts in clusters and sectors. The main goal of the cluster system is to provide timely and
coordinated response in disasters. Each cluster is guided by a specific humanitarian service and
is assigned a lead agency to oversee and coordinate efforts and also individuals that are referred
to as cluster coordinators. The ‘cluster approach’ is a top-down, UN centered initiative that aims
to offer timely and effective response and improve coordination between various responding
agencies and actors in huge disasters (Thomas & Rendon, 2010). It is right to say that currently
there are two approaches that exist in managing disasters in Pakistan. One approach has been
applied several times while the other one has yet to be tried and tested. The newly developed
NDRP by NDMA is yet to be fully implemented in response to disasters. However, the other
approach, lead by the United Nations has been tried and tested within Pakistan.
The cluster system works to organize relief according to functional operations within
different sectors with a predefined and predetermined leadership. This approach was developed
and implemented with the aim to improve and increase overall efficiency and effectiveness in a
number of areas such as: global capacity for responding to existing and future crises; predictable
leadership at both the global and local levels; strong partnerships between responding agencies
such as UN agencies, international NGOs and local agencies; accountability and transparency in
relief operations; and strategic prioritization and coordination in implementing various clusters
during emergencies (OCHA, 2007). This approach was first implemented and tested in the South
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Asian Earthquake/Kashmir Earthquake in October 2005, then in the 2007 Sindh and Balochistan
Floods and then in the 2010 Pakistan Floods.
The cluster system was piloted in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. During this time the
system tremendously helped in improving relief coordination. But it is important to understand
that this is still a system in transition (Young et al., 2007). The issue has been that the UN cluster
system and the NDMA itself are still in its development phases and are trying to understand new
mandates and operational procedures, etc. In the past NDMA-UN relations were strained due to
various reasons. Some of these reasons are:
the lack of a shared agreement as to the objectives and strategy of the whole operation;
misunderstanding of each other’s mandates, roles and responsibilities; lack of systematic
data-gathering and, from NDMA’s perspective, sharing of information on international
relief efforts and capabilities; a fundamental difference of approach between overtly
centralized, on the one hand, and the more participative and consultative approach of the
humanitarian community on the other. This has produced unrealized expectations and
disappointment on both sides. (Young et al., 2007, p. 18)

3.2.6 Recent Developments
More recently, the NDMA is carrying out contingency planning for the monsoon season
in Pakistan every year. In 2012 and subsequently in 2013, a national contingency plan was
prepared by NDMA after various consultation meetings held in different regions and provinces
with relevant federal agencies and ministries, provincial departments and district level offices. A
two day conference was also planned by the NDMA in June, 2013 to coordinate contingency
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plans for the monsoon season in 2013 (NDMA, 2013). Currently, the Punjab Disaster
Management Authority has identified 11 districts out of 25 total districts to be vulnerable to
monsoon related floods in Punjab. The contingency plan by Punjab has detailed the roles and
responsibilities of various government departments and relevant stakeholders along with
identifying evacuation sites and relief shelters (NDMA, 2013). The recent National Monson
Contingency Plan of 2013 suggests that DDMAs in vulnerable districts have availed capacity
building programs and have managed to improve their existing infrastructures and systems.
The most recent policy approved by the National Disaster Management Commission has
been the National Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Policy in 2013. This policy aims to strengthen
the institutional framework of NDMA as it will be the lead agency for implementing this policy.
This policy has also been an important step in meeting the goals of the UN Hyogo Framework
for Action (HFA) 2005-2015.
Although a comprehensive apparatus has been outlined in the recent NRP, and other
recent plans and policies, the challenge is to build the capacity for their implementation at the
district and local levels. Currently existing disaster and relief departments across the country, and
at different jurisdictional levels lack the capacity or the training for disaster management (Khan
& Khan, 2008). The federal government and the NDMA should work towards building
community-level capacity by offering trainings and disaster management related certification to
personnel working in disaster management cells and offices. The requirement of contingency
planning at district levels and the development of plans and SOPs at the local level are steps in
the right direction.
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However leading national agencies still lack the required capacity to invest in developing
better risk reduction methods, and mitigation strategies along with the development of
interoperable systems for response and relief. Khan and Khan (2008) suggest that the disaster
management agencies suffer from “a dearth of knowledge and information about hazard
identification, risk assessment and management” (p. 11). They are certainly also suffering from a
lack of financial resources. Therefore, although the disaster management system and existing
structure reflect that many organizations are involved in flood management, improvements in
interaction and coordination between different entities is required. Also there is a need to
delineate clear roles and responsibilities of agencies to ensure there is no duplication or overlap
in them (ADB, 2010). Although experience with frequent floods has improved the flood control
and management system in Pakistan enormously, there is a lot that still needs to be done. The
Pakistan Floods of 2010 were an eye-opener for Pakistan.
3.3 The Role of the Armed Forces in Disaster Response
Pakistan’s Armed forces have three main branches: Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy
(Marines), and Pakistan Air Force, along with the Pakistan Coast Guard. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee overseas the Armed Forces operations.
Pakistan is a country that has had a tremendous influence of the armed forces in civil
administration functions. Despite some periods of democracy in Pakistan, the Pakistan Army has
“governed the country directly or indirectly for most of the state’s existence” (Fair 2011, p. 572).
The country has experienced three military coups in the country from 1958-1971, from 1979 till
1988 and from 1999 till 2008. According to Chengappa (1999) there has been a clear
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militarization of civil society in the country. Military officers have taken positions as provincial
governors, head of public agencies and some retired military officers have also become political
leaders and have stood in elections. With these trends there is a concern of “the creation of an
armed bureaucracy” (Chengappa, 1999, p. 299). The Pakistan military have justified their role
and interference in the civil administration due to the incompetence of civilian rulers.
The military plays a key role in coordinating and mobilizing disaster relief and response.
According to Madiwale and Virk (2011) some of the reasons why the role of the military in
disaster response has increased over the years are: “an increase in the scale and incidence of
natural disasters; a concurrent trend towards militarization of humanitarian response in conflict
situations; and increased interest in disaster response on the part of militaries” (p. 1086).
The international community also partners closely with the Pakistani Military during
response since it has the capacity to carry out search and rescue functions, the logistics available
for massive relief efforts, and personnel with expertise. However, the international community
also recognized the shortcomings of a highly militarized response such as lack of a nondiscriminatory and unbiased response (Madiwale & Virk, 2011). Despite the criticisms it is
important to understand that the Armed Forces of Pakistan have always played a crucial role in
disasters. According to Retired Brig. General Nadeem Ahmed, the former Chairman of NDMA,
the Pakistan Army has the capacity to deploy large numbers of all types of responders. The
Armed Forces have engineers who look after damaged infrastructure and roads, doctors who
provide first aid and immediate medical relief, Army Corps that provide search and rescue
missions. Thus, the Armed Forces partner very closely with the different branches of government
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during response (N. Ahmed, Personal Communication, September 23, 2013). The following
section provides a comprehensive list of response functions that are given importance in national
response plans and are activated during disaster response.
3.4 Disaster Response Functions and Clusters
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in Pakistan has developed a
number of response plans and frameworks that have identified certain important response
functions. NDMA’s National Disaster Response Plan of 2010 refers to the response functions
as: Salient Features of Disaster Response (NDMA, 2010, p. 48). These features are: (1)
Evacuation (2) Assessment (3) Search and Rescue (4) Medical Services (5) Relief Management
(including food and non-food items) (6) Shelter (7) Water and Sanitation (8) Protection (9)
Communication (10) Transportation and Delivery (11) Early Recovery and Rehabilitation (12)
Compensation Policy (13) Reconstruction Policy. Out of the 13 response functions identified by
the government of Pakistan, the last three do not concern immediate response and in fact can be
referred to as early recovery and long-term response functions and will be excluded from this
discussion of response functions.
Evacuation: Evacuation is one of the most critical response functions when a warning is
issued and a threat or hazard is identified specific to a region and area. The main goal of this
function is to relocate people/citizens from a vulnerable and high-risk area or even a disaster
inflicted area to an area that is safe. This function may take place both before a disaster strikes
(voluntary evacuation) and during a disaster (forced evacuation) (NDMA, 2010).
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The NDMA’s response plan suggests that this function is the responsibility of the district
administration officers that are required to develop a team of government officials from various
district level officers and departments that include military personnel and some volunteers. The
actual evacuation needs to be carried out after the orders of the relevant DCO or Senior Police
Officer, and should be carried out with the help of local community leaders, NGOs and
community based organizations. Moreover, a list of all the evacuations need to be prepared by
the DCO or another designated official and should be reported to the DEOC. In dangerous
situations, the government is allowed to use police, Army Rangers and officials to ensure
mandatory and forced evacuations. In less threatening situations, district government with the
help of volunteers, local NGOs, and local district departments will try and convince people to
make voluntary evacuations (NDMA, 2010).
Assessment. Assessments are required throughout the disaster response and relief stage
for ensuring that relevant needs of affected regions and populations within those regions are met,
relevant relief goods and services are provided in a non-redundant and timely manner. These
assessments take the form of situation analysis and also needs and damage assessments.
According to the National Response Plan of Pakistan, there are two types of assessments that
need to be carried out: The Initial Rapid Assessment and the Expanded Rapid Assessments. The
Initial Rapid Assessment, as the name suggests, is an assessment of the basic needs required for
immediate response and relief of affected populations and regions. This type of assessment is
usually carried out in the first 2-3 days to get a snapshot of the needs and damages caused by the
disaster and its results help to arrange for immediate relief and response. An Expanded
assessment follows 4-5 weeks after the disaster has struck and collects more detailed data on
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needs and damages. According to the NDRP (2010), at the federal level the NDMA is tasked to
carry out the rapid assessment by developing a team of 6-8 members from different federal
departments. The NDMA is expected to share the report with relevant PDMAs and relevant
ministries and other federal agencies. A recommended list of ministries that should be shared the
report is also provided by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). This list includes: PDMA, DDMA,
Health Department, Public health Engineering Department, Livestock Department (prov/district
level); Agriculture Department (provincial and district level), Communication and works/ Social
Welfare Department, and Civil Society Representative (NDMA, 2010). The plan also suggests
that the GoP may approach international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), Asian
Development Bank (ADB) or other relevant agencies to conduct a needs assessment if the need
is felt.
Similarly, at the provincial level, the PDMAs are responsible for carrying out a rapid
assessment within the first 2-3 days of a disaster. The relevant PDMA needs to develop a team of
members from different provincial departments such as the Health Department, Public Health
Engineering Department, Livestock Department, Agriculture Department, etc. The findings from
the assessment need to be shared with DCOs, DDMAs, CM and Governor of the relevant
province, and other relevant departments along with the NDMA (NDMA, 2010).
When the scale of a disaster is small and limited to a district of several Union Councils,
then the DCO is required to carry out an initial assessment within 48 to 72 hours after forming a
team of members from different district level departments such as the Revenue Department,
Health Department, Public Health Engineering Department, Livestock Department, or
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Agriculture Department. The assessment report needs to be shared with the PDMA, CM,
Governor and other relevant departments at the provincial level (NDMA, 2010).
Search and Rescue. At the onset of a disaster, man-made or natural, one major response
function is of carrying out search and rescue operations. Search is the function of locating or
finding missing people, while rescue is the act of taking out people from harm’s way and taking
them to safer locations. The Armed Forces in Pakistan, such as the Pakistan Navy and the
Pakistan Army, have the expertise in mountain and air search and rescue operations. The
Pakistan Army has played a forefront role in previous disasters to carryout search and rescue
functions via helicopters (NDMA, 2010).
Medical Services. Providing medical services as part of immediate response is essential
for survivors and affected populations. The Ministry of Health is responsible for mobilizing
medical resources and coordinating the overall medical services response. At the onset of a
disaster, government health departments along with humanitarian organizations, and Army
medical teams provide health services. In previous disasters the Army has played a supportive
role of setting up mobile and static medical clinics (NDMA, 2010). Other than the Ministry of
Health, other federal level agencies also play an important role in providing and maintaining
medical services during the response phase of the disaster. Patient data needs to maintained by
NADRA and also be shared with the Ministry of Health and NDMA. Also special needs of
orphans, disabled, and women need to be addressed to the Ministry of Social Welfare and
Special Education. Also as part of medical services, a disease early warning system needs to be
put in place. At the local level, basic health units are trained to identify signs and symptoms of
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diseases. The basic health units share this information with district and provincial level health
units. Additionally, provincial and district level health departments work closely with relevant
humanitarian organizations to carryout health situation analysis and assessments (NDMA, 2010).
Relief Management – Food and Non Food Items (NFIs). The National Disaster Response
Plan (2010) refers to Relief Management as the most essential part of the response phase. This is
the function that provides ‘life sustaining commodities to the affected communities in a fair and
organized system’ (NDMA, 2010, p. 58). Food aid involves both the distribution and provision
of cooked meals for the affected population and the gradual shift to the distribution and
availability of dry ration for the affected population (NDMA, 2010). Often duplication of efforts
and resources occurs in this response function, thus close coordination with humanitarian
organizations and aid agencies dealing with relief supplies is recommended. The national plan
also suggests that a ration card be developed for food distribution with the partnership if World
Food Programmme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other relevant agencies and I/NGOs.
Non-food aid, or commonly referred to as NFIs includes clothing and bedding, hygiene
kits, and kitchen sets. Both in the case of food and NFIs provision there are many humanitarian
agencies and I/NGOs working to provide this response function. The national plan recommends
that the organizations involved in providing this function need to coordinate and share their
agendas and actions with relevant government agencies such as the DDMAs, PDMAs and
NDMA to ensure redundancies and resource provision and duplication of efforts is
circumvented. Although many humanitarian and multi-lateral development agencies such as the
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UNOCHA are leading the function of relief management, the government agencies are
eventually held responsible to coordinate and collaborate with I/NGOs and humanitarian
agencies concerning this relief function (NDMA, 2010).
Shelter. Immediately following a disaster or a threat of disaster, temporary shelters are
made available by the government or humanitarian agencies. These shelters are usually in the
form of tents or temporary accommodations in government buildings such as schools,
warehouses, playgrounds, etc. The Public Health Engineering Department helps to arrange for
temporary water arrangements in shelters.
The response functions can also be understood through the cluster approach that is led by
the UN. The cluster system operates in close partnership with the government of Pakistan. Each
cluster in lead by a UN agency but is co-chaired by relevant line ministries and NDMA. For
instance the Food Security cluster is led by the WFP and is also co-chaired by the NDMA and
respective PDMAs. Similarly, the Health cluster is led by World Health Organization (WHO)
and is co-chaired by the Ministry of Health.
Table 3.1 shows the UN lead agencies for the activated clusters and the relevant partner line
ministries that co-chaired each cluster. In the response plan developed by the UN, the emphasis
was laid that “each cluster’s response strategy has been developed to recognize that the
Government of Pakistan (through its National Disaster management Authority) will lead the
relief and recovery activities in flood-affected areas, and that the humanitarian community will
focus on covering gaps where the needs exceed the government’s response capacity” (UN, 2010,
p. 11).
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Table 2 Cluster Leads and Co-chairs (Source: OCHA, 2010).
Cluster

Cluster Lead

Co-chair Governmental Institutions

Food Security

WFP

NDMA, PDMAs

Health

WHO

Ministry of Health

Shelter & NFIs

IOM

NDMA, PDMAs

WASH

UNICEF

Ministry of Environment, Provincial
Public Health Engineering
Departments

Logistics, Emergency
Telecommunications, and Coordination

WFP/OCHA

NDMA, PDMAs

Nutrition

UNICEF

Ministry of Health

Protection

UNHCR

Ministry of Social Welfare

In the Initial response plan developed by the UN 7 clusters were activated to launch their
response. These clusters were: Food Security; Health; Shelter/NFIs; WASH; Logistics,
Emergency Telecommunications and Coordination; Nutrition; and Protection. These response
clusters are briefly explained below. In a detailed interview with the former NDMA chairman
(who was serving during the time of the floods) Lt. General Nadeem Ahmed, he emphasized that
these clusters work well to get all the relevant players on board. According to him immediate
response requires four key clusters to be activated on time. These are: Food, Shelter/NFIs,
Health, and WASH (Water and Sanitation) (N. Ahmed, Personal Communication, September
2013). Brief descriptions of these four clusters is provided below.
Food Security. This cluster is essential for meeting basic food requirements for the
affected population so that lives can be saved and impacted people can avoid starvation. A
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common impact of a disaster is the shortage of food supplies that drives up the price of staple
foods. Thus, this cluster aims to meet the immediate food needs and requirements of affected
populations. Typical activities under this cluster are: supplying food baskets, ready-to-use
supplementary food, high-energy biscuits. Another goal of the flood security cluster is to protect
existing livestock. The WFP is the lead agency for the Food Security Cluster (UN, 2010).
Health. The main goal of the cluster is to provide emergency medical assistance and help
to affected populations so that lives are saved. The cluster also aims to restore damaged medical
units and services to ensure that essential health services are maintained in critical areas and
regions. The cluster is also involved in monitoring the health situation closely so that outbreaks
of diseases can be identified and prevented. The WHO is the lead agency for the Health Cluster
(UN, 2010).
Shelter/NFIs. The main aim of this cluster is to provide housing and shelter to people
who have lost their homes or who have been evacuated. Other than providing shelter the cluster
also provides Non-food Items (NFIs) such as household kits and tool kits for repairing houses .
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is leading this cluster (UN, 2010).
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). The WASH cluster aims to provide safe
drinking water, access to sanitation facilities and hygiene kits to people impacted in the disaster.
This cluster is lead by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (UN, 2010).
These response functions identify the basic nature of interactions and the diverse set of
resources and skills required to mobilize an effective response. The following section provides
an overview of the scale and severity and damages incurred during the Pakistan Floods 2010
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3.5 Pakistan Floods 2010
Pakistan has experienced many natural disasters in recent years such as floods, landslides,
earthquakes, droughts and cyclones. However, what it experienced in the summer of 2010 was of
unimaginable and unprecedented scale since its creation in 1947. The 2010 floods affected over
78 districts (compared to a total of 141 districts) (NDMA, 2011; United Nations [UN], 2011) that
cover 100, 000 square km of the country (ADB, 2010) and impacted 20 million people (out of a
total population of nearly170 million people) of which 14 million required immediate assistance
(Kronstadt, Sheikh &Vaughn, 2010; Independent Evaluation Group [IEG], 2010), 8 million
required urgent health care (UN, 2011), and 3.5 million were children (NDMA, 2011). Due to
breeched levees, water flowed to rural floodplains destroying agricultural land and resulting in
mass destruction of houses and causing a high internal displacement of people. Alongside many
roads, bridges and transportation routes were destroyed, causing havoc to the overall
infrastructure in many regions across the country. The 2010 Pakistan Floods were referred to as
the worst disaster in the history of the country (ADB, 2010). The United Nations (UN)
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon upon visiting the country declared that this disaster was larger
than the accumulated impact of major disasters such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, the 2005
Kashmir Earthquake, the 2008 Nargis Cyclone and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Solberg, 2010).
The Secretary-General of UN also referred to as the floods as a slow-motion tsunami (UN,
2011).
Pakistan experienced the worst floods since its creation in 1947. Monsoon rains began
end of July in 2010 till August, 2010 and resulted in flash flooding in the northwestern and
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eastern regions of Pakistan. Due to breeched levees, water flowed to rural floodplains resulting in
mass destruction of houses and internal displacement of people (Kronstadt, Sheikh, &Vaughn,
2010). Flooding began in the northern regions of Pakistan and within days it reached the Arabian
Sea, which lies at the southern part of Pakistan. Within a matter of days the entire Indus Valley
and surrounding regions were flooded (Webster et al., 2011). The 2010 monsoon rains stood out
as a period of above average rainfall in northern parts of Pakistan (Houze et al., 2011) compared
to the 1998 to 2010 period. A year earlier in 2009 the monsoon rains were sparser and let to
deforestation which helped to exacerbate the flash floods and their run off in the mountainous
regions of north (Webster et al., 2011). One major concern after the 2010 floods was to gauge
whether these floods were predictable (Webster et al., 2011), and if so why wasn’t the
government prepared to curtail the flooding or deal with its after effects in a better way. A study
by Webster et al. (2011) shows that heavy rainfall could have been predicted a week in advance
of the floods. And if they were predicted in time, the government and water management
authorities and irrigation departments could have taken proactive measures to release water
before flash flooding.
The 2010 floods were ranked as the worst natural disasters in Pakistan in terms of total
population impacted and economic loss suffered (NDMA, 2011). It was a profound humanitarian
disaster (Houze et al., 2011) since coping with the destruction was not possible for any national
government alone. According to NDMA (2011) when the number of affected population, total
area impacted and households damaged are all taken into consideration it can be claimed that this
disaster was bigger than the combined impact of five major disasters in the last ten years which
are: the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 2005 Earthquake in
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Pakistan, the 2008 Nargis Cyclone in Myanmar and the Haiti Earthquake in 2010. Usually the
international community views a disaster as huge due to the deaths and injuries it causes. This
disaster is often compared with the Haiti Earthquake and rightly so because both disasters took
place in the same year but had fairly different dynamics. The death toll was fairly high in the
Haiti Earthquake compared to the death toll of around 2000 in the floods, but the area impacted
and total population impacted was far more. The impacted area was around 20 times more than
Haiti and the total displacements were 13 times more than the displacements in the Haiti
Earthquake (Malik, 2011; Webster et al., 2011).
The floods impacted different parts of the country in a dissimilar fashion. The flashfloods
in Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa (KPK) and Baluchistan were very intense due to the mountainous
terrain of the regions. However, the Punjab and northern Sindh areas are flatter and the riverine
flooding had a slow pace but affected massive areas of cultivation and densely populated regions
as well (World Food Programme [WFP], 2010). The biggest challenge was to attend to the
massive displacements and to provide the displaced survival goods and services such as safe
drinking water, sanitation, basic food, medical and health facilities and temporary shelter (UN,
2011).
According to a study conducted by Kirsch et al. (2012) out of the families affected by the
floods, 90% belonged to rural areas. This implies that 90% of the families required substantial
help to support their survival and provide them relief services. Their study clearly suggests a
disproportionate impact on the rural households and communities. Disasters of such nature have
a cascading effect. Within weeks of the disaster there was huge threat of malnutrition amongst
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the survivors. Most of the people impacted by the floods were unskilled laborers or farmers.
These people live either below the poverty line, on the poverty line or just barely above it. 60%
of these survivors had lost access to their livelihoods and around 3/4th of the affected had limited
access to the supply of food (WFP, 2010).
Along with killing 2000 people, and injuring around 3000 people, the floods also killed
several thousand livestock (20,000 cattle drowned) (Webster et al., 2011) and many standing
crops (around 2 million hectares) as it wiped areas of cultivated land (NDMA, 2011; WFP,
2010). The flash flooding resulted in a huge agricultural crisis which will take years to recover
(Webster et al., 2011).The irrigation sector struggled a great deal after the floods as many
systems were destroyed and the plantation and sowing of many crops were delayed. The
agricultural costs were believed to exceed 500 million US dollars (Webster et al., 2011).
Floodwaters and heavy downpour destroyed many roads and homes, public buildings and
officers, electricity grids and stations and around 2.4 million hectares of land that it cultivated
every year (UN, 2011). According to the UN report “over 1.6 million homes, over 430 health
facilities, and an estimated 10,000 schools were damaged or destroyed” (UN, 2011, p. 19).
Standing water in many regions weeks after the floods started have not only resulted in massive
areas of uncultivable land but has also resulted in the spread of water-borne and skin diseases
amongst the affected population (Malik, 2011).
The response to the floods was initially slow and very challenging due to the havoc
caused to the infrastructure in the flooded areas as many roads, bridges and transportation routes
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were destroyed and blocked. Alongside security concerns in northern areas of the country also
hindered flood response (Kronstadt, Sheikh, & Vaughn, 2010; Webster et al., 2011).
According to reports the major relief effort was lead by the Pakistani government. The
United Nations along with International NGOs and NDMA also helped in relief and response
stages of the disasters. Due to the international and national efforts, 1.5 million people were
rescued by the 20,000 army/military troops deployed by November 2010. It is also believed that
despite the slow onset on response and many relief challenges, search and rescue operations and
timely distribution of food and medical assistance were overall successful in saving many lives
and handling the breakout of deadly water-borne diseases (Oxfam, 2011).
The Pakistan Army led the rescue and evacuation efforts in the KPK province while
humanitarian agencies began providing relief goods to displaced people in August. On August 1,
2010, the government realizes the scale and scope of the disaster and announces that the floods
have impacted 1 million people only to realize two weeks later that the actual impact affects 15
million people. It took a while to realize the extent of the disaster for both the government and
the international community. The international community became more active after the UN
launched an initial floods emergency response appeal at $ 459.7 million on August 11, 2010
(UN, 2011). After the UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon’s visit to Pakistan on August 15, 2010
(three weeks after the floods began), on the August 18, 2010, a special session of the General
Assembly is conducted to urge the international community to support relief efforts in Pakistan
(UN, 2011). A timeline of events pertaining to response are shown in APPENDIX A.
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During the floods, the NDMA, being a constitutionally mandated agency, was expected
to coordinate the overall response efforts between federal, provincial and district governments
along with both local and international NGOs (Malik, 2011). However, due to its lack of
experience in coordinating such a huge disaster and leading the response efforts on its own,
NDMA partnered closely with the United Nations resident coordinator to come up with a
response framework. Moreover, all international organizations had to seek the permission of the
government of Pakistan before providing any relief operations.
Moreover, despite a newly developed National Response Plan in March 2010 that
outlines the role of federal, provincial and district level disaster management offices (NRP,
2010), the different levels of government were unclear about their roles their local level
representatives could play to manage the floods. Moreover, there was also rarely any
preparedness efforts, evacuation plans and manuals at the district levels (Malik, 2011).
On the July 30, 2010, the government of Pakistan formally asked the Pakistan Army to
carry out search and rescue operations while collaborating closely with the NDMA. Overall, the
Pakistan Military helped to evacuate and rescue around 1.4 million people while deploying
20,000 troops who used either helicopters or boats. The Military also distributed essential
survival items such as water and food to the affected population. The Military also set up camps
for the displaced population and worked closely with the NDMA and PDMAs (UN, 2011).
The UN played the most important support role in the floods via its cluster approach.
Recent catastrophic disasters in Pakistan have increased the familiarity and the applicability of
the country with the cluster system. The UN also played a very important role to pledge donor
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support, create awareness about the scale and scope of the disaster, and urge the international and
humanitarian community to respond to the disaster (UN, 2011).
The scope and scale was such that no government could have managed it on its own. The
government of Pakistan urged the international humanitarian community to help and support
relief and response efforts (UN, 2011). Scaling-up the response by the international community
and INGOs also met enormous challenges since many of their resources, financial and nonfinancial, were being utilized in the Haiti Earthquake that took place few months earlier than the
floods. However some UN agencies with a strong presence in the country had already developed
a network of partners and garnered resources to scale-up in a short time (UN, 2011).
Overall, one can conclude that the role of the international community in managing
disasters in Pakistan is very important. Without the humanitarian organizations such as the UN
organizations and other INGOs it is not possible to deal with such massive internal
displacements and provide relief services such as food, shelter, health and medical facilities, and
temporary housing (UN, 2011).
The perceptions of key individuals involved in response to the floods also provides and
highlights important insights. Mr. Nadeem Ahmad, the former chairman of the NDMA in a
report issued one year after the floods says: “When I look at the response now, I can see
immense achievements. Whether perfectly structured or not, this is because the people, the
Government, the UN, donors, and the humanitarian community gelled together. Make no
mistakes; this response was a collaborative effort” (UN, 2011, p. 9). While there are interesting
insights by scholars describing the floods as “an ideal case study for understanding how
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traditionally poor public policies coupled with resource shortages and a weak government can
exacerbate the impact of natural disasters” (Malik, 2011, p. 1).
This chapter provided a comprehensive overview of the disaster management system and
policies in place in Pakistan. This chapter has also identified the Armed Forces, and the United
Nations agencies as crucial partners of the government in responding to natural disasters. The
next chapter details the methods adopted to answer the research questions and test the
hypotheses. The chapter will also justify the methods used for an exploratory study and explain
the reason for adopting a case study design for this type of research.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD
The Pakistan Floods of 2010 are an important case to study in depth to reflect on the
various factors that influence multi-level collaborative response. It forms a rich case study where
the federal government, the military, the international community, and the UN agencies play an
integral role. This research follows a mixed-methods approach that is explained in the following
sections. The first section of the chapter explains the rationale for utilizing the case study method
to conduct this research. The section also discusses the various methods used for analysis such as
content analysis, document analysis, and SNA. The second section of the chapter details the unit
of analysis, data collection methods, and measurements used for study variables.
4.1 Case Study
Disaster related research has often adopted a case study approach to highlight certain
aspects of disasters and study them in detail. The highly contextual nature of disasters warrants a
case study approach. Many scholars support the case study method even to formulate and build
theory. According to Eisenhardt (1989), theory building from case studies can take place when
one or more case develops theoretical constructs and propositions from empirical evidence found
through cases. However, the challenge in this approach is that, especially a single-case study
approach (which is adopted in this research), rich qualitative data and supporting evidence needs
to be intertwined with theory to show that there is a close relationship between empirical
evidence and emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Moreover, case study research
can be strengthened by ensuring the “careful justification of …theoretical sampling of cases,

93

interviews that limit informant bias, rich presentation of evidence in tables and appendixes, and
clear statement of theoretical arguments” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 30). Another
common approach to justifying a case study method is to combine both qualitative and
quantitative techniques and follow a mixed method or triangulation approach. This approach
helps to decrease the deficiency in utilizing single methods of research and should be used with
great articulation to ensure that it helps to improve the interpretation of results and enhance the
study (Thurmond, 2001). Yin (1989) is also a proponent of combining both quantitative and
qualitative data to strengthen the case study method. This is a useful technique that can create
new ways of approaching and studying a problem compared to single, traditional methods of
research (Jick, 1979). Thus, within the overall framework of a case study design this research
utilizes the mixed methods approach to collect and interpret the data needed to answer the
research questions and strengthen the interpretation of results. These methods include: content
analysis, documentary analysis, social network analysis (SNA), and semi-structured interviews
of some agency representatives identified through SNA results.
4.1.1 Content Analysis and Document Analysis
Content analysis is a systematic method or technique for measuring the relevant and
specified characteristics of a message. According to Atteveldt (2008), the definitions of content
analysis by different scholars differ on various aspects but agree on two requirements for this
method to be scientific: validity and relevance. Validity lies in following an objective and
systematic approach so that selection bias can be avoided. Theoretical relevance is also
maintained by identifying certain terms or characteristics that are theoretically relevant.
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Many leading scholars in the field have applied content analysis to study an evolving
disaster response system (Comfort, 1999; Comfort & Haase, 2006; Kapucu, 2005, 2006, 2012).
Through a detailed content analysis of newspapers, situation reports, and after-action reports
network analysis is carried out to identify agencies interacting in response to the Pakistan Floods,
the types of exchanges taking place, the different levels of agencies involved to see how
collaborative response differs at the local, provincial and national-international level, and what
functions of response (search and rescue operations, aid/donations, provision of basic relief
goods such as food and shelter) are attributed to certain players, sectors, and levels of
governance. The detailed content analysis also helps to identify the factors that have hindered
and fostered collaboration in response.
Content Analysis of newspapers and after-action reports was chosen as a method for
research due to the fact that the Floods of 2010 took place three years ago and there has been
recurrent flooding in Pakistan in 2011, 2012, and also 2013. Thus, there was going to be a threat
of information bias and challenges with recall if representatives of agencies were interviewed to
develop a network of relationships or if a snowball technique was used to identify the network.
Relying on after-action reports, situation reports, and newspaper coverage of the Floods helped
to reduce the threat of bias in this research.
Document Analysis was also carried out for developing and indentifying a planned
response network of agencies that exists according to response plans. Two documents were
analyzed to formulate and understand the planned response network. These two documents are:
The 2010 Floods Response Plan developed by UN in early August 2010 just after the Floods
began and followed the cluster approach, while the other was the National Disaster Response
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Plan (NDRP) developed by the NDMA of Pakistan in March 2010 (few months prior to the 2010
Floods). Although the NDRP was not implemented fully, it identified detailed SOPs of
responding agencies for each government level. Through the SOPs, roles, and responsibilities
identified for major stakeholders and responding agencies at the district level, provincial level,
and the federal level, a planned response system was developed. This plan was developed after
several consultations with major stakeholders. The effectiveness of the actual response network
is compared with the planned network that is recommended in the NDRP. This is a viable
method of analyzing the effectiveness of response networks and has been adopted by Kapucu,
and Demiroz (2011) to analyze Hurricane Katrina and September 11 Terrorist Attacks response
networks.
The table below shows an example of the excel codebook for the content analysis
conducted as part of this research. An open coding method was utilized to code relevant content
from newspapers, after-action reports, and situation reports. There are several methods identified
for open coding by Strauss and Corbin (1998). The method followed in this research follows the
analysis of whole sentences and paragraphs to determine whether relevant information is found
in the content. This method is most useful when the researcher has already formulated and
identified certain categories according to which coding will be carried out. In this research the
response functions were already identified through a review of the existing response plans.
Moreover, categories for the types of organizations such as government, private sector,
nonprofit, and multi-lateral agencies were also identified and so were the level of organizations
(national, international, provincial, and district).
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Figure 7 Example of Content Analysis Coding
4.1.2 Social Network Analysis
After carrying out a content analysis some descriptive statistics were generated to show
how the response network was different at each level of response (at the national-international
level, at the provincial level, and at the district levels), what was the organizational composition
of the network, and how the network evolved over the span of four weeks (the initial response
period). The period of four weeks (starting from July 22, 2010, till August 19, 2010) specifies the
boundaries for data collection. Boundary specification is an important issue in analyzing and
collecting data on networks. There are different methods in specifying network boundaries. The
event-based strategy is applied in this research. As the name suggests an event-based strategy is
applied when an event or certain activity takes place and the actors that participate in that event
or activity make up the boundary of the network. However, this approach requires a careful
examination of setting the most appropriate location, and identifying the correct activities for the
purpose of the research so that this method gives a complete picture of the network and includes
all significant actors and activities (Knoke & Yang, 2008). This research adopts the 4 week
period of initial response. Scholars in the field have utilized 3 weeks for studying response in
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disaster research such as Comfort et al. (2011), Comfort (2002), and Kapucu (2006). This
research chooses a 4 week period instead, since the rains started end of July, but the realization
that this was a full-fledged disaster came later around the beginning of August. Also it is
important to understand that floods are a slow onset disaster compared to other natural disasters
such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or hurricanes.
The information on the agencies, types of agencies, nature of interactions between
agencies was entered into excel sheets so that network analysis was carried out. UCINET
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman 2002), a popular software for carrying out SNA, is used to present
data in the form of sociograms and network structural aspects and measures are analyzed and
compared between different networks that have developed. The structural aspects of the
networks, the characteristics of responding agencies, the most central players, and boundary
spanners in response were identified. Apart from conducting a network analysis for the actual
response networks, the UCINET software was also used to develop sociograms for the planned
response networks derived from the NDRP of 2010. The comparison between the two helped to
gauge the effectiveness of response.
As mentioned earlier in the literature, SNA contains measures that study individual
nodes/organizations and their interactions and connections with other nodes such as centrality
measures, and also contain measures that study whole networks such as density of the network.
This research uses the following centrality and whole-network measures.
Degree Centrality: This ego measure identifies the number of ties each actor has with
other actors. The more ties an actor has with others in the network the more easy access the actor
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has to different resources and the less dependency on one or few particular actors. Due to this
positional advantage they also have brokerage power. Ties can be either directional or undirectional. In this study we have observed interactions and links at un-directed. This study uses
Freeman’s degree centrality procedure. This procedure also shows value of normalized degree
centrality. Standardized and normalized values of centrality will help to compare the value across
various networks with different structures and sizes (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
Closeness Centrality: Rather than only taking direct ties and links to other actors in
account, the closeness measure also takes indirect ties to others in account. This measure helps to
identify whether the actors are central in the whole network or in a sub-network only. In this
research the eigenvector of geodesic distances closeness measure is utilized. This is an important
measure that identifies most central players in the overall network and rather than local area and
utilizes factor analysis to arrive at these results. Also this procedure assumes symmetric data
which is relevant for the data collection techniques employed in this study (Hanneman & Riddle,
2005).
Betweenness Centrality: This is a measure used for binary data. The interactions in this
research are also termed as binary. When a relationship exists between two nodes the value is
“1”, when an interaction does not exist between two organizations the value is “0”. An actor
within a network that has a high betweenness score is in an advantageous position since it lies
between the geodesic paths of other pairs of actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). In this research
the Freeman’s approach to binary relations is used.
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Density: This measure is a macro level measure that calculates the proportion of ties that
are present compared to all ties that are possible in the network. Density is important to gauge
the levels of connectivity and social capital available in the network (Hanneman & Riddle,
2005).
Centralization: For centralization, this research utilizes Freeman’s graph centralization
measure that reflects the variance and positional inequality of a network. A high centralization
figure, let’s say of more than 50% shows that the power of different players within the network
in largely unequal as some actors are positioned in more advantaged and powerful positions
compared to other members. For a low centralization figure – let us say around 15% it can be
assumed that positional advantages in the network are more or less equally distributed in the
network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
Clique Analysis: This is the method that helps to identify the sub-networks and tightly
tied nodes that emerge at the micro level so that the structure of the network at the macro level
can be understood in a better way. Thus, a clique depicts the maximum number of actors that
have the highest possible density amongst themselves (all possible ties between them exist). It is
important to view clique overlap to see which are the most central players and those players
playing multiple roles in the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
4.1.3 Semi-structured Interviews
The SNA results helped to identify the key players within the actual response networks
and the planned response networks at each of the three levels of response. A list was developed
to seek the appropriate contacts and attempts were made to obtain an institutional response from
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the identified agencies. At the national-international level, the key players identified through
centrality measures were: National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), International
Organization of Migration (IOM) (the leading agency for the Shelter cluster), Pakistan Red
Crescent Society (PRCS), Government of Pakistan (GoP), and World Food Programme (WFP)
(the leading agency for the Food cluster).The main players identified at the provincial level were:
Chief Minister Punjab, Punjab Health Department (PHD), PRCS, WHO, Pakistan Army, and
PDMA. The PDMA was identified as the focal player in the planned network, but had very low
centrality scores in the entire network. This was a cause of concern and the need was felt to get
an institutional response from PDMA and understand its role in the provincial response system.
At the district level, the key agencies that were identified in both the Dera Ghazi Khan district as
central players included: Chief Minister of Punjab, PHD, and the district administration or
District Coordination Officer (DCO) of both districts.
To conduct interviews of the identified agencies and to collect additional relevant data for
content analysis and document analysis, a field visit was conducted from May 28, 2013, till July
8, 2013, in Pakistan. This was an election year for Pakistan and the highly anticipated elections
were conducted mid-May, two weeks before the scheduled visit. Due to the transition between
the interim government to the newly elected government, it was difficult to approach officials
who had been involved in the 2010 Floods. Therefore, during the field visit most of the time was
spent in identifying and locating the correct contacts for interviews. The relevant contacts were
either identified through conversations with high officials in the government who knew the
system well or were identified through websites of government offices and government reports
or situation reports. After identifying the relevant contacts, these people were either sent emails
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or contacted via telephone. In the case of telephonic conversations, the permission to conduct an
interview along with the explanation of exempt research and questions for interview was also
sent via email. APPENDIX F provides a list of the interview questions.
All the agencies identified at the national-international level were contacted except the
Government of Pakistan. NDMA represented and led the overall government response, thus the
need to separately contact the former PM and President of the country for an interview was not
recommended nor possible given the recent elections and change in government. IOM and PRCS
were contacted via email multiple times. The initial contacts for IOM responded but referred to
additional contacts who were more involved in the Floods of 2010. A major issue encountered in
getting the relevant contacts for international organizations was that most of the field workers
involved during the Floods of 2010 were not serving in Pakistan anymore but were serving in
other countries going through crises. The relevant contacts that were finally indentified by IOM
representatives did not respond. The contacts identified through after-action reports of PRCS did
not respond as well. Both the current and former Chairmen of NDMA were contacted via email.
The NDMA Chairman, Mr. Nadeem Ahmed, a retired senior Army officer who served
during the 2010 Floods and also led the relief and recovery efforts in the 2005 Kashmir
Earthquake, was the most relevant contact for the nature of this research. He responded very
quickly and forwarded his telephone number and a telephonic interview time was set with him.
His comprehensive responses provided detailed information on the background of the 2010
Floods, all the collaborative efforts with key partners including international donors and
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countries and humanitarian agencies. He also provided written responses to the interview
questions via email in addition to the detailed telephonic conversation.
The current chairman of NDMA Major General Saeed Aleem was also contacted via
email. He initially agreed to respond, but then due to the Earthquake in Balochistan Province on
September 23, 2013, and its aftershocks he was occupied with relief efforts in Balochistan and
was unavailable to be interviewed. An official from WFP, who was deployed in the 2010 Floods
in Southern Punjab, and is now at a senior position in the WFP country office in Islamabad,
agreed to be interviewed. He provided detailed responses to the questions via email. Thus, at the
national-international level senior and relevant officials from both NDMA and WFP were
successfully interviewed.
At the provincial level the Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab was identified as the most
central and important contact. However due to recent elections and also due to the busy schedule
of the CM Punjab it was difficult to interview him. Through discussions with some bureaucrats
and senior officials in Punjab during my field visit it was suggested that the former Chief
Secretary of Punjab, Mr. Nasir Khosa, should serve as the closest proxy to the CM and should be
interviewed to represent the CM’s response. Mr. Nasir Khosa at the time of the interview was
serving as the Secretary to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and is now appointed as one of the
Executive Directors at the World Bank in Washington. He has worked closely with the CM of
Punjab during the floods of 2010, 2011, and 2012. He was interviewed briefly using Skype
technology and was interviewed in detail via telephone. The founding Director of PDMA, Khalid
Sherdil, who was also serving as the Director General relief of the Board of Revenue in Punjab,
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was also interviewed via telephone. Several short conversations were held with him due to his
busy schedule since he is now serving as the principal secretary to the CM of Punjab. He
provided important information regarding the overall relief efforts in Punjab and also provided
several documents related to the 2010 Floods response. He also highlighted several websites that
provide relevant information on Punjab government’s immediate response to the 2010 Floods.
Since the Pakistan Army was identified as an important player at the provincial and local level, a
senior official of the Public Relations department of the Army which deals with media was
contacted and interviewed. He sent brief responses and requested that his responses should
represent the response of the Army. A WHO official deployed during the 2010 Pakistan Floods
also responded to the interview questions briefly and suggested that after-action reports and
situation reports of WHO’s response should be studied in detail to get an idea of the institutional
response to the floods. The Secretary of the PHD was contacted via email but no response was
received.
At the district level the CM and PHD were identified as key players in response networks
along with respective district administrations lead by DCOs. Relevant DCOs were contacted
through email multiple times but response was not received. Some other bilateral agencies such
as UNICEF, UN OCHA, and UNODC were also contacted. But instead of agreeing to be
interviewed these organizations sent after-action reports relating to the 2010 Floods.
A total of 6 interviews were conducted. All respondents were male and held senior
positions in their respective organizations. Three of these interviews were conducted primarily
via telephone, and remaining three were conducted via email (responses to the questions were

104

emailed). Each telephonic interview was transcribed and detailed notes were taken to ensure
important information was not missed.
Interviews are relevant when the disaster is fresh in the minds of agency representatives
responding to the disaster and recall is not challenging for them. This research does not rely on
interviews heavily since there are a number of issues with this type of analysis. Some of the
issues are: With elections held earlier this year, there is a change in the government and most
government agency heads have been posted to other provincial departments. Thus it is difficult
to get in touch with officials operating in the Floods of 2010. Also recording the response to
Floods which requires recall might not be accurate since floods have occurred every year in the
summer monsoon months after 2010. Thus, document analysis and content analysis was the most
appropriate method to be utilized to study the 2010 Floods in Pakistan. Some interviews were
conducted to achieve triangulation in the research and get supportive information about the
institutional responses from organizations, agencies, and departments that played an important
role in floods of 2010.
4.2 Unit of Analysis, Units of Observation, and Study Variables
The unit of analysis for this study is the collaborative response network which emerged in
the 2010 Pakistan Floods at different levels. This is derived through two different units of
observation which are: individual responding agencies/organizations and the inter-organizational
interactions and relationships between these organizations functioning in the overall disaster
response networks. Through content analysis information on both units of observation were
collected.
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Table 3 Variables of the Study and their Operationalization
Study
Variables
Collaborative
Response
Effectiveness

Role of
variable
Dependent

Measurement of the variable
Network Analysis - Through the comparison between the planned and
actual response network. Similarity depicts an effective collaborative
response.
Clique analysis results depict cohesive and collaborative response as well.
Are cliques formed around specific response functions?
Semi-structured Interview Question:
Was your organization collaborating and cooperating with multiple
organizations during response?

Network
Capacity

Independent

Network Analysis - Centrality especially closeness eigenvector centrality
depicts the power to mobilize others. Which organizations have strong
closeness eigenvector centralities? Which have weak? Which agencies
enjoy clique overlap in the cliques identified?
Semi-structured Interview Questions:
Does your organization, on a regular basis, engage in relationship-building
activities with other agencies such as training drills and exchange of
ideas?
Do you engage in and avail opportunities to form newer partnerships with
other and newly formed agencies working in the community?

Leadership/
political
Support

Independent

Network Analysis – Centrality measures - Who are leading the response?
Are those the ones identified in the actual response plans? Are clear
leaders identified in the actual response systems? Are they providing
support to others in the network and facilitating and brokering exchanges?
( Betweenness centrality)

Institutional
Support

Independent

Network Analysis – Betweeness Centrality - Who are the brokers? Are
they the ones identified in the Response Plans? Are the central players
managing and administering relief funds? What players are providing
coordination and logistical support? Content analysis provides rich
support on what institutional arrangements were activated during
response.
Semi-structured Interview Questions:
Are there formal and informal institutional rules for supporting
collaboration in place?
Are plans and policies in place? Are they effective?

Organizational
Resource
Dependency

Independent

Network Analysis – centralization/decentralization, density of ties, the
kinds of resources exchanged identified through content analysis. Does
Clique Analysis depict mutual exchange between agencies that are highly
resource dependent on each other?
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The operationalization of the study variables is shown in Table 3. A number of network
measures discussed earlier are utilized to measure the study variables.
4.3 Data Collection
To get accurate information in order to capture the complete collaborative response to the
disaster national newspapers (i.e., The News, The Daily Times), international newspapers (such
as The New York Times – US based and The Guardian – UK based), and after-action reports and
situation reports by the UN OCHA, IOM, UNICEF, USAID, WFP, WHO, IFRC, and PRCS
were reviewed. These sources provided information on organizational actors and the interactions
between them. The initial response period lasts for three weeks according to the leading scholars
in the field thus newspapers and documents published from the onset of the Floods starting on
July 22, 2010, till August 19, 2010, were used. Moreover, data from the NDRP of 2010 and the
UN Response Plan for the floods were used to collect data and information on the planned
response system/network.
4.4 Validity and Reliability
The reliability of data collected through a content analysis hinges on the consistency of
the method utilized to collect and identify words and interactions through the content. Moreover,
the fact that the content analysis and identifying relationships between players is backed by a
sound theoretical framework and follows a consistent method warrants the validity of the results
and observed patterns (Riffe et al., 1998). This research follows an established method of data
collection that is well accepted in the scholarly community.
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There may be some issues with construct validity since not many scholars and
academicians have attempted to link network measures to the type of constructs used in this
study. Multiple measures are used for each construct since there is no single measure that can
cover all aspects of the construct. However, the measures for each construct have been based on
the literature. Also it is important to understand that SNA is not a traditional tool of analysis that
requires a clear formation of independent and dependent variables and the causal relationships
between those variables. So as such there have not been any attempts to test and establish
construct validity. However, in future research this study will go beyond the exploratory and
descriptive study it is and will advance the constructs of collaborative response effectiveness and
the factors influencing collaborative response. The measures of centrality and clique analysis
have often been used in the field to understand the collaborative interactions in disaster response
networks. Thus, the face validity of using centrality measures to depict leadership and using
clique analysis for collaborative activity is well-established and high.
The exploratory and descriptive nature of the research also raises some concerns about
internal validity and selection bias. Some semi-structured interviews were carried out. The list of
organizations was chosen according to SNA results, particularly centrality results. However,
since the analysis deals with understanding the system at all levels – provincial, federal, and
local, a number of organizations were chosen to represent and understand each level based on
centrality scores. However, although all central players were contacted through either emails or
telephone, not all replied and responded. Thus, proxy organizations (not most central) were
chosen for conducting some interviews instead. So there might be some element of selection bias
in the study although attempts were made to interview the most central players to understand the
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level and nature of collaboration. Also attempts were made to contact the CM of Punjab because
of his most central role, but due to election campaigns and the new formation of government it
was difficult to reach him. Instead the serving Chief Secretary of Punjab during the floods was
identified and interviewed to represent the response of the Chief Minister of Punjab during the
Floods. These replacement and proxy points of contact were identified through discussions with
personal Pakistani contacts that are bureaucrats in the country and understand the system very
well.
Since this is a case study, there might be some challenges posed to the external validity of
the study. The information provided through the semi-structured interviews does not provide
information representative of the whole response systems studied at each level. They provide
supportive information to the SNA results and are not generalizable to whole response system
being studied. The aim of semi-structured interviews was not to provide a representative view of
the whole network but to gather supportive information from the most central players either
identified in the actual or planned networks at each level.
In terms of the reliability of the data, many measures were taking to ensure that the data
collected was free of selection bias and would be highly reliable. The fact that data was collected
from a number of sources such as both national and international newspapers and after-action
and situation reports from several humanitarian organizations reflect that the response networks
identified were representative of the actual system. For example, if government reports were
only relied upon the system would have reflected the government response system and might not
have reflected the response of the international humanitarian community fully. Also since
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multiple sources were used for data collection, there was the risk of duplicating interactions and
exchanges. The duplicate information was carefully examined and was eliminated while
preparing a database and entering SNA data into excel sheets. Also triangulation was achieved
by including some semi-structured interviews to support SNA analysis. Ethical concerns of
getting IRB approval before conducting the study were met and additional compliance concerns
and challenges in meeting ethical standards in regions of Pakistan were also met. An IRB
approved and exempt explanation of research is provided in APPENDIX E and F.
4.5 Region Selected for Study
Out of the four provinces that were impacted by the floods namely: Khyber
PakhtoonKhwa (KPK), Punjab, Balochistan, and Sindh, one province was chosen for provincial
level analysis and district level response. The Punjab province was chosen for this study. A valid
question to ask is: why is the provincial level of response only going to focus on the Punjab
province and the highly impacted districts within this province? The first reason is that it is not
possible to study and analyze the response networks in all localities throughout the country due
to the scale and scope of the disaster. Also the timeline of events shows that the not all regions
and provinces were impacted together or similarly. The floods started in KPK and Balochistan,
and then moved along to the southern parts of the country. So the nature of destruction and
impact was very quick in the mountainous regions in KPK and Balochistan, while the nature of
destruction varied in terms of the pace and scale in flat regions of Punjab and Sindh. According
to a flood assessment carried out by the WFP (2010) results show that KPK suffered the highest
number of fatalities due to the sudden onset of flashfloods on the July 22, 2010. Although
precious lives were lost, the irrigated and cultivated lands did not suffer. KPK province was
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more or less well-prepared to deal with the disaster. In KPK there were already many projects
going on for community development and community-based disaster risk management (UN,
2011), and there was already a strong military presence in the region which meant quick access
to transportation, evacuation and relief goods. Balochistan suffered the least due to its low
population density and huge mass of rangeland (almost 80% of the land area is rangeland).
The Punjab province due to massive riverine flooding which is a slower phenomenon
than flashfloods but its impact was huge due to the fact that areas surrounding River Indus are
highly populated and highly irrigated. The Punjab province also has the second highest amount
of damage costs amongst all provinces (Table 4). Moreover, Declan Walsh, a journalist from The
Guardian describes the response and relief efforts in the Punjab province to be a chaotic and
patchy. There were also certain political allegations floating about how floodwaters were
diverted from certain regions to other regions (UN, 2011).

Table 4 Estimated Provincial Damage Assessments (adapted source: ADB, 2010)
Province

Damage Costs PKR millions

Damage Costs USD million

Balochistan

52,676

620

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

99,625

1,172

Punjab

219,272

2,580

Sindh

372,341

4,380

Interestingly, in the wake of the disaster when all provinces had a functional PDMA,
Punjab was the only province that had failed to establish a formal body with a formal Director
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General leading the efforts. It is only after the Floods had started that the CM of Punjab quickly
approached Khalid Sherdil, the founding Director General of PDMA, to head the PDMA in
Punjab and coordinate the relief and response functions. This makes studying the response
network in Punjab certainly more interesting and important due to the political influences and
complexities in the response stage of managing disasters.
This chapter addressed the methods utilized to answer the research question pertaining to
this research. The chapter has detailed the process and sources of content analysis and document
analysis along with the process followed for conducting interviews. The next chapter reports the
results of the SNA at each level of governance and compares actual networks with planned
response systems. The results are substantiated and supported with the result of semi-structured
interviews and also some excerpts from content analysis of newspapers and after-action and
situation reports. The last section of the chapter highlights key findings to address the hypotheses
in the study.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of the SNA conducted through content analysis of
newspaper articles, after-action, and situation reports. SNA was used to identify both the actual
networks during response and also the network response system identified through existing
disaster management plans. Along with content analysis and document analysis, some semistructured interviews of key representatives and agencies identified through SNA were also
conducted.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section analyzes the local level disaster
response through SNA analysis and additional document analysis. The second section discusses
the provincial disaster response pertaining to the Province of Punjab. The third section describes
the national-international level of response through SNA results and document analysis. These
sections highlight some important additional information collected through semi-structured
interviews that contribute to understanding the various factors that were either hindering or
facilitating the collaborative response in the 2010 Pakistan Floods. Throughout these sections the
actual response networks are compared with the recommended and planned response networks
and frameworks that exist in previous and existing disaster management plans. These planned
response networks and structures are compared with the actual response networks in the 2010
Floods to examine response effectiveness and identify the key agencies that are still missing in
recently developed plans. The fourth part synthesizes the overall results and provides some
important discussions and findings. The last part of the chapter addresses the study hypotheses.
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5.1 Local/District Level Response to the 2010 Floods
According to the Punjab’s Provincial Disaster Management Authority [PDMA] (2013)
the worst affected districts in the Province were Bhakkar, Layyah, DG Khan, Mianwali,
Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh, and Rahim Yar Khan. Punjab’s government, backed by the Provincial
Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) led the relief efforts to provide relief in impacted
regions. Quick evacuations were carried out in many regions and temporary shelters and later on
tent villages were developed for the displaced people of Punjab. Due to the massive scale of the
Floods, the NDMA along with respective PDMAs had appealed to the international community
and to the UN particularly, to provide support in managing the unprecedented disaster (PDMA,
2013). Through an interview with the former chairman of NDMA, Lt. General Nadeem Ahmed it
was found that at the onset of the Floods (early August) Punjab was criticized for not
establishing a fully functional PDMA since an Act for the establishment of PDMAs and DDMAs
had been passed in 2007 and the Punjab government had failed to take action. It was in the midst
of the disaster that the CM of Punjab, Shahbaz Shareef quickly appointed a PDMA chief and
made the organization operational (N. Ahmed, personal communication, September 23, 2013).
During the 2010 Floods, Mr. Khalid Sherdil was appointed as the founding Director
General of Punjab’s PDMA. He was involved in leading the relief and reconstruction efforts
during the 2010 Floods. PDMA’s Major accomplishments during the relief phase were the
development of Model Villages in Punjab for the internally displaced people (PDMA, 2013).
These model villages are a huge success story in the country and during a telephonic
conversation with Mr. Sherdil, he re-iterated the success of this project and the partnerships and
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collaborations it required. Moreover, another major accomplishment led by Mr. Sherdil during
the relief and rehab phase was the disbursement of the Watan Cards (flood-damage
compensation debit cards) that were provided to more than 1 million families in Punjab. These
are well planned efforts and deserve to be recognized as part of a successful response and
recovery strategy developed by the Punjab government and the PDMA.
However, during the initial phase of response – the first 3-4 weeks following the onset of
the disaster – provincial governments and other leading agencies such as the PDMAs did not
have enough resources to mobilize massive recovery and reconstruction strategies, but were
more focused on providing relief for basic survival needs of the affected population. Relief in the
early stages (3-4 weeks) majorly concerns the distribution of basic food and non-food items
(NFIs) such as temporary shelter, clothes, blankets, and jerry cans. The former NDMA Chief, Lt.
General Nadeem Ahmed suggests that initial response should focus on four main elements:
Shelter, Food, Health, and Water and Sanitation (N. Ahmed, personal communication,
September 23, 2013). Thus, at the local response level, these functions require immediate
mobilization of relevant resources from both communities and international UN cluster agencies
that have a huge donor support base.
The content analysis and document analysis of the National Disaster Response Plan of
2010 shows the recommended/planned response framework/system at the local/district level. The
following sections of the chapter discuss both the planned and actual response networks in detail;
identify the similarities and differences between them, and the important characteristics of both
actual and planned response systems.
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Out of the 7 highly affected districts in Punjab, immediate response systems and
networks were identified in two of the 7 districts in this chapter. Two districts that were chosen
in this study are: Dera Ghazi Khan (DG Khan), and Muzaffargarh. These two were chosen due to
the high amount of total damages incurred and suffered in these regions. Table 5 and Table 6
below shows the comparison of the damages incurred in these districts and some basic
information on the initial relief operations provided by Punjab’s PDMA (PDMA, 2013).

Table 5 Initial Damage Assessment in worst hit districts in Punjab (Source: adapted from
PDMA, 2013)
District

Estimated
Population

Number
of
Villages
Affected

Infrastructure
Damages

Damages
to the
Education
Sector

Livestock
Damages

Agriculture
Damages/
Crops
Affected

Total
Damage
s in
billions

Bhakkar

1,346,000

64

Rs. 1.69
billion

Rs. 1.63
billion

200,000
animals

99,060
acres

Rs. 6.47

Layyah

1,486,000

70

Rs. 0.53
billion

Rs. 1.38

380,000

143,500

Rs.4.41

DG Khan

2,219,000

237

Rs. 2.23
billion

Rs. 3.35
billion

1,500,000

148,146
acres

Rs.
10.42

Mianwali

6,936,000

154

Rs. 2.25
billion

Rs. 3.32
billion

120,000

31,945
acres

Rs.
10.82

Rajanpur

1,485,000

168

Rs. 4.03
billion

Rs. 3.30
billion

600,000

355,984
acres

Rs.
11.37

Muzaffargarh

3,579,000

323

Rs. 5.61
billion

Rs. 5.65
billion

2,500,000

400, 260
acres

Rs.
16.66

Rahim Yar
Khan

4,198,000

82

Rs. 2.85
billion

Rs. 3.39
billion

900,000

136,046
acres

Rs. 9.9
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Table 6 Relief Information in worst hit areas of Punjab (Source: adapted from PDMA, 2013)
District

People
Evacuated

People provided
with First Aid

Police Relief
Camps

NGOs
participating in
relief efforts

Bhakkar

1,308

472

7

7

Layyah

2,878

149

35

9

DG Khan

11,156

2,393

25

9

Mianwali

0

431

14

8

Rajanpur

8,208

1,311

14

9

Muzaffargarh

10,841

400

44

19

Rahim Yar
Khan

586

96

64

9

Before discussing the actual response networks that emerged in the highly impacted
districts it is important to provide an overview of the existing plans, Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), and frameworks available for disaster response at the local-level. The next
section provides a discussion on the existing response framework at the district level (as
recommended by the NDRP of 2010).
5.1.1 District Disaster Response Plans and Frameworks
The National Disaster Management Ordinance of 2007 orders that all districts should
establish DDMAs. The NDRP of 2010 suggests that all districts have established these
authorities but many of them are not functional. The DDMAs are essentially led by Head
officials of Tehsil (an administrative division that heads several villages and municipalities) and
District Administration such as DCOs (NDMA, 2010). Thus, in the case where a DDMA is not
117

operational, it is fair to make the assumption that the coordinating and leading body for the
response system will either be the Tehsil Administration or the District Administration according
to the response system structured in the NDRP of 2010. Since the PDMA was not functional at
the onset of the 2010 Floods, it is fair to make the assumption that DDMAs also essentially
existed in plans and on paper in the provincial districts. The former Chairman of NDMA and the
Chief Secretary of Punjab both confirmed that DDMAs existed on paper only.
The 2010 NDRP for Pakistan includes a detailed appendix of the SOPs for district level
organizations and agencies. Appendix B provides the SOPs for the response phase of district
level agencies as provided in the NDRP of 2010. Appendix H provides a list of abbreviations for
the agencies in the planned district response framework. Through a document analysis and a
thorough review of the SOPs, SNA was utilized to develop the planned response framework for
district level response. The planned response network is shown in the Figure 8.
In Figure 8 the DDMA, DEOC, and the TMA all play central roles within the network.
Although according to the National Disaster Response Plan of 2010 most districts have
established a DDMA. Mr. Khalid Sherdil, the Director General of PDMA during the floods of
2010, and now the Principle Secretary to the Chief Minister Punjab, also suggests that on paper
and through plans district level disaster management authorities have been identified, but they
lack the operational capacity to function (K. Sherdil, Personal Communication, July 25, 2013).
The Chief Secretary of Punjab during the 2010 floods, Mr. Nasir Mehmood Khosa also suggests
that the districts and local governments lack the capacity to develop fully functional disaster
management authorities (N. M. Khosa, Personal Communication, July 6, 2013).
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Figure 8 District Disaster Response Planned Network
Through a pictorial representation of the planned response network, the local response is
fairly centralized. The response system shown in Figure 8 has a density of 0.079, with a number
of ties equal to 136, and an average degree of 3.238. The density of 0.079 shows a sparsely
connected network, not a densely connected one. One advantage is that it does not put
unnecessary pressures of coordination on many organizations (Provan et al., 2007), although it
does restrict communication flows and information and resource exchange within the network
(Rowley, 1997).
Figure 9 shows a response system where a DEOC has not been activated, a highly likely
scenario since the district level governments do not have the operational capacity to activate a
fully functional DEOC, nor function or operate DDMAs. A look into actual response
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frameworks will show how the planned response system is different than the emergent, actual
response system during the disaster events.

Figure 9 District Disaster Response Planned Network (without a DEOC activated)
According to the Freeman’s degree centrality measures, the DDMA is the most central
organization, followed by the DEOC and TMA. The results for degree centrality are shown in
Table 7. According to the plan the DCO or TMA head leads the DDMA so they would be
playing the most central role. It is important to understand that these agency heads on a regular
basis manage the day to day functions in the districts. Thus during disasters they are expected to
lead the disaster management and coordination efforts as well. Instead of the hiring professional
emergency managers at the district level, the districts (due to the lack of capacity and funds) rely
on DCOs to manage disasters.
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Table 7 Degree Centrality Scores of District Level Planned Response System
Degree NrmDegree
Share
------------ ------------ -----------DDMA
25.000
60.976
0.184
DEOC
14.000
34.146
0.103
TMA
11.000
26.829
0.081
Health Dept
7.000
17.073
0.051
Police Dept
6.000
14.634
0.044
PHED
6.000
14.634
0.044
Irrigation Dept
5.000
12.195
0.037
Agri Dept
4.000
9.756
0.029
W & S Dept
4.000
9.756
0.029
CSW & T Dept
4.000
9.756
0.029
INGOs
3.000
7.317
0.022
NGOs
3.000
7.317
0.022
F & W Dept
3.000
7.317
0.022
Food Dept
3.000
7.317
0.022
Edu Dept
3.000
7.317
0.022
Industries Dept.
2.000
4.878
0.015
Armed Forces
2.000
4.878
0.015
DCO
2.000
4.878
0.015
Livestock Dept
2.000
4.878
0.015
UN Agencies
2.000
4.878
0.015
HOs
2.000
4.878
0.015
Charity and Donor Agencies
2.000
4.878
0.015
Private Telecom
2.000
4.878
0.015
Firefighters
1.000
2.439
0.007
CBOs
1.000
2.439
0.007
Farmer's org.
1.000
2.439
0.007
Emb and UN Officials
1.000
2.439
0.007
NDMA
1.000
2.439
0.007
Local Media
1.000
2.439
0.007
Provincial CSW & T Dept
1.000
2.439
0.007
Provincial Health Dept
1.000
2.439
0.007
Provincial Police Dept
1.000
2.439
0.007
Provincial Irrigation Dept
1.000
2.439
0.007
NEOC
1.000
2.439
0.007
Secretary Food Dept
1.000
2.439
0.007
SW HOs
1.000
2.439
0.007
PDMA
1.000
2.439
0.007
PEOC
1.000
2.439
0.007
UC
1.000
2.439
0.007
Volunteers
1.000
2.439
0.007
WASH INGOs
1.000
2.439
0.007
Local Mosques
1.000
2.439
0.007
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Also according to freeman’s degree centrality measures the overall network centralization
is 55.73%. The planned network does show that few organizations such as the DDMA, DEOC,
and TMA are centrally located and are powerful entities in terms of controlling resources and
determining information and resource exchanges between other organizations within the
network.
Other centrality measures such as betweeness and closeness/eigenvector results are
shown in the Table 8 below. These results also show that DDMA, DEOC, TMA, and also the
Punjab Health Department (PHD) (with a high eigenvector centrality score) have the power to
mobilize other responding agencies within the planned district level network. These central
players enjoy control and power over others in the network and are perhaps capable for
managing resource and information flows. However, it is interesting to note that with positional
power comes the responsibility to bridge others by providing access to sources of information
and resources (Prell et al., 2009). Thus, these central players in the planned network require the
capacity and capabilities to lead an effective response operation. Currently with the existing
institutional structure in place, the DCOs are unable to lead DDMAs and activate fully functional
DEOCs. Major investment is needed to implement these frameworks in districts. In Punjab most
of the rural areas of Punjab were devastated with the 2010 Floods and some of these were
experiencing floods of this extent for the first time. According to General Nadeem, the NDMA
Chief, most local districts that experience monsoon rains every year take measures to mitigate
the threat and prepare accordingly. However, in 2010 Floods, due to climate change, previous
years’ deforestation, and flashfloods some areas were totally taken by surprise.
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Table 8 Centrality scores of the District Level Planned Network
Degree Eigenve Between
------- ------- ------Agri Dept 4.000 0.184 1.000
Armed Forces 2.000 0.104 0.000
CBOs 1.000 0.036 0.000
Charity and Donor Agencies 2.000 0.115 0.000
CSW & T Dept 4.000 0.140 79.000
DCO 2.000 0.059 6.000
DDMA 25.000 0.548 534.500
DEOC 14.000 0.384 142.167
Edu Dept 3.000 0.137 40.000
Emb and UN Officials 1.000 0.024 0.000
Farmer's org. 1.000 0.024 0.000
Firefighters 1.000 0.020 0.000
Food Dept 3.000 0.137 40.000
F & W Dept 3.000 0.137 40.000
Health Dept 7.000 0.250 44.667
HOs 2.000 0.103 0.000
Industries Dept. 2.000 0.134 0.000
INGOs 3.000 0.151 0.000
Irrigation Dept 5.000 0.168 79.000
Livestock Dept 2.000 0.134 0.000
Local Mosques 1.000 0.036 0.000
Local Media 1.000 0.036 0.000
NDMA 1.000 0.079 0.000
NEOC 1.000 0.079 0.000
NGOs 3.000 0.151 0.000
Private Telecom 2.000 0.134 0.000
PDMA 1.000 0.079 0.000
PEOC 1.000 0.079 0.000
Police Dept 6.000 0.165 95.833
Provincial CSW & T Dept 1.000 0.020 0.000
Provincial Health Dept 1.000 0.031 0.000
Provincial Police Dept 1.000 0.024 0.000
Provincial Irrigation Dept 1.000 0.024 0.000
PHED 6.000 0.215 80.333
Secretary Food Dept 1.000 0.020 0.000
SW HOs 1.000 0.020 0.000
TMA 11.000 0.247 144.500
UN Agencies 2.000 0.115 0.000
UC 1.000 0.036 0.000
Volunteers 1.000 0.020 0.000
WASH INGOs 1.000 0.031 0.000
W & S Dept 4.000 0.176 1.000
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Clique analysis was also carried out on the planned network to show the types of
preferred cliques and subgroups in the recommended district level response system. The Results
of the clique analysis are shown in Table 9.

Table 9 Clique Analysis in District Planned Network
18 cliques found.
1: Agri Dept DDMA DEOC Irrigation Dept
2: Agri Dept DDMA DEOC W & S Dept
3: CSW & T Dept DDMA DEOC
4: DDMA DEOC Edu Dept
5: DDMA DEOC Food Dept
6: DDMA DEOC F & W Dept
7: DDMA DEOC Health Dept PHED
8: DDMA DEOC Industries Dept.
9: DDMA DEOC Livestock Dept
10: DDMA DEOC Private Telecom
11: DDMA DEOC Police Dept
12: Charity and Donor Agencies DDMA TMA
13: Armed Forces DDMA W & S Dept
14: DDMA HOs Police Dept
15: DDMA Health Dept INGOs TMA
16: DDMA Health Dept NGOs TMA
17: DDMA Health Dept PHED TMA
18: DDMA TMA UN Agencies

With 18 cliques identified in the planned network, there seems to be a great deal of
collaborative activity taking place with DDMA and DEOC as the common members in most
cliques. To get a clearer picture on clique membership overlap the results for the Hierarchical
Clustering of the Overlap Matrix were also analyzed. It is observed that DDMA and DEOC are
close to each other since they share 11 clique memberships in common. This makes sense since
DDMA is tasked to activate DEOC. Another interesting finding is that the TMA and Health
Department share 3 clique memberships in common as well.
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Figure 10 Hierarchical Clustering of Overlap Matrix in the District Planned Response Network
The cliques show the types of recommended coordination and collaborative response
subgroups that need to exist in the actual response. This list of cliques will be compared with the
actual cliques found in districts to see if the planned collaborative activities were taking place or
not. This will help to gauge whether the response was collaborative and effective.
Thus, overall the planned district level response network depicts a centralized network
lead by either the DDMA/DEOC and also the TMA and shows collaborative activity around
these players through clique analysis results. The Punjab Health Department (PHD) is also
playing an important role in mobilizing other relevant players within the planned network.
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5.1.2 District Muzzafargarh Response Network/System
Muzzafargarh district is a district in south Punjab that has a population of more than
3,800,000 people. The district is divided into four Tehsils: Alipur, Jatoi, Kot Addu and
Muzaffargarh. As discussed earlier, Muzaffargarh was one of the districts that suffered the most
during the 2010 floods. A total of 323 villages were affected in the district (PDMA, 2013). Also
in less than a month, over 10,000 people were evacuated in the district and many relief camps
were established for the displaced and the evacuees. Through content analysis of newspapers, it
was found that the Pakistan Army played a crucial role in evacuating the affected population in
the district. The following figure shows the response network in Muzaffargarh District.

Figure 11 Muzzafargarh Response Network
The response network arrived at through content analysis reflects a very scattered
network with different subgroups and a number of isolated players albeit important players such
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as the Irrigation Department, the Commissioner of Muzaffargarh, Pakistan Red Cross Society
(PRCS). Such important players as isolates shows that the network formed through content
analysis may not show the complete picture. However, it does provide important information
such as the response network is highly dispersed and fairly decentralized, a finding in contrast
with the planned district response system developed through the NDRP of 2010. The overall
density of the network is = 0.027 with an average degree as 1.026 and the number of ties to be
40. This is a sparsely connected response network with a network centralization of 13.798%.
Thus, a decentralized network shows that there are not any powerful and dominant players in the
network that are leading the overall response efforts in the district.
5.1.2.1 Key Players in the Network
In order to get information on the most central and powerful players in the response
network, centrality measures were applied. According to the centrality measures applied in Table
10, 11, and 12 (degree, closeness, betweenness) the most powerful organization in the network is
the Punjab Health Department (PHD), not the Muzzafargarh District Administration/ DCO.
According to the degree centrality scores – the power of the Muzzafargarh District
Administration is the same as that of the Army or WHO.
The Army in this network actually entails not a single organization or a unit. Through
content analysis it was reflected that the Army is actually playing a very important role in
response operations. The Army in the network not only includes Army Corps arranging for the
distribution of relief or evacuating civilians but also includes Army personnel managing camps,
Army Engineers restoring damaged infrastructure, ISPR providing information, and the Chief of
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Army Staff visiting impacted regions. Thus, the network may not be providing the complete
picture of the various functions an organization or various units of an organization are playing in
response.

Table 10 Centrality scores in Muzzafargarh District
Degree NrmDegree
Share
------------ ------------ -----------Punjab Health Dept
6.000
15.789
0.150
WHO
3.000
7.895
0.075
Army
3.000
7.895
0.075
Muzaffargarh District Administration
3.000
7.895
0.075
Mayo Hospital
2.000
5.263
0.050
UNICEF
2.000
5.263
0.050
CM
2.000
5.263
0.050
PMA
2.000
5.263
0.050
Services Hospital
2.000
5.263
0.050
Medical Teams from various lahore hospitals
1.000
2.632
0.025
SW Dept
1.000
2.632
0.025
Nishtar Hospital
1.000
2.632
0.025
Saudi Arabia
1.000
2.632
0.025
AIMC
1.000
2.632
0.025
UAE
1.000
2.632
0.025
UNFPA
1.000
2.632
0.025
UHS
1.000
2.632
0.025
PML (N)
1.000
2.632
0.025
Local NGOs
1.000
2.632
0.025
EDO (H)
1.000
2.632
0.025
Rescue 1122
1.000
2.632
0.025
PMC
1.000
2.632
0.025
Punjab Industrial Estates
1.000
2.632
0.025
WFP
1.000
2.632
0.025

Also through the results of the various centrality measures it can be determined that the
medical relief and health-related response operations are the central response function in this
network. This is an important finding. Through content analysis, and a detailed study of what
types of agencies were involved in the different response activities – it was identified that the

128

distribution of food and NFIs is not difficult to arrange and many organizations isolated in the
network such as the Edhi Foundation visit the impacted areas and provide relief directly, without
having to go through any bureaucratic procedure or formal channels involving government
authorities. Moreover, response functions such as conducting situation analysis and provision of
funds and donations also do not require extensive collaborations. However, the provision of
medical relief does require coordination and collaboration amongst a number of health-related
agencies and organizations. This reflects strong organizational resource dependencies in the case
of medical relief provision.

Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for Degree Centrality Scores in Muzaffargarh
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Degree NrmDegree
Mean
1.026
2.699
Std Dev
1.209
3.181
Sum
40.000
105.263
Variance
1.461
10.117
SSQ
98.000 678.670
MCSSQ
56.974 394.559
Euc Norm
9.899
26.051
Minimum
0.000
0.000
Maximum
6.000
15.789
N of Obs
39.000
39.000

Share
0.026
0.030
1.000
0.001
0.061
0.036
0.247
0.000
0.150
39.000

Network Centralization = 13.80%
Blau Heterogeneity = 6.13%.
Normalized (IQV) = 3.65%

Table 11 also shows a decentralized network according to Freeman’s degree centrality
measure. The mean degree score and the variance scores are both very low indicating a
decentralized structure with less power differentials as the maximum score for degree centrality
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is only 6. Closeness centrality scores are reflected through the Betweenness centrality scores in
Table 12 and indicate that the Punjab Health Department (PHD) is clearly an agency serving as
the focal agency of contact and playing a role of a broker linking other agencies and resources.

Table 12 Betweeness Centrality Results
Punjab Health Department
Mayo Hospital
Chief Minister Punjab (CM)
Pakistan Medical Association (PMA)
Muzaffargarh District Administration
Services Hospital
WHO
Army
UNICEF

100.00
66.00
60.00
60.00
55.00
52.00
44.00
31.00
16.00

Sometimes a network needs to be highly decentralized and disconnected so that various
subgroups and cliques can be developed to focus on varied response operations and functions. A
Clique Analysis shows whether the subgroups in the network are performing specific response
functions by working together in cohesive and collaborative groups. The results for the clique
analysis show that there were no cliques in the network which reflects a highly scattered network
and less collaborative one, while the planned network discussed earlier clearly indicates the
presence of collaborative sub-groups within the network.
5.1.3 District Dera Ghazi Khan Response Network/System
Dera Ghazi Khan (DG Khan) district is divided into two main Tehsils: Dera Ghazi Khan
and Taunsa Sharif. DG Khan was one of the worst affected districts out of the 78 districts
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impacted. As discussed earlier it incurred losses of over Rs. 10 billion (PDMA, 2013). Figure 12
shows the response network in DG Khan district.

Figure 12 Response Network in District DG Khan
The response network in DG Khan is clearly scattered and dispersed into isolated
response clusters. Apart from the clearly isolated players such as the Pakistan Air Force (PAF),
PRCS, and WFP, there are a number of agencies that are collaborating or coordinating with one
or two players and lie outside the central response network. Due to these scattered response
activities, the response network has a network centralization of 17.01%, depicting a highly
decentralized network, compared to the 55.73% centralization in the planned district response
system. Similarly, the density of the network is also very low with a density score of = 0.041,
number of ties = 38, and average degree = 1.226. However, if the connected network in the
sociogram is observed and examined, there are some parallels that can be drawn with the planned
network. A DDMA is essentially run by the head of the district government and the DCO of DG
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Khan lies at the center of the connected part of the network. The DCO is also directly connected
to important players such as the Armed Forces, the Irrigation Department, Local NGOs, and the
Chief Minister of Punjab (the CM’s Relief Fund also providing funding to impacted districts).
5.1.3.1. Key Players in the Response System
In order to get information on the most central and powerful players in the response
network, centrality measures were applied. Table 13 identifies the central players in the network.

Table 13 Degree Centrality Results

CM Punjab
DCO DGK
PHD
Army
AWF
NHA
PARCO
Army Engineers
DCO Sheikhupura
Irrigation Dept
ISPR
SWS Sheikupura
NDMA
Nespak
BV Hospital
PMHR
CS Punjab
UNICEF
Ppolice
QMC
PID
Local NGOs
WHO

Degree
6.000
4.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

NrmDegree Share
20.000
0.158
13.333
0.105
13.333
0.105
10.000
0.079
6.667
0.053
6.667
0.053
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026
3.333
0.026

According to the degree centrality measures, the most embedded player in the network is
the CM of Punjab. He is the most influential and powerful player in the network and has access
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to many resources and information. The DCO DG Khan and PHD also have a central role to play
in the connected network.

Table 14 Eigenvector Centrality Results
Eigenvec nEigenvec
--------- --------APTMA
0.000 0.000
AWF -0.000 -0.000
Army
0.326 46.047
Army Engineers
0.000 0.000
CS Punjab 0.195 27.618
CM Punjab
0.559 79.029
DCO DGK
0.409 57.836
DGK Comm
0.000 0.000
HHRD
0.000 0.000
Irrigation Dept
0.143 20.212
ISPR
0.000 0.000
NHA
0.000 0.000
NDMA
0.000 0.000
Nespak
0.000 0.000
PAF
0.000 0.000
Lahore Corps -1.2E-0043-1.7E-0041
PML-Q
0.000 0.000
PRCS -0.000 -0.000
PMHR
0.195 27.618
PHD 0.409 57.836
PID
0.195 27.618
Ppolice
0.195 27.618
DCO Sheikhupura
0.000 0.000
SWS Sheikupura -0.000 -0.000
UNICEF -0.000 -0.000
WFP
0.000 0.000
WHO
0.000 0.000
Local NGOs
0.143 20.212
QMC
0.143 20.212
BV Hospital 0.143 20.212
PARCO
0.114 16.092
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Eigenvector centrality results in Table 14 show how agencies differ in their power to
mobilize others. According to the eigenvector results, the CM Punjab and the DCO DGK have
the highest eigenvector values in the network. Similar results are found for the betweenness
centrality measures.
Freeman’s betweenness scores provide similar results when the CM Punjab, District
government of DG Khan headed by the DCO and the PHD play the most focal roles of
connecting agencies and brokering relationships for resource mobilization and exchange in the
response system.

Table 15 Betweeness Centrality Results for DG Khan

Betweenness nBetweenness
------------ -----------CM Punjab
42.500
9.770
DCO DGK
26.000
5.977
PHD
26.000
5.977
Army
15.500
3.563
AWF
1.000
0.230
NHA
1.000
0.230

A clique analysis was run to find out that there exist no cliques in this district response
network as well. The N-clique analysis was then carried out to relax the assumption of all actors
connected to each other. At the 2-clique level, 7 cliques were found. These results show that the
most of the important players at the district level are included in network and involved in various
cliques/sub-networks performing important response functions. These players are: CM Punjab,
the Armed Forces, and DCO D G Khan.
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Table 16 Clique Analysis Results for DG Khan
7 2-cliques found.
1: CS Punjab CM Punjab DCO DGK PMHR PHD PID Ppolice
2: Army CM Punjab DCO DGK PHD
3: Army CM Punjab DCO DGK Irrigation Dept Local NGOs
4: Army CM Punjab PHD QMC BV Hospital
5: AWF DCO Sheikhupura SWS Sheikupura
6: NHA NDMA Nespak
7: Army DCO DGK PHD PARCO

Another key finding from the clique analysis shows that the presence on humanitarian
agencies especially INGOs and multilateral UN agencies is missing in field work. The Army is
partnering closely with the provincial and district government and also local NGOs but INGOs
and UN agencies are missing. A senior official from the Public Relations office of the Pakistan
Army, who was involved in the Pakistan Floods emphasized that the Army was collaborating
with the civil administration as well as NGOs in the field. “At the federal level the Army was
closely partnering with the NDMA, at the provincial levels the respective PDMAs and at the
district level the district administrations”. Also he suggested that “as per the constitution of
Pakistan, the Army is always called in to provide relief by civil administration if they feel that
they need assistance in the case of an emergency or a natural disaster” (Senior Official of Armed
Forces, Personal Communication, September 25, 2013).
5.2 Provincial Level Response to the 2010 Floods
The 2010 NDRP for Pakistan includes a detailed appendix of the SOPs for provincial
level organizations and agencies. Appendix C provides the SOPs for the response phase of
provincial level agencies as provided in the NDRP of 2010. Through a document analysis and a
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thorough review of the SOPs, SNA was utilized to develop the planned response framework for
provincial level response. The planned response network is shown in the Figure 13 below.

Figure 13 Planned Provincial Level Response Network
The planned provincial response system is a fairly centralized structure with a network
centralization of 48.69%. Its density is low with a total density score of 0.059 with a number of
total ties of 170 and an average degree of 3.148. The most central player from the visualization is
the PDMA, being closely followed by the PEOC. The PEOC is the provincial emergency
operations center that is mainly activated through, and by the PDMA. This essentially makes
PDMA the most powerful organization in the planned response system.
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Table 17 Planned Response Network Centrality Scores
Degree Eigenvector Betweenness
PDMA 28.000 0.553 975.418
Health Department 4.000 0.133 104.056
Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) 5.000 0.143 99.319
Education Department 5.000 0.174 59.897
Agriculture Department 6.000 0.196 108.897
Livestock Department 5.000 0.161 108.897
Irrigation Department 6.000 0.227 12.430
Works and Services Department 6.000 0.209 36.233
Local Govt Rural Development 7.000 0.155 172.993
Culture, SW and Tourism Department 6.000 0.165 158.897
Home Department 8.000 0.213 110.389
Forest, WildLife and Fisheries Dept 4.000 0.101 103.000
IT Department 2.000 0.084 52.000
Industries Commerce Transport and Labor Dept 2.000 0.127 1.056
Information and Archives Dept 5.000 0.154 104.556
Mines and Minerals Dept 2.000 0.109 3.381
NEOC 2.000 0.108 0.000
PDMC 1.000 0.082 0.000
NDMA 3.000 0.136 1.814
Armed Forces 4.000 0.178 3.417
Media 2.000 0.115 0.000
INGOs 1.000 0.082 0.000
NGOs 2.000 0.097 0.000
UN Agencies 2.000 0.113 0.000
Charities 2.000 0.113 0.000
CM 1.000 0.082 0.000
HOs 2.000 0.113 0.000
Governor 1.000 0.082 0.000
Private sector Agencies 1.000 0.082 0.000
PEOC 12.000 0.305 213.846
Medical Teams 1.000 0.020 0.000
Health HOs 1.000 0.020 0.000
District level PHEDs 1.000 0.021 0.000
Local WASH NGOs 2.000 0.044 1.833
WASH INGOs 2.000 0.044 1.833
DDMAs 7.000 0.184 35.150
District Edu Depts 1.000 0.026 0.000
Farmers 1.000 0.029 0.000
Agriculture Extention Workers 1.000 0.029 0.000
District Livestock Depts 1.000 0.024 0.000
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Degree Eigenvector Betweenness
Livestock HOs
District W and SD
District LG & RD Depatments
UNICEF
District SW deparments
Social welfare Cente
USAR teams
CBOs
Firefighting Units
Federal Agencies
Provincial Ministries
SW HOs
DCOs
DEOCs

1.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.024
0.054
0.023
0.023
0.024
0.024
0.032
0.015
0.015
0.023
0.023
0.024
0.032
0.012

0.000
1.688
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Centrality results also depict that PDMA is the most influential player in the response
network. It has a large control over other players and resource and information flows. With the
high level of positional power, it is assumed that the PDMA has the capacity to function in the
planned position depicted through the network.
In terms of the functional response, the Punjab Monsoon Contingency Plan of 2012
identifies different organizations carrying out different response functions. The plan identified
the Rescue 1122, Punjab Police, and the Civil Defense Authorities to be responsible for search
and rescue and evacuation operations; the relief management functions to be mobilized and
implemented by the Health Department, Social Welfare Department (SWD), and Construction &
Works Department (C&W); the monitoring of risk prone regions to be carried out by the
Meteorological Department, Irrigation Department, Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) and the Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA); Communication and media
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information management needs to be coordinated by PDMA and the Information Department
(NDMA, 2012). The existence of these functional partnerships during actual response will be
analyzed to gauge whether response was collaborative and effective. Let me now compare this
with the actual provincial response network that emerged during the 2010 Floods.
5.2.1 Provincial Response Network/System
Although the country has experienced flooding every year after 2010, 2010 remains to be
the worst year of flooding for the Punjab province. The results of SNA are observed at the
provincial level only describing the network that exists at the provincial level and excluding the
resource exchanges and relationships that exist between provincial actors that are categorically
operating in the local arena or transactions and interactions that are taking place at the district
level. To ensure that only the provincial level response network is captured, all local level
interactions and transactions are excluded from this analysis.
The provincial network below shows a fairly decentralized network with few central and
powerful players. The network centralization score is 19.54% and according to density measures,
the average number of ties within the network are only: 0.018, with the total number of ties
equaling 144. Therefore this seems to be a clearly less dense network. The Figure 14 shows
strong hubs within the network. The identified hubs that are observed from the figure are: CM
Punjab, Health Department, PRCS, and UNICEF.
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Figure 14 Provincial Disaster Response Network
According to freeman’s degree centrality measures the most central player is the CM of
Punjab with the degree centrality of 19. The Punjab Health Department (PHD) is also one of the
key central players at the provincial level of response (degree centrality of 13) closely being
followed by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS). Similar results are shown for
eigenvector and betweeness centrality. PDMA, on the other hand is not playing a central role in
the emergent network.
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Table 18 Centrality Scores of the Provincial Response Network
Degree Eigenvec Between
APTMA 1.000 0.000 0.000
American RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
Austrian RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
BoP 0.000 0.000 0.000
BoR Punjab 1.000 0.115 0.000
Canadian RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
Caritas 0.000 0.000 0.000
CS Punjab 1.000 0.115 0.000
CM Punjab 19.000 0.555 1313.500
Danish RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
Livestock Dept 1.000 0.115 0.000
DAF 1.000 0.115 0.000
DHQ hospitals 1.000 0.082 0.000
FeI 1.000 0.000 0.000
FAP 0.000 0.000 0.000
FFD 0.000 0.000 0.000
FAO 1.000 0.032 0.000
German RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
GoP 2.000 0.133 86.667
Governor Punjab 1.000 0.000 0.000
Guard Grp 1.000 0.115 0.000
HHRD 0.000 0.000 0.000
ICRC 1.000 0.041 0.000
IFRC 1.000 0.041 0.000
IOM 1.000 0.045 0.000
Iranian Consul 1.000 0.115 0.000
JuD 1.000 0.000 0.000
Lhr CoC 1.000 0.000 0.000
Lhr Gym 1.000 0.115 0.000
Mayo Hosp 1.000 0.082 0.000
MoFA 1.000 0.000 0.000
MoH 3.000 0.165 0.000
MoLPA 1.000 0.000 0.000
MoF 0.000 0.000 0.000
MMTs 1.000 0.082 0.000
NDMA 4.000 0.153 231.333
OCHA 4.000 0.063 37.167
Oxfam 1.000 0.045 0.000
Packages Grp 1.000 0.115 0.000
Army 5.000 0.127 181.500
MET 2.000 0.145 0.000
Navy 1.000 0.026 0.000
PPP 1.000 0.000 0.000
PPMA 1.000 0.082 0.000
Rangers 1.000 0.026 0.000
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Degree Eigenvec Between
PDMA 2.000 0.031 0.000
PLF 0.000 0.000 0.000
PM 3.000 0.090 115.000
PML-Q 0.000 0.000 0.000
PRCS 11.000 0.200 535.000
PDA 0.000 0.000 0.000
PIO 1.000 0.082 0.000
PHED 1.000 0.082 0.000
Agri. Dept. 0.000 0.000 0.000
PBIT 1.000 0.115 0.000
Punjab Cabinet 1.000 0.000 0.000
Food Dept. 1.000 0.115 0.000
PEF 0.000 0.000 0.000
EPD 0.000 0.000 0.000
FRC 0.000 0.000 0.000
Governor Punjab 0.000 0.000 0.000
Punjab Goverrment's Relief Fund 0.000 0.000 0.000
Health Dept 13.000 0.395 990.000
Irrigation Dept 1.000 0.026 0.000
PMFPD 1.000 0.019 0.000
PP 2.000 0.141 68.000
Relief Dept 0.000 0.000 0.000
Revenue Dept 1.000 0.000 0.000
PWC 0.000 0.000 0.000
QIE 1.000 0.115 0.000
Rajanpur ROD 0.000 0.000 0.000
R&CMgt 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rescue 1122 2.000 0.145 0.000
Sheikhupura CoCI 0.000 0.000 0.000
SWD 1.000 0.045 0.000
Spanish RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
SSG 0.000 0.000 0.000
SNGPL 2.000 0.024 0.000
Swedish RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
THQs 1.000 0.082 0.000
TMAs 0.000 0.000 0.000
Turkish RC 1.000 0.041 0.000
UK govt 1.000 0.045 0.000
UN 1.000 0.018 0.000
UNDSS 2.000 0.031 0.000
UNFPA 1.000 0.038 0.000
UNICEF 9.000 0.218 305.500
US consul Lhr 1.000 0.115 0.000
US govt. 1.000 0.045 0.000
USAID/OFDA 2.000 0.083 0.000
WFP 6.000 0.089 133.833
WHO 5.000 0.186 83.500
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A very important question to ask at this point is that: Why is the CM of Punjab, who is
playing a merely peripheral role in the planned response network, playing the most important
role in the emergent network – as a leader, as a broker, as the most powerful player? Whereas,
the PDMA is playing a peripheral role in the emergent network. First and foremost, the PDMA
was established during the Floods and was not available, nor had the capacity, to be involved in
the early response and relief operations. One reason for the highest centrality of the CM is
attributed to the fact that the CM of Punjab, rather than playing the role of the Chief in charge of
the provincial response by calling immediate meetings of relevant line departments and agencies
to understand and analyze the situation, is also running a CM’s Relief Fund. It is interesting to
note that the Governor of Punjab, late Salman Taseer, also arranged a relief fund but was unable
to secure many donations. While on the other hand, CM Shahbaz Sharif was able to secure many
funds/donations both locally and from abroad. As a result the CM was in a position to call out
the shots and lead the relief and response efforts in the Province. Also the CM enjoys a good
reputation and is a go-getter and had been proactively involved in visiting flood impacted
regions. PDMA, on the other hand is playing a peripheral role since it is fairly new and did not
have the capabilities or team to carry out large scale relief efforts. Thus, strong leadership clearly
leads to an improved collaborative response. Moreover, a leader with resources to share and
distribute is in a very powerful and influential position within the emergent network.
Nasir Mehmood Khosa, the former Chief Secretary of Punjab, worked very closely with
the CM of Punjab during the 2010 Floods. He suggests that the CM worked as a true collaborator
during the floods working with multiple provincial level departments such as the health
department and the revenue departments. Alongside he worked very closely with federal bodies
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such as the Armed Forces, the NDMA and relevant donor organizations. He was very quick to
reach the local communities and extend them financial support and also monitored the flood
situation in the 9 highly affected regions in Punjab (N. M. Khosa, Personal Communication, July
6, 2013).

Table 19 Cliques in the Provincial Response Network
7 cliques found.
1: CM Punjab MET Rescue 1122
2: MoH UNICEF WHO
3: NDMA OCHA WFP
4: OCHA UNDSS WFP
5: OCHA PDMA WFP
6: UNICEF USAID/OFDA WHO
7: Health Dept UNICEF WHO

Through a clique analysis it is found that most cliques contain humanitarian multi-lateral
agencies such as WHO, UNICEF, and WFP. The CM is part of one of the cliques and is
partnering with Rescue 1122. The CM is not collaborating with any of the multi-lateral agencies.
The predominance of multi-lateral agencies and cluster leads in the clique analysis shows that the
cluster framework as an institutional framework /or interagency framework for responding is
effective. This finding was not fully supported with the information Mr. Nasir Khosa provided.
He suggested that the CM was working side-by-side with the UN agencies and other
international humanitarian agencies (N. M. Khosa, Personal Communication, July 6, 2013). A
major reason why the international agencies were slow to respond to the Floods in the Punjab
region was identified by the NDMA Chairman, Nadeem Ahmed. He narrated the difficulties he
faced in trying to convince UN agencies to move out of the KPK province to southern provinces
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such as Punjab and Sindh. As the disaster was a slow onset disaster and caused havoc and
destruction in KPK before the other provinces were affected, most INGOs and charities focused
their efforts and relief in the KPK Province. According to the NDMA Chairman once
international organizations such as the UN agencies and INGOs start their relief efforts and start
mobilizing all their energies and resources in a particular region it is very difficult to convince
them to move out to a new, more vulnerable region (N. Ahmed, Personal Communication,
September 23, 2013).
5.3 National-International Level Response to the 2010 Floods
This level of disaster response is observed at the international and national level where
interactions are either taking place at the international level, such as awareness campaigns and
raising funds in other countries, or at the national level involving interactions such as the transfer
of donations and funds from foreign countries to Pakistan, or resource sharing and information
exchange between government agencies, humanitarian agencies, and INGOs operating at the
federal level. This level of observation is referred to as the International-National response
network or response system.
Through content analysis of newspapers, both national and international were used (The
News for national coverage of the disaster response and the New York Times and The Guardian,
which are US and UK based for International coverage of response) in analyzing and developing
an emergent response network for the international-national level. Alongside the ReliefWeb
database was used to study after-action and situation reports published by UN cluster leaders and
other international agencies and national agencies such as the PRCS.
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Table 20 Types of Organizations in the National-International Response Network
Type of Organization
Public
Federal/National, State and Local
Foreign/International

Number of Agencies
111
60
51

Nonprofit (including NGOs, INGOs,
Charities)

85

Private
Multilateral
Military-based
Federal/National
Foreign
Political Parties and affiliated agencies
Total

29
23
13
7
6
9
270

As shown in the Table 20, as expected government agencies form a major part of the
international and national disaster response system. These departments and agencies are both
operating at the international and national level in this system. 60 of the total 111 public sector
agencies belong to the Pakistan government. Most of these organizations are federal level
departments and ministries that are tasked to operate at the federal level. Some of the agencies
operating at the federal level are also state/provincial agencies such as Punjab Chief Minister’s
Secretariat, Punjab Governor, Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement
Authority (PaRRSA), PDMAs, and Provincial Health Departments. As expected none of the
organizations operating at the federal and international level are local (city or district) level
government agencies.
The Pakistan Embassies and High Commission offices in consulates in foreign countries
also play an important role in mobilizing resources and funds for disaster response by creating
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awareness in other countries about the scale of the disaster and the urgency for response.
Although these units and agencies are based outside the country they form an important part of
the national government response system.
5.3.1 Planned National Response System

Figure 15 National Planned Response Network
The planned response network/system in Figure 15 also shows a fairly centralized
structure with NDMA, NEOC, and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting along with
PDMAs playing an integral role in the response phase. Centralization and centrality results for
the planned network are shown in Table 21.
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Table 21 Centrality Scores of the Planned National Response Network
Degree NrmDegree
Share
------------ ------------ -----------NDMA
43.000
53.086
0.121
NEOC
23.000
28.395
0.065
PDMAs
15.000
18.519
0.042
M of IB
15.000
18.519
0.042
PRCS
12.000
14.815
0.034
DDMAs
10.000
12.346
0.028
Civil Def
10.000
12.346
0.028
M of FAL
9.000
11.111
0.025
M of D
9.000
11.111
0.025
MET
9.000
11.111
0.025
M of Health
9.000
11.111
0.025
UN
8.000
9.877
0.022
M of SWSE
8.000
9.877
0.022
CGs
8.000
9.877
0.022
M of HW
7.000
8.642
0.020
FFC
7.000
8.642
0.020
CAA
7.000
8.642
0.020
M of FA
7.000
8.642
0.020
PEOCs
7.000
8.642
0.020
M of Interior
7.000
8.642
0.020
M of IT
6.000
7.407
0.017
M of Edu
6.000
7.407
0.017
DEOCs
5.000
6.173
0.014
Rescue 1122
5.000
6.173
0.014
M of LGRD
5.000
6.173
0.014

The descriptive statistics shown in Table 22 depict a high level of variance and thus
reflects a fairly centralized structure with few players having more advantaged and powerful
positions in the network. The centralization figure of 48.92% also depicts a highly centralized
network system. A centralized network may not always be a desired quality in huge response
network such as an international-national response network. Also clique analysis show 61
cliques that reflect a highly collaborative structure.
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Thus, although the planned system is clearly centralized depicting a top-down
management style, the 61 cliques within the network reflect a high level of collaborative activity.
Moreover, the UN cluster approach is also a top-down approach but the break-down of response
into specific response functions such as Food Security, Shelter, Health, Water and Sanitation
makes the system effective in ensuring coordination between responding agencies is taking place
and response is collaborative leading to less wastage and duplication of resources.
Table 22 Freeman’s Centrality Descriptive Statistics for Planned National Response Network
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Degree NrmDegree
------------ ------------ -----------Mean
4.341
5.360
Std Dev
5.869
7.246
Sum
356.000 439.506
Variance
34.444
52.499
SSQ
4370.000 6660.570
MCSSQ 2824.439 4304.891
Euc Norm 66.106
81.612
Minimum
0.000
0.000
Maximum
43.000
53.086
N of Obs
82.000
82.000

Share
0.012
0.016
1.000
0.000
0.034
0.022
0.186
0.000
0.121
82.000

Network Centralization = 48.92%
Blau Heterogeneity = 3.45%.
Normalized (IQV) = 2.26%
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5.3.2 National-International Response System

Figure 16 National-International Response Network
The sociogram in Figure 15 shows the actual national-international response system
during the Floods of 2010. The sociogram above shows the connected network only and omits
the isolates from the figure. If the complete network (with isolates) is viewed it is observed that
there are many players isolated in the whole network. There are also a number of subgroups that
are not integrated and connected to the central, main response network reflected in Figure 15.
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The network centralization is very low for the actual/emergent response system Network Centralization = 2.49%. This is mainly because the network has many isolates and
dyads not connected to the main central network. Also the type of interactions and transactions at
this level are very diverse and of varied nature.
5.3.2.1. Key Players and Partners in Response at the National-International Level
According to the content analysis and SNA results, it was established that the
Government of Pakistan (GoP) and the NDMA played a major coordination and leadership role
in the overall response system. According the NDRP of 2010 the NDMA is tasked to play a
leadership and coordination role ensuring that the response is flowing smoothly and the essential
partnerships are mobilized. According to the NDMA Chairman serving during the Floods:
The nature of collaboration extended from forecasting assistance required, de-conflicting
to ensure all areas were covered and there was no duplication, review daily progress,
undertake strategic decisions in collaboration with all concerned stakeholders,
redistributing assets if required, re-orientation of effort in accordance with the need,
coordination support required from the military, allocation of aviation effort,
establishment of field hospitals that were sent by friendly countries, receiving military
contingents coming for assistance and deploying them in areas where needed, receipt of
bilateral assistance coming thru special chartered flights and moving them to areas where
needed, working out facilitation procedures like visa on arrival, tax exemptions, security
arrangements, standard reporting formats, increased visibility and transparency of
assistance, coordination with other relief providers from the informal sectors like
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corporate world, Banks, Philanthropists, Cluster functioning - UN (OCHA, WFP,
UNICEF, IOM, and WHO), Pakistan Armed Forces, PDMAs, District Coordination
Officers/DCs, SUPARCO for daily satellite imageries, NADRA and few scheduled banks
for Cash Distribution through Watan Cards Scheme, PMD for weather forecasts,
Irrigation departments for monitoring the flood protection structures. (N. Ahmed,
Personal Communication, 22 September, 2013).

Table 23 Degree Centrality Results for the National-International Response Network
Degree NrmDegree
GoP
20.000
1.838
IOM
19.000
1.746
IFRC
15.000
1.379
DEC
15.000
1.379
PRCS
13.000
1.195
NDMA
9.000
0.827
WFP
9.000
0.827
PM
8.000
0.735
UN
7.000
0.643
Army
7.000
0.643
IR
6.000
0.551
UNICEF
6.000
0.551
ADB
4.000
0.368
French gov
4.000
0.368

Share
0.060
0.057
0.045
0.045
0.039
0.027
0.027
0.024
0.021
0.021
0.018
0.018
0.012
0.012

The centrality measures shown in Table 23 reflect that the GoP was leading the response,
closely being followed by the International Organizations of Migration (IOM) (the International
organization that is responsible for leading the Shelter cluster). With such massive floods, there
were many evacuations and international displacements and houses were washed away or
severally damaged, thus providing shelter immediately was a major response operation. Also
IFRC is the coordinating body for Red Cross and Crescent Societies and has a strong network of
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chapters in different countries and within Pakistan as well. Similarly DEC is UK based and is an
umbrella agency/committee that coordinates donor support from a number of charities and
nonprofit agencies. This organization is also playing a central role in the response network.

Table 24 Descriptive Statistics for Centrality for the National-International Response System
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Degree NrmDegree
Share
------------ ------------ -----------Mean
2.147
0.197
0.004
Std Dev
4.018
0.369
0.007
Sum
586.000 53.860
1.000
Variance
16.147
0.136
0.000
SSQ
5666.000 47.865
0.016
MCSSQ
4408.139 37.239
0.013
Euc Norm
75.273
6.918
0.128
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
Maximum
29.000
2.665
0.049
N of Obs
273.000 273.000 273.000

Network Centralization = 2.49%
Blau Heterogeneity = 1.65%.
Normalized (IQV) = 1.29%

The descriptive statistics for degree centrality depicted in Table 24 depict a highly
decentralized network with the mean centrality score of 2.147 and a variance of 16.147. The high
variance score reflects power imbalances within the responding agencies. There are also plenty
of isolated agencies in the network that contribute to the high variance in the network.
According to the response system and plan in place NDMA is recommended to play the
most central role in the response network. The organization is playing a central role. Sometimes
in media coverage the role of NDMA and the GoP are substituted for each other, since NDMA is
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the federal level government agency heading and coordinating the response. This has to be taken
into consideration when making conclusions about the most central actors in the network.
According to betweeness centrality measures the NDMA is playing a more central role compared
to the DEC or IFRC. This depicts a strong coordination and brokerage role being played by the
organization. This is in line with the planned response system in place since NDMA is
essentially responsible for coordinating the overall response in the country and mobilizing
support.

Table 25 Betweenness Centrality Results for the National-International Network
Betweenness nBetweenness
------------ -----------GoP
2851.952
7.738
IOM
2785.529
7.558
NDMA
1346.550
3.654
US gov 1288.795
3.497
PRCS
1107.252
3.004
DEC
997.119
2.705
WFP
861.017
2.336
IFRC
836.057
2.268
IR
769.100
2.087
UN
758.310
2.057
Army
752.086
2.041
PM
723.821
1.964
ADB
597.833
1.622
UNICEF
545.000
1.479
ICRC
512.019
1.389
BC
501.976
1.362
M of Finance
436.000
1.183
China gov
430.786
1.169
EAD
301.783
0.819
Governor
229.583
0.623

Clique analysis results are shown below. A total of 43 cliques were found in the overall
national-international response system which reflects a high level of collaborative activity.
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Table 26 Cliques identified in the National-International Response System
Cliques
1: Australian gov GoP NDMA UN
2: China gov GoP NDMA
3: GoP Indo gov NDMA
4: GoP M of Finance NDMA
5: GoP NDMA OCHA WFP
6: GoP NDMA Saudi gov
7: GoP NDMA UK gov
8: GoP NDMA US gov
9: GoP M o FA NATO
10: GoP M o FA Saudi Embassy
11: GoP M o FA Saudi gov
12: GoP M o FA UN
13: GoP M of H Saudi Embassy
14: GoP Pak Embassy US US gov
15: ADB M of Finance NDMA WB
16: Army NDMA PM
17: Army PAF PM
18: Army PHD PM
19: Army Navy PAF
20: Army NDMA Saudi gov
21: Australian RC IFRC PRCS
22: DFID PM UN
23: DRC IFRC PRCS
24: EAD PM UN
25: FRB IMF M of Finance
26: GRC IFRC PRCS
27: IFRC IOM PRCS
28: IFRC NRC PRCS
29: IFRC PRCS Spanish RC
30: IOM PRSP UNICEF
31: IR OCHA WFP
32: M of IB&N NDMA PM
33: M of SF&EA NDMA PM
34: Military NDMA US gov
35: M of Finance NBP PM
36: Oxfam PU UNICEF
37: M of Finance PBOI PM
38: M of Finance NDMA PM President
39: China gov NDMA PM
40: NDMA PM UN
41: M o FA PM UN
42: PM PRCS SNGPL
43: OCHA QC WFP
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NDMA on behalf of the federal government was cooperating and coordinating the
response with the humanitarian agencies under the umbrella of the UN Humanitarian Country
team, working under the humanitarian coordinator who coordinated through UN OCHA. NDMA
was also networking with a network of INGOs under the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum and
national NGOs under the National Humanitarian Network. Additionally PRCS (ICRC and IFRC
help through local chapters), Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund and Focus of Agha Khan
Foundation were also prominent members of the federal government and NDMA. The response
was also coordinated with the donor countries highlighting the areas of assistance like Food,
Shelter, WASH, and Health so that they could fund the UN Agencies in accordance with the
priorities of the government (N. Ahmed, Personal Communication, 22 September, 2013).
Through the Foreign Office an appeal was also made to Pakistani expatriate communities
to help with certain items which were required and had a Pakistani context (For instance in the
Kashmir Earthquake of 2005 NDMA had received skirts and long boots for women that had
gone to waste since the affected population required traditional dresses). Non-traditional donors
like the Gulf / Middle-eastern countries along with traditional donor countries such as China,
Turkey, which normally help with in-kind donations directly to the government, were also
approached and they helped substantially. Within the government, it was the Army, PMD, Flood
Forecasting Division, SUPARCO, Utility Stores Corporation, Line Ministries like
Communications, Energy, Health (through National Health Emergency Prepared Response
Network - NHEPRN) with which the NDMA coordinated the response (N. Ahmed, Personal
Communication, 22 September, 2013).
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5.4 Findings and Discussions
A main reason for breaking the overall response system into multi-level response systems
was to determine what functions and response activities are taking place at each level of
response. Through the theoretical framework, it was identified that different levels are playing
different roles in the disaster response. Thus, it is important to identify networks according to
individual response functions. Through a thorough content analysis the response function for
each transaction was also identified. At the national and international level, many transactions
and interactions concerned the provision of funds and donations. These interactions were
identified under the ‘Funds/Donations’ response function. This is a response function that was
not formally identified in the UN cluster approach led response plan, and nor was it identified in
the salient response features in NDMA’s 2010 response plan. However, through judgment and
through a literature review on the role of humanitarian agencies and multi-lateral agencies, it was
identified as a major immediate response function. Additional functions such as the provision of
‘Food, NFIs, Shelter’ rely on the ‘Funds/Donations’ response function and are really not possible
unless a certain amount of aid or funds flow in the country either directly or through well-reputed
and well- recognized multi-lateral agencies like the UN agencies.
There are many factors that influence the flow of international aid and donations within
the country. Previous research has identified the following factors that influence the amount,
timely provision, and flow of aid in the impacted country: severity of the disaster, the income of
the impacted country (the lower the income the more the aid flow), news coverage, proximity of
the impacted country to the country providing aid (Strömberg, 2007). Drury, Olson, and Belle
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(2005) suggest that the flow of US aid in disasters depends dominantly on foreign policy and is
really not a nonpolitical or objective decision. Pakistan, being a major ally in the US ‘War on
Terrorism’ warrants itself as being a major recipient of aid.
Through SNA the key players in the funding network are identified and through a content
analysis the motivations and reasons for the flow/or lack of flow of funds were also determined.
A major reason why funds flow in the first place following a catastrophic disaster, such as the
Pakistan Floods, is because a formal appeal has been made by the disaster inflicted country, or
through multilateral agencies such as the UN agencies.
Through a content analysis the major appeals were identified throughout the analysis
period (from July 22, 2010, to August19, 2010). The Table 27 shows these appeals. Apart from
international and national appeals for funds and donations, the National-International response
system is involved in a lot of information sharing activities. Information is usually shared via
different media outlets (newspapers, televised appeals and through the radio). Many of these
information sharing sessions are isolated events and do not involve multiple players coordinating
and collaborating. This is one reason why the National-International response network has so
many isolates. Moreover, the response function termed ‘Assessments’ is an important response
function at the National-International level. In this analysis we use assessments for a range of
activities such as damage and needs assessments, situation analysis reports and information
exchanges on the situation. Thus, the most common response activities at the nationalinternational level are provision and management of funds and donations, launching international
and national appeals, and also situation, damage and needs assessments along with regular
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information sharing at meetings and press conferences. Apart from these main activities there
are many interactions and transaction that concern in-kind donations and aid from foreign
countries and INGOs. The in-kind aid includes both food and non-food items such as tents for
shelter.

Table 27 Major Appeals by National and International Agencies/Leaders
Prime Minister of Pakistan
(August 6, 2010)

Prime Minister of Pakistan
(August 14, 2010)
(Independence Day for the country)
British Charities
(August 5, 2010)
Disasters Emergency Committee
(August 5, 2010)
US Government
(August 18, 2010)

Gordon Brown , Former British Prime
Minister
(August 10, 2010)
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
(August 15, 2010)

Regional Director of the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Daniel Toole
(August 17, 2010)

Appeals for immediate international assistance
through a televised address.
Identified the floods as the ‘worst floods’ in
the history of the country.
(Daily Times, August 07, 2010).
“I appeal to the world community to extend a
helping hand,” he said.
(New York Times, August 14, 2010)
Launched an appeal to raise funds for the
country (Daily Times, August 6, 2010).
Broadcasting appeals for donations on a
number of TV channels and radio channels.
(Daily Times, August 6, 2010)
US secretary of state Hillary Clinton appealed
to the American public to donate generously to
a newly established "Pakistan relief fund".
(The Guardian, August 19, 2010).
Appeals to the British public to increase their
efforts since international response has been
slow compared to previous disasters.
(The Guardian, August 11, 2010).
Appealed to foreign donors to increase their
donations and aid efforts to support the
suffering people of the country.
(New York Times, August 15, 2010).
Appealed to the international community to
generously donate. He was reported to have
declared this “the biggest emergency on planet
earth to this day”
(The News, August 18, 2010)
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At the provincial level most response activities are taking place. At the provincial level
distribution and management of aid seems to be the most important activity. The provincial
capital of Punjab, the city of Lahore has the most transactions concerned with setting up and
managing relief camps. Moreover, many interactions at the provincial level also show the flow of
funds to CM’s Relief Fund. Also many interactions involve some type of information sharing
activity involving a situation analysis and reporting on the needs and damages in regions of
Punjab. The results of the clique analysis show that Multi-lateral agencies (MLAs) are playing a
collaborative role in the network with OCHA coordinating with both the PDMA and NDMA,
and also with other UN agencies such as the WFP. The CM doesn’t seem to be involved
collaboratively with MLAs but is more involved with government agencies. To get more insights
on the provincial level collaborative activity from a multilateral agencies’ perspective, a
representative from WFP working in the Punjab region was interviewed.
WFP worked with implementing partners (INGOs and NGOs), government line
departments, the Army and other UN agencies. Remember that the cluster system was
also activated so the UN agencies and other development partners were coordinating and
sharing information pretty regularly – in the initial first few weeks we were meeting
every day. The government (Relief Commissioner Mr. Iftikhar Rao) was officially
spearheading the response. The Army’s 2nd Corp was also very active and we coordinated
with them at the same frequency as we did with the government. (WFP Representative,
Personal Communication, 23 September, 2013).
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At the local level, the results of the analysis show that very little collaborative activity was taking
place. There were no cliques identified in both the districts studied which is a rather surprising
finding. Moreover, in the district of Muzzafargarh the predominant response activity was related
to providing medical relief and facilities to the affected population and the most central role was
being played by the Punjab Department of Health. In DG Khan district, the CM and the DCO
were playing a central role. Moreover, the Army was also playing a major role in the relief
efforts as was identified through the content analysis. Many areas needed to be evacuated, thus
the predominant response activity in DG Khan seemed to be evacuations, transportation, and
provision of shelter and food. It can be concluded that contextual factors influence the nature of
response and collaborative activity at the district level.
5.5 Hypotheses and Results
The nature of the study does not allow hypothesized relationships to be tested the way
they are tested in traditional research using statistical tools and analysis. The utilization of SNA
allows understanding the process along with exploring and describing the response networks and
factors that influence the structure and working of the systems.
Table 28 below provides the summary of the study hypotheses and the overall results.
Results show that the network structure, leadership, and institutional support highly influence the
collaborative response in disasters. The networking capacity and the organizational resource
dependencies also reflect an influential role on the collaborative response but additional research
is required to support H2 and H5 fully.
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Table 28 Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypotheses

Results

H1 Network structure influences overall effectiveness of response

Supported

networks.
H2 Networking capacity of organizations positively impacts collaborative

response effectiveness
H3 Leadership support positively impacts collaborative response

Somewhat
Supported
Supported

effectiveness.
H4 Institutional support positively impacts collaborative response

Supported

effectiveness
H5 Organizational resource dependencies positively impact collaborative

response effectiveness.

Somewhat
Supported

Hypothesis 1: Network structure influences overall effectiveness of response networks.
Dense relationships can achieve goals in a better way in a local network where contextual
knowledge determines the types of response functions and players that have to be activated. For
example in the DG Khan network, evacuation of people was a critical function and most
transactions involve that function. Thus, dense relationships around the specific function will
help to mobilize the desired response. The district level plans at the moment depict a highly
centralized network which might function well if the capacity for running a DDMA is in place.
Features of networks such as strong hubs, brokers within the network, multiplexity of
relationships all reflect a strong network structure and are missing at the local level of analysis.
Also no cliques at the local level reflect an ineffective collaborative response. Thus, network
structure is influencing the collaborative response at the district level. The network structure
changes with the level at which response is observed and studied, and so does the collaborative
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response. So this hypothesis is supported through the visual depiction of networks, the
centralization and decentralization scores, and the level of clique activity at the three levels of
analysis.
Hypothesis 2: Networking capacity of organizations positively impacts collaborative
response effectiveness.
Throughout the SNA results and the analysis of semi-structured interviewed this was
identified as an important variable that supports collaborative response. The former NDMA
Chief identified the usual partners it has worked in the past and comfortably works with across
many disasters. Thus, trust and existing relationships improve coordination and collaboration in a
response.
During interviews it was discussed that NDMA meets regularly with all the donor
countries, UN Agencies and PDMAs. They hold pre-monsoon conferences as a regular feature to
keep all agencies updated. Contingency planning is a regular feature. Additionally conferences
and seminars are held with representation from all concerned. Additionally the Armed Forces
also hold a regular pre-monsoon conference to review the preparations of all the three services in
which NDMA is represented at the leadership level. All the activities that fall in the pre-disaster
phase are planned in close coordination with the stakeholders where in there is joint planning by
NDMA and UN agencies/donors for undertaking certain activities like risk mapping, establishing
Emergency Warning systems, undertaking disaster risk mitigation efforts. At the national level,
there seem to be both relational and programmatic networking capacity.
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At the provincial level, a WFP representative explained what type of partnerships and
trust-building activities played out in the response to 2010 Floods:
WFP is part of the humanitarian cluster system so partnerships are formed through the
inter-agency structure. For instance since 2009 in the conflict/post conflict scenario: the
army evacuates IDP’s, the government directs and coordinates the effort, UNHCR
undertakes registration and WFP does household food distributions. In 2010 no one had
time to prepare and we simply launched operations. We developed informal partnerships
wherever we could but the emphasis was on scaling up the operation and saving lives.
(WFP representative, Personal Communication, September 22, 2013)
Thus, it can be concluded that relational networking capacities that are built prior to a disaster
very well play out during response. However, the scale and nature of the disaster and the urgency
of the situation also help to create new partnership during response. Thus, it is programmatic
capacity such as interoperability between agencies in response that seems to be more important
than relational network capacity in the context of large-scale disasters such as the floods. Also
the data collection method provides stronger data on programmatic capacity and less of relational
network capacity. Relational network capacity reflects pre-existing ties and previous interactions
between agencies that develops trust and social capital between responding agencies. This
information can be supported through more interviews of responding agencies and thus the
hypothesis is not fully supported.
Hypothesis 3: Leadership support positively impacts collaborative response effectiveness.
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This hypothesis is supported through all the three levels of response systems studied in
the case. Leadership takes the form of political, managerial, and organizational leadership.
Through a content analysis and the various SNA measures applied in the research, it is clear that
network systems with clear leadership and the ability of these leaders to engage other players
within the network through playing important brokerage and coordination roles influences the
collaborative nature of response. The lack of clear leadership at the district levels and high
centrality scores of players at the national-international level correlates with the type of clique
activity and overall collaborative response of the networks. Results show that more powerful
players in the network also enjoy clique overlap and are involved in collaborative activities.
Missing leadership at the district level is a clear indication of a weaker and scattered response.
Also organizational leadership of the UN agencies through the cluster approach and the strong
leadership of PRCS with its international partners reflect strong functional sub-networks within
the overall response system.
Hypothesis 4: Institutional support positively impacts collaborative response
effectiveness.
Institutional support was available in the form of disaster management plans but those
documents were never really utilized and subsequently, the SOPs were not activated. Through
the interviews it was established that these plans were developed but never implemented in the
2010 Floods. Some respondents suggest that there was not enough time to go through plans and
follow procedures. The task was to scale up relief efforts and build partnerships as seemed
appropriate according to situation (WFP representative, Personal Communication, September 22,
2013). However, during the response phase the government of Pakistan formally requested the
165

United Nations to launch a response plan and around the second week of August an Initial
Response Plan was developed by the UN detailing the relevant clusters ( Food, Shelter and NFIs,
Water and Sanitation, Health, etc.). The inter-agency UN system is an institutional set-up that is
required to improve coordination between different NGOs, INGOs and relevant government
ministries. Thus, the launching of this plan and the launching of clusters during response help to
improve collaborative response. Many cliques identified in the study show lead members of the
various clusters such as WHO, WFP, OCHA, and IOM playing central roles in the networks and
also enjoying clique overlap with each other that shows highly collaborative activity. Thus,
institutional support positively impacted the collaborative response in the 2010 Floods.
Through the literature and through the ICA theoretical framework it has been established
that the type and nature of institutional rules and policies can either facilitate response or make
the mobilization of effective relief and response more cumbersome and problematic. ICA theory
identified transaction costs in partnerships and agreements to play an important role in
determining the outcomes of collaborative activity. Thus, institutional support can take the form
of formal plans and policies in place, the creation and effective management of appropriate funds
for quick mobilization of relief goods and services, arrangements such as relaxing visa
requirements for international relief teams all fall under the type of institutional support
available. Moreover, this research shows that institutional support was available in the form of
Relief Funds that were launched either through international appeals by INGOs, Charities, and
UN agencies and also by the political and government leadership within the country to facilitate
disaster response and relief.
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Hypothesis 5: Organizational resource dependencies positively impact collaborative
response effectiveness.
In terms of resource dependencies and resource exchanges, disaster response networks
comprise of organizations from different sectors and levels of the government that rely on each
other when faced with capacity constraints. From a vertical response perspective, local
governments rely on the state government when they are unable to cope with disaster response
and relief. While, state level/provincial organizations rely on national and international sources
of help when their capacity to respond is limited. At the horizontal level, a multitude of
organizations from different sectors collaborate and pool resources to provide effective relief to
disaster victims. Through content analysis, each interaction and transaction involving response
agencies were also coded according to response functions. Networks pertaining to specific
response functions such as Shelter, Food, WASH, and Health need to be developed in order to
explore and study this hypothesized relationship fully. Currently, the results definitely show an
influence of resource dependencies; however, more analysis may be required to fully support this
hypothesis.
This chapter has analyzed the results of the content analysis, document analysis, and
SNA. Various SNA measures have been utilized to explore the hypothesized relationships. The
next chapter addresses the specific research questions of this study and provides a brief
discussion on the implications of this research.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter highlights the findings of the research and addresses the research
questions through the results of the analysis carried out in the previous chapter. The second part
of the chapter discusses the implications of this research. The concluding part of the chapter
identifies some limitations of the research and discusses the possible future directions of
research.
6.1 Research Findings
6.1.1 Factors Facilitating and Hindering Collaborative Response
The first research question of the study is: What factors facilitate and impede
interorganizational collaborative response to catastrophic disasters at the local, provincial,
national, and international levels?
The overall goal of the study was to be able to identify factors that contribute positively
to collaborative response. Along with facilitating factors, it is important to identify factors that
may hinder response so that these factors can be avoided. The content analysis of various sources
along with some semi-structured interviews provided a list of some factors that either facilitate
response or hinder it. Previous research has suggested that coordination and collaboration
between different responding agencies is challenging in emergency and crises situations
(McEntire, 2002). Crises situations are made complicated due to pressures on responders to react
quickly and effectively, usually with limited means and capacities. Thus, a detailed study of what
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factors hinder and facilitate response in a polycentric structure of responding agencies is
important to advance and improve emergency management practice in developing countries
suffering from both natural and man-made disasters, such as Pakistan.
Some of the factors identified as facilitating factors by respondents were: coordination
mechanisms such as the interagency platform by the UN (clusters activation); coordination
bodies at every level such as the NDMA and PDMAs; preplanning and preparedness activities
such as stock prepositioning; local capacity to evacuate; availability of funds; government
contingency planning; geographical positioning and expertise of the Pakistan Armed Forces;
philanthropic spirit of citizens and Pakistani Diaspora living abroad; and good relationships with
donors and international agencies.
Some of the factors identified as facilitating factors at the National-International level
through SNA results and content analysis were: the launching of international and national
appeals, formal requests for activating response, prior working and friendly relationships
between countries, the strategic importance of the country from a foreign policy perspective, and
the activation of the UN inter-agency cluster approach.
Some of the factors identified as facilitators of response at the provincial level were: the
activation of a provincial level relief fund, and strong leadership support from the Chief Minister
of Punjab. Other factors identified as facilitators at the local/district level were: the strategic
positioning of the Armed Forces, and the expertise of the Armed forces in engineering and
medical relief services along with search and rescue and evacuations.
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Some of the factors identified as hindering factors by respondents were: lack of
coordination mechanisms, lack of preparedness and planning activities, weak capacity of local
governments to provide funds available or carryout essential response and relief activities,
capacity/delivery differential between provinces, nonfunctional DDMAs in many districts,
absence of detailed hazard and risk maps, and comprehensive community-based disaster risk
reduction measures.
The factors identified as hindering factors at the national-international level through
content analysis of documents and reports along with SNA results have been identified as: the
nature of the disasters (the slow onset of floods), the lack of appropriate and timely warnings,
and external events such as the Airblue Flight 202 mysterious air crash tragedy that took place on
the July 28, 2010. Due to this tragic event, all the attention was diverted away from the quickly
approaching floods and response became slower than it should have.
The factors identified as hindering factors at the provincial level through content analysis
of documents and reports along with SNA results have been identified as: lack of an operational
PDMA at the onset of the disaster, and the different political affiliations of the Chief Minister of
Punjab and the Governor of Punjab.
The factors identified at the local/district level through content analysis of documents and
reports along with SNA results have been identified as: lack of operational DDMAs or a weak
role of the district government in coordinating and collaborating the overall response; a lack of
contingency planning at the local levels; a reactive approach to managing disasters; and a lack of
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partnerships between local government and international NGOs, such as PRCS, and local NGOs
such as the Edhi Foundation.
6.1.2 Differences and Similarities in Multi-Response Systems
The second research question of the study is: What are the differences and similarities in
the multi-level response systems? What response functions/operations are important at different
levels of interactions?
All the planned networks in the 2010 National Disaster Response Plan were structured as
highly centralized networks with the NDMA, PDMA, and DDMA as the most central and
coordinating bodies at their respective levels of response. However, in reality this was not the
situation. Perhaps a small emergency can warrant such coordinated and centralized structures,
but the scale of the 2010 floods was unprecedented. Through interviews, almost all respondents
suggested that no plan, not even the most sophisticated of them, could have sufficed for the 2010
Floods. It was a disaster beyond the scope of any governments’ scope or imagination for that
matter. All the actual response networks were fairly decentralized with the most decentralized
network at the national-international level. A major reason for decentralization is because there
are many isolates operating at the national-international and provincial level of response. Also
none of the networks were highly dense. All networks had isolates, dyads, and triads that were
not connected to the overall central response network.
Moreover, district level response networks were focused on one or two key response
functions such as medical response and evacuations and provision of transportation and shelter.
At the provincial level the provision of relief goods and the management of relief camps was a
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major response function along with information sharing and situation analysis. At the nationalinternational level the response network was preoccupied with managing the flow of funds and
donations along with making appeals for donor and aid support. Moreover, another major
response function at the national-international level concerned information sharing, situation
analysis, and damage and needs assessments. This is a very important finding of this research as
in future plans these varied response activities and functions at different levels should be taken
into account.
6.1.3 Leadership Support in Response Systems
The third research question of the study is: How does leadership support in response
systems impact interorganizational collaborative response to disasters?
Leadership has been observed in the response networks through centrality measures such
as degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. At the nationalinternational level the leaders, coordinators and facilitators of response, the most powerful and
resourceful players are: Government of Pakistan and IOM (lead the shelter health cluster),
NDMA, IFRC, and DEC. At the provincial level the leaders are: the Chief Minister of Punjab,
the PRCS, and the Health Department of Punjab. At the local levels: the DCO DG Khan and CM
Punjab are identified in the DG Khan and the Punjab Health Department is the most central
organization in the Muzzafargarh district. It is interesting to observe that these leaders are highly
active in the cliques identified at the national-international level and the provincial level. No
cliques were identified at the local levels. Also due to the scattered and small nature of the local

173

disaster response networks, the variance in centrality scores is low reflecting that the most
central players may not be the most powerful players.
Other dimensions of leadership support can be in the form of flash appeals and the press
conferences leaders participate in to ensure that relief activities pick up the pace. However, to
gauge the impact of these appeals on collaborative activity, it is important to observe the
structure of the network before and after the appeal to see if these specific leadership-backed
appeals help to pick up response. This will be taken up as a future research project.
6.1.4 Institutional Support in Response Systems
The fourth research question of the study is: How does institutional support (in the form
of formal and informal structures such as plans, development of institutionally backed relief
funds, and international appeals for response) facilitate collaborative response in disasters?
Institutional support was available in the form of disaster management plans but those
documents were never really utilized and the standard operating procedures were not activated.
Through the interviews it was established that these plans were developed but never
implemented in the 2010 Floods. Some respondents suggested that there was not enough time to
go through plans and follow procedures. The task was to scale up relief efforts and build
partnerships as seemed appropriate according to situation (WFP representative, Personal
Communication, September 22, 2013). However, during the response phase, the government of
Pakistan formally requested the UN launch a response plan. Around the second week of August,
an Initial Response Plan was developed by the UN detailing the relevant clusters (Food, Shelter
and NFIs, Water and Sanitation, and Health). The inter-agency UN system is an institutional set174

up that is required to improve coordination between different NGOs, INGOs, and relevant
government ministries. Thus, the launching of this plan and the launching of clusters during
response help to improve collaborative response. Many cliques identified in the study show lead
members of the various clusters, such as WHO, WFP, OCHA, and IOM playing central roles in
the networks and also enjoying clique overlap with each other that shows highly collaborative
activity. Thus, institutional support positively impacted the collaborative response in the 2010
Floods.
6.1.5 Network Capacity of Responding Agencies in Response Systems
The fifth research question of the study is: How does the network capacity of different
organizations responding in disasters influence and impact collaborative response?
Two types of network capacities are relevant in this study: Programmatic capacity (the
ability to network with each other due to common program goals and interoperable systems that
make exchange easy), and relational network capacity (the capacity formed through trustbuilding and relationship building activities and joint planning and preparedness activities).
Results of clique analysis showed that organizations that had worked prior to the 2010 Floods in
other disasters (NDMA had worked with WHO, WFP, and OCHA), and organizations that
shared same humanitarian goals, such as WFP, WHO, and OCHA, were also in same cliques.
Moreover, during interviews it was also identified that NDMA meets regularly with all
the donor countries, UN Agencies and PDMAs. They hold pre-monsoon conferences as a regular
feature to keep all agencies updated. Thus, at the national-international level, network capacity is
influencing the collaborative response. At the local level, network capacity seems to be weak at
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the moment. Thus, further investment in developing these network capacities of key players will
improve local, district level response.
6.1.6 Organizational Resource Dependencies in Response Systems
The sixth research question of the study is: How does the level and nature of resource
dependencies between different organizations influence collaborative response in disasters?
Results from SNA analysis show that collaborative activity is taking place around
common response functions. For example, at the district level Punjab Health Department (PHD)
has links with a number of different hospitals and other agencies providing medical relief to
victims and the affected populations. However, organizational resource dependencies explain
transactions and interactions between two agencies; there is not enough evidence to suggest that
the resource dependencies actually lead to collaborative response. One way to collect more
evidence is to study the cliques and the interactions between the various members of the cliques
and identify whether strong resource dependencies exist or not.
6.1.7 Network Structure and Response Systems
The last research question of the study is: Which structural configurations in networks
hinder or/and facilitate collaborative response in disasters? Is decentralization superior compared
to a centralized structure of the response system?
The structure and nature of response networks might vary at different levels of analysis.
A local response network will be smaller in size and more focused on ground activities, ( i.e.
relief and rescue operations, evacuations, and provision of health), compared to the national176

international response system that will be occupied with getting donor support, managing the
flow of aid, and coordinating overall response functions. It is important to identify which
response functions are important and each level so that resources can be mobilized effectively
and capacity can be built accordingly as well.
This is a question that has been explored in variously studies before (Drabek, 1985;
Milward & Provan, 1995). There has been an attempt made to study the structural configurations
that lead to better network performance and outcomes. The argument for a more centralized
structure is to ensure goals are met in the network, while the other side of the argument suggests
that flexibility and decentralization helps to adapt to changing needs and situations during
disasters (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Mendonca & Fiedrich, 2004).Thus, it is difficult to
conclude whether decentralization is better than a centralized response network.
Dense relationships can achieve goals in a better way in a local network where contextual
knowledge determines the types of response functions and players that have to be activated. For
example in the DG Khan network, evacuation of people was a critical function and most
transactions involve that function. Thus, dense relationships around the specific function will
help to mobilize the desired response. The district level plans at the moment depict a highly
centralized network which might function well if the capacity for running a DDMA is in place.
Features of networks such as strong hubs, brokers within the network, and multiplexity of
relationships, all reflect a strong network structure and are missing at the local/district response
networks. Also no cliques at the local level reflect an ineffective collaborative response. Thus,
network structure is influencing the collaborative response at the district level. The network

177

structure changes with the level at which response is studied, and so does the collaborative
response. Therefore, research question is addressed through the various SNA measures utilized
in this study.
6.2 Implications of the Study
6.2.1 Theoretical Implications
This study is important to advance network theory perspectives in the field of disaster
management and collaborative public management. It is also important to understand that largescale unprecedented disasters cannot be studied through the same lens as routine emergencies or
small localized disasters. Also the subject of complex disasters cannot be studied through a
single theory due to the complex nature of management and interactions between agencies. The
utilization of Social Capital Theory, ICA framework, and Resource Dependency Theory are all
relevant for understanding and exploring the disaster response context. Each theory was used to
build few prepositions that further helped to develop the study hypotheses. All these theories are
relevant in studying collaboration. Also the development of the conceptual framework reflects
that there exist some overlaps in these theories. The discussion on weak ties and strong ties is
addressed in collective action theories, as well as the Social Capital Theory. Moreover, the
comprehensive conceptual framework developed in this study will help to guide not only
scholars but also practitioners to understand the different dimensions and predictors of an
effective collaborative response. Currently this study remains to be descriptive and exploratory.
In the future better conceptualizations and operationalizations will help to conduct some formal
hypothesis testing.
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This study proposes that large-scale disasters need to be studied from a multi-layered and
multi-level governance perspective since not all layers and levels of response are the same in
terms of the network structure or the focal response functions. The results have clearly identified
the unique dynamics of exchange and interactions taking place at each level of response. This
approach has been applied in policy creation and governance issues, and needs to be explored
more in mainstream disaster management research. The approach adopted in this research breaks
down a complex system into different levels and components so that these components are better
understood and in turn improved. This is a theoretical approach that can easily be applied to
catastrophic disasters across the globe.
6.2.2 Methodological Implications
Content analysis and document analysis is a well-established and thorough way of
collecting data for past events. A rich pool of information was found through different
newspapers and situation reports. However, going through the various sources meticulously is a
difficult process. However, this was the best way to collect data since Pakistan has suffered
floods every summer after 2010. If a snowball method was used for developing the response
network, then the results might not be very because a recall to three years earlier is difficult for
agencies that are responding in the floods every year. This study identified content analysis of
reports and newspapers are a viable method to utilize in similar studies. Moreover, triangulation
was achieved in this research by including semi-structured interviews of representatives of key
agencies that are identified through SNA results. This not only brings supportive qualitative
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information to the quantitative analysis via SNA but strengthens the single case study design of
this research.
However, methodologically a major shortcoming and concern was experienced when
developing the district level response network. National level newspapers did not contain very
detailed information of districts. Thus, it is important to identify local/district level newspapers
and re-develop the district level response networks to ensure that a complete network response
system is identified and analyzed. Moreover, future research will also involve more semistructured interviews of players identified as central nodes and periphery nodes in disaster
response networks to get a complete picture of the factors that may be hindering and effective
disaster response.
6.2.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations
This research has several policy implications and policy recommendations. Since this
study analyzed the planned and actual response networks and structure, it is important to address
gaps in the current plan. There are several cliques and collaborative activities taking place in
actual networks that are not identified in the actual plans. Since plans are evolving documents,
the NDMA needs to update its current plan to include the collaborations and partnerships
identified in this analysis.
Moreover, the discrepancies in the plans and the actual response show that DDMAs are
required to head response and relief at the local level. This has not been put into practice.
Although an NDMA Act was passed in 2007 requiring all districts to establish DDMA, the
districts have not taken this task seriously. More recently the country has been engaged in
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monsoon contingency planning which is a step in the right direction. However, the fact that
DDMAs are required to be headed by DCOs, or senior officials of the district government and
tehsils has to be altered. Through interviews and through the planned networks, DDMAs are
required to activate the DEOC to coordinate and manage district level disasters. Just like there
are a number of district level offices headed for Directors, the DDMA needs to have a separate
Director who is tasked to coordinate response during the disaster but also engaged in
contingency planning, awareness drives, and training and capacity building of local
communities. This will help to develop the capacity that is missing at the local level at the
moment. Previous research has suggested that coordination and collaboration between different
responding agencies is challenging in emergency and crises situations (McEntire, 2002). Crises
situations are made complicated due to pressures on responders to react quickly and effectively,
usually with limited means and capacities. Thus, a detailed study of what factors hinder and
facilitate response in a polycentric structure of responding agencies is important to advance and
improve emergency management practice in developing countries suffering from both natural
and man-made disasters, such as Pakistan.
This study has also identified the response functions that are most important at each level.
This will help to identify which players and resources should be mobilized at each level of
response. This will help with planning and identifying SOPs again. The structure and nature of
response networks might vary at different levels of analysis. A local response network will be
smaller in size and will be more focused on ground activities such as relief and rescue
operations, evacuations, provision of health, compared to the national-international response
system that will be occupied with getting donor support and managing the flow of aid and
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coordinating overall response functions. It is important to identify which response functions are
important and each level so that resources can be mobilized effectively and capacity can be built
accordingly as well.
6.3 Limitations
This section of the chapter identifies some of the weaknesses and limitations of this
research. First of all, content analysis helped to identify the interactions and transactions that
took place during the first few weeks. Although an attempt was made to use multiple sources of
information to reduce bias, there might be some data missing. The response networks at the local
level are sparse. Thus, more information from local newspapers will identify the complete
network at the local response. Apart from content analysis, more interviews need to be conducted
at the district level to get contextual information and understand district disaster management in
a better way. Another main concern that comes with a case study methodology is the rich
contextual information in the case. Thus, with the high contextual information, external validity
in the country case is weak.
6.4 Future Research
Future research will focus on expanding the case study to include the response in all
provinces in Pakistan to gauge the differences and commonalities. This research focused on
studying 2 of the 7 most adversely impacted districts in Punjab. Future research will focus on all
8 districts and will utilize local newspapers and reports to formulate local disaster response
networks. More interviews will also be conducted to include contextual information and compare
the local level response at different districts.
182

Another direction for future research is to compare the 2010 Floods with other, similar
disasters both within the country and outside the country. Within the country, other cases of
Floods of 2011, 2012, and 2013 will be compared with the 2010 Floods to see how the disaster
management system has learned and improved over the passage of time. This is a potential case
for studying policy learning, policy change, and institutional change. The changes in policies and
their level of effectiveness over the years will be reflected through the disaster response networks
in the floods of 2011, 2012, and 2013.
As part of future research sub-networks will be developed according to the various
response functions identified in the study. These sub-networks will help to develop better
function based response plans so that agencies have been assigned certain roles and
responsibilities during routine and catastrophic disasters. Moreover, this will help to improve the
implementation of the existing cluster approach and build the capacity of the government as
well. Alongside research will be expanded to study man-made disasters in the country and study
the viability of an all-hazards approach to managing disasters.
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APPENDIX A: A TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN THE 2010 PAKISTAN
FLOODS
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22 July 2010: Dozens of people are killed and tens of thousands displaced following heavy rains across
Balochistan, Punjab and Khyber Pahktunkhwa.
29 July: Flash floods and landslides devastate large parts of Khyber Pakthunkhwa, smaller areas of the
Federally Administered Tribal Area, Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. According to
the Government, more than 800 people died and millions may be affected.
6 August: Pakistan declares a red alert as floods reach southern provinces. Hundreds of thousands of
people are evacuated.
7 August: Landslides and flash floods are reported in Gilgit-Baltistan and other parts of northern Pakistan.
Floods move into Sindh and Balochistan.
11 August: The Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan requests $459 million for relief
assistance for an initial three months.
15 August: United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits flood-affected areas.
25 August: More than 800,000 people are cut off by floods. The United Nations requests more support for
helicopter missions.
26 August: A breach develops on the eastern bank of the Indus River in Thatta district. Thatta city is
officially evacuated as the Indus breaches its western bank in the south.
30 August: At least 1 million people are reportedly on the move in Sindh as villages are submerged.
7 September: United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos arrives in Pakistan for a threeday mission.
13 September: Manchar Lake overflows, flooding new areas in Sindh’s Jamshoro district.
17 September: A revised Floods Emergency Response Plan requests $2 billion for relief and early
recovery needs for 12 months.
Source: OCHA (September 17, 2010).
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APPENDIX B DISTRICT LEVEL SOPs FOR RESPONSE PHASE
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1.

District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA)

(1) Activate DEOC.
(2) Warn all district level departments to get ready for emergency response.
(3) Inform PEOC and NEOC about the situation.
(4) Organize evacuation on priority basis.
(5) Conduct initial and subsequent assessment of disaster affected areas and determine the extent
of loss and damage.
(6) Prepare detailed plan for the resources requirement for relief operation and share it with the
PMDA and NDMA.
(7) Provide food, drinking water, medical supplies, non-food items to the affected population.
(8) Deploy medical, search and rescue and emergency response team immediately.
(9) Set up relief camps and provide relief in the camps.
(10) Coordinate with PDMA and NDMA to deploy resources for emergency response.
(11) Liaise with I/NGOs, UN bodies and philanthropist organizations for resource mobilizations
for response.
(12) Develop complaint mechanism system and set up complaint mechanism cell in the DEOC
and sub district level.
(13) Hold regular media and public information briefings.
(14) Arrange detailed assessment for the early recovery programme and prepare proposal and
submit to PDMA and NDMA.
(15) Forward Situation Report (SITREP) on daily and weekly basis to the PDMA, NDMA and
Armed Forces etc.
2. Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA)
(1) Keep sirens operational for early warning. Issue warning through mosques, community
centre, TV cable network, local newspapers and other available means of communication.
(2) Arrange evacuation of affected population through proper transportation and house affectees
in relief camps. Maintain and supervise the management of relief camps. Make separate
arrangements for women in the camps according to cultural norms.
(3) Deliver food and non food items to the affected population (in camps, host locations and in
the affected villages where population is still living).
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(4) Provide all basic facilities in the camps e.g. electricity, health services, water and sanitation
etc.
(5) Ensure security to the affected population in the villages and relief camps. Assist health
department in transportation of injured and disposal of dead bodies.
(6) Brief media about the situation.
3. Health Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Conduct a rapid health assessment and assessment of damage to health infra structure
facilities. Mobilize all available health resources for emergency response.
(3) Provide first aid to the injured people and arrange evacuation to the hospital for further
assistance. Setup medical camps. Deploy medical teams in mobile and static clinics and monitor
it.
(4) Facilitate CBOs/NGOs, INGOs and philanthropist organizations involved in health services.
Exercise vigilance for epidemic outbreak and remain prepared to deal with any disease.
(5) Coordinate with PHED for safe drinking water and sanitation facilities in relief camps. Draw
up plan for early recovery of health infrastructure and submit to the provincial health department
for funding.
(6) Document lessons learnt from response experiences. Disseminate to all stakeholders
including provincial, health department and DDMA. Incorporate same in future planning.
4. Public Health Engineering Department (PHED)
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Arrange assessment of water and sanitation schemes damaged by the disaster and prepare
plan for fast track rehabilitation.
(3) Set up community water supply system in relief camps with water treatment system.
(4) Provide safe drinking water according to the Sphere Project Minimum Standards to the
affected population.
(5) Deploy teams to set up temporary new water supply system for affected population.
(6) Conduct water quality testing on regular basis to ensure the minimum standards of the quality
of water.
(7) Ensure that sanitation system is functioning in relief camps and make proper arrangements
for drainage in the camps/temporary emergency shelters.
(8) Facilitate local and INGOs working on the water and sanitation in emergency.
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(9) Exercise vigilance about any disease outbreak disease because of water and sanitary
conditions and remain prepared to deal with any epidemic.
(10) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely. Document lesson learnt from the
response experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
5. Education Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Conduct assessment of the school conditions. Prepare plans for fast track rehabilitation.
(3) Deploy volunteer teachers and students to assist DDMA in emergency response.
(4) Organize volunteer teachers and students to assist in distribution of relief goods in the local
areas.
(5) Continue education of children using mobile/tent schools.
6. Agriculture Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Conduct initial rapid assessment to assess damage to the agriculture crops.
(3) Render agriculture machinery to farmers for protection of crops.
(4) Render technical advice to farmers‟ community for the protection of crops in flood, drought
and cyclone situation.
(5) Release messages through agriculture extension workers, print and electronic media, TV
cable network for the protection of standing crops. Exercise vigilance about pest/disease attack
and remain prepared to deal with the disease/problems.
(6) Coordinate with irrigation department during flood/rainy season. Develop plan for agriculture
sector for early recovery phase, if needed.
(7) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely. Document lessons learnt from the
response experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
7. Livestock Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Arrange assessment on livestock.
(3) Set up mobile veterinary camps e.g. vaccination, de-worming etc in floods, cyclone and
drought situation.
(4) Provide animal feed on subsidized rates in emergency situation, particularly in drought.
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(5) Monitor situation during emergency period.
(6) In prolonged drought, deliver fodder, de-worming medicines and vaccine for the animals.
Exercise vigilance about disease outbreak in the animals and be prepared to deal with the
problem.
(7) Develop plan for livestock sector for early recovery phase if needed.
(8) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely .Document lessons learnt from the
response experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
8. Irrigation Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Conduct damage assessment of irrigation channels, embankments etc and develop
rehabilitation plans.
(3) Monitor canal water flows. Inform DDMA and farmers through irrigation department’s
network and local media channels etc.
(4) Assist in evacuation process of marooned people by providing boats.
(5) Deploy irrigation staff teams on embankments in flood season.
(6) Take measure to fill canal/distributaries breach.
(7) Coordinate with farmers organization on management and maintenance of the water courses,
distributaries and embankments.
(8) Document lessons learnt from response experiences and share it with DDMA and provincial
irrigation department.
(9) Incorporate lessons learnt in future planning.
9. Works and Services Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
(2) Arrange damage assessment of roads, bridges and other infrastructure.
(3) Deploy team to remove debris.
(4) Facilitate Armed Forces to clear roads, remove debris and undertake restoration of
infrastructure.
10. Culture, Social Welfare and Tourism Department
(1) Designate a representative to the DEOC.
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(2) Arrange assessment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp situation and share it with
humanitarian organization working in this area.
(3) Register all affected people living in the camp. Distribute relief material and arrange medical
facilities. Set up safe play areas for children.
(4) Monitor protection issues in IDP Camps with particular focus on children and women.
(5) Facilitate the humanitarian organizations working on core issues (child protection, disability,
orphanages and separated children).
(6) Coordinate with DDMA to ensure that needs of most vulnerable groups (e.g. minorities,
disabled persons, elderly, widows etc) are addressed in emergency response.
(7) Assist DDMA to manage relief camps, undertake relief distribution and carry out early
recovery assessment.
(8) Document lessons learnt from the response experiences and share it with all stakeholders
including DDMA and provincial, culture, social welfare and tourism departments. Incorporate
the same in future planning.
11. Police Department
(1) Designate a representative to the District OEC.
(2) Assist district administration in evacuation.
(3) Maintain law and order in emergency response.
(4) Monitor and maintain normalcy in the relief camps.
(5) Arrange adequate police cover for the humanitarian organizations, embassy representatives,
UN officials, dignitaries etc.
(6) Protect life and property.
(7) Assist fast track deployment of emergency vehicles by efficient traffic management.
(8) Provide reflective lights / reflectors around the scene of incident at night, to facilitate the
working of rescue workers, fire fighters etc.
(9) Document lessons learnt from the experience. Share it with DDMA and provincial Police
Department. Incorporate same in the future planning.
12. Forest and Wild life Department
(1) Designate representative to the District EOC, if and when needed.
(2) Conduct impact assessment of flood/cyclone on fisheries, wild life and mangroves forest.
(3) Coordinate with fire fighting teams, in case of forest fire.
(4) Control deforestation, Plant new saplings in disaster prone areas.
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(5) Build capacity of staff at district level on disaster preparedness in wildlife sector.
(6) Control grazing of animals in range land areas to prevent tree depletion.
(7) Supply drought resistant seeds/plants of trees to farmers and communities.
13. Food Department
(1) Arrange security for wheat stores warehouses/gowdowns.
(2) Regularly update DDMA about stocks position.
(3) Release wheat to DDMA on the orders of the Secretary Food Department.
(4) Assist DDMA in distribution of subsidized/free edible commodities to the affected
population in the district.
14. Mines and Minerals Department
(1) Assess situation.
(2) Deploy search and rescue team. Coordinate with fire fighters in case of fire in the mine.
(3) Initiate search and rescue operation and provide first aid to the injured workers. Shift them to
hospital.
(4) Recommend case for worker compensation in case of loss of life/limb.
15. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited/Pakistan Telecommunication
Authority
(1) Provide uninterrupted telephone and telegraph facilities during emergency response.
(2) Provide communication services to DEOC round the clock. Make arrangements for alternate
communication system. Coordinate with private telecommunication services in the district to get
their services if needed.
(3) Issue order to keep telephone exchange open round the clock during emergency operations.
16. Industries Department
(1) Designate a representative for the DEOC, if and when needed.
(2) Immediately deploy fire fighters in case of fire in industrial unit. Evacuate people
immediately and provide first aid.
(3) Arrange transportation of personnel and material to affected areas as well as evacuation of
the affectees.
(4) Take steps for rehabilitation of the industries adversely affected by disasters.
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APPENDIX C PROVINCIAL LEVEL SOPs FOR RESPONSE PHASE
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1. Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA)
(1) Activate PEOC.
(2) Disseminate early warning information to all stakeholders.
(3) Conduct rapid assessment and launch quick response.
(4) Prepare detail plan for the resource requirement for relief operation and send to the PDMC
for approval.
(5) Provide food, drinking water, medical supplies, non food items to the affected population.
(6) Keep NEOC abreast of latest situation.
(7) Warn all concerned departments to prepare for emergency response.
(8) Coordinate with NDMA, Armed Forces and keep them informed about the situation and
resource mobilization.
(9) Keep print and electronic media updated on regular basis.
(10) Liaise with I/NGOs, UN bodies and philanthropists organizations for resource mobilizations
for emergency response.
(11) Organize regular media and public information briefings.
(12) Forward Situation Report (SITREP) on daily and weekly basis to Chief Minister, Governor,
PDMC/Equivalent Members, NDMA, Armed Forces etc.
(13) Organize initial and subsequent assessment of disaster affected areas and determine the
extent of loss damage and volume and relief required.
(14) Organize detailed assessment for the early recovery programme and prepare proposal and
circulate it to the PMDC, NDMA, UN and I/NGOs.
2. Health Department
(1) Designate a representative to the Provincial EOC.
(2) Mobilize and deploy medical teams and paramedic staff for rapid assessment and quick
response in the affected areas.
(3) Exercise vigilance about outbreak or possibility of any epidemic/outbreaks. Take effective
measures against it.
(4) Support district health teams in carrying out smooth health services in emergency response.
Develop plan for health sector in recovery phase, if needed.
(5) Coordinate and facilitate other humanitarian actors working in health sector.
(6) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely.
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(7) Document lessons learnt from the response experience and incorporate same in future
planning.
3. Public Health Engineering Department (PHED)
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct rapid assessment of water and sanitation for emergency response.
(3) Provide safe drinking water according to the Sphere Project Minimum Standards to the
affected population in emergency situation.
(4) Provide support to district level PHED for effective emergency response.
(5) Facilitate local and INGOs working on water and sanitation activities in emergency.
(6) Exercise vigilance about any out break/possibility of epidemic outbreak due to water and
sanitary conditions. Take effective measures against it.
(7) Ensure that water and sanitation system is operational in public buildings during emergency
situation.
4. Education Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Make arrangements to deploy teachers and student for voluntary assistance in assessment and
distribution of relief goods in the affected areas.
(3) Support PDMA, DDMAs, districts level education departments to run emergency mobile
schools and provide teaching material to continue education during the emergency.
(4) Prepare a report on response experiences and share it with provincial education department,
PDMA and NEOC.
(5) Document lessons learnt from response experiences and widely disseminate it to the relevant
stakeholders. Incorporate same in future planning.
5. Agriculture Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct initial rapid assessment to assess the damage to standing crops.
(3) Provide agriculture machinery to the farmers to protect their crops during flood and cyclone.
(4) Provide technical advice to the farmer community to protect standing crop from any insect
attack during floods, cyclones, drought etc.
(5) Release public messages through agriculture extension workers, median and TV cable
network, to protect the standing crops.
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(6) Exercise vigilance about pest attack on the crop and take effective measures against it.
(7) Coordinate with irrigation department and DDMAs.
(8) Develop plans for agriculture sector for early recovery phase if needed.
(9) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely.
(10) Document lesson learnt from the response experiences and incorporate same in future
planning.
6. Livestock Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct/assist PDMA in rapid assessment on livestock and provide financial and technical
resources to the district livestock departments to run the animal camps.
(3) Arrange vaccines for animals in flood, cyclone and drought situation. Support districts
livestock departments, DDMAs for the provision of fodder, de-worming medicines and vaccine
for the animals in prolonged drought situation.
(4) Make arrangements for delivery of animal feed on subsidized rates in emergency response
particularly in drought.
(5) Exercise vigilance about disease attack in animals. Take effective measures against.
Coordinate and facilitate humanitarian organizations working in the livestock sector.
(6) Develop plan for the livestock sector for early recovery phase if needed.
(7) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely. Document lessons learnt from response
experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
7. Irrigation Department
(1) Designate a representative to the PEOC.
(2) Monitor embankment situation during floods and set up camp of irrigation officials on
sensitive points of the embankment.
(3) Monitor water flows in canal and its distributaries during the flood season and update EOC
on river and canal water flow in monsoon period on daily basis.
(4) Update communities on river and canal water flows through PDMA, DDMAs (as applicable),
print and electronic media.
(5) Issue early warning of potential floods or canal breach through media, TV cable operators,
police wireless network etc.
(6) Monitor alert and be ready to face any situation e.g. breach of canal/sub distributaries etc.
(7) Coordinate with Armed Forces and indigenous breach filling experts for canal breach filling.
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8. Works and Services Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct infrastructure loss and damage assessment and share it with DDMAs, PDMA and
NDMA.
(3) Provision of heavy machinery to the district department and district administration for
clearing roads, debris etc.
(4) Take steps to ensure speedy repair and restoration of transport links.
(5) Coordinate with Armed Forces to get their help in restoration of roads and infrastructure e.g.
bridges, clearing land slides and clearing road blocks etc.
(6) Support PDMA and district administration by providing temporary structures in relief camps.
(7) Organize repairs to the damaged public buildings and infrastructure for early recovery and
rehabilitation.
(8) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely. Document lessons learnt from response
experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
9. Local Government Rural Development and Katchie Abadies
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct assessment of the water/sanitation and rural infrastructure schemes.
(3) Deploy teams to restore water supply schemes and establish sanitation system for affected
communities.
(4) Conduct health and hygiene programme for affected communities.
(5) Promote indigenous water purification methods.
(6) Support districts LG&RD Department to conduct awareness activities on water purification
in the affected areas.
(7) Assess the water situation particularly hand pumps and sanitation in disaster prone areas.
(8) Coordinate and facilitate I/NGOs, UNICEF and other agencies working on water/sanitation
activities.
(9) Prepare a detailed report and disseminate it widely. Document lessons learnt from response
experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
10. Culture, Social Welfare and Tourism Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Conduct assessment of Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp situation and share it with
humanitarian organization working in this area.
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(3) Register all affected people live in the camp, arrange distribution of relief material and
provide medical facilities in the camp.
(4) Make arrangement for protection of Internally Displaced People (IDPs), especially women
and children.
(5) Provide technical support to district social welfare departments in managing of social welfare
issues including orphanage centres, safe play areas for children.
(6) Coordinate and facilitate humanitarian organizations working on child protection,
orphanages, separated children and disability. Manage social welfare centre and orphanages.
(7) Coordinate with PDMA and DDMAs to ensure that needs of most vulnerable social groups
are addressed in emergency response.
11. Home Department
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Support district administration in evacuation of affected people and transport to camp sites.
(3) Assist Armed Forces and USAR teams in search and rescue operation.
(4) Maintain law and order situation in relief centres, distribution point and shelter sites.
(5) Ensure security measures for relief material warehouses set up by the government.
(6) Provide security to the foreign dignitaries, donors, UN agencies, and humanitarian
organizations, engaged in emergency response as well as visitors to the areas.
(7) Keep close watch for any criminal and anti state activity in the area activities.
(8) Manage traffic during the disaster situation and develop alternative traffic management plan
to avoid inconvenience.
(9) Arrange security for government property and installations damaged in disaster.
(10) Maintain public order and internal security. Protect life and property.
(11) Assist local administration to stop theft and misuse of relief material.
(12) Facilitate access for emergency/rescue operation vehicles to the disaster sites.
12. Forest, Wild life and Fisheries Department
(1) Conduct assessment on flood/cyclone impact on fisheries and wild life.
(2) Gauge impact of flood/cyclone on mangrove plantation.
(3) Coordinate with fire fighters in case of forest fire.
(4) Nurseries to support NGOs and community to promote tree plantation in the area.
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13. Information Technology Department
(1) Deploy technical staff to support PDMA and DEOCs in disaster situation.
(2) Monitor the situation and make sure that communication and IT System function smoothly to
carry out the relief and rehabilitation work.
14. Transport
(1) Designate a representative to the provincial EOC.
(2) Immediately deploy fire fighters in case of fire in an industrial unit.
(3) Evacuate people immediately and provide first aid.
(4) Arrange transportation of personnel and material to affected areas as well as evacuation of
affectees.
(5) Take steps for rehabilitation of industries adversely affected by disasters.
15. Information and Archives Department
(1) Designate a representative to the PEOC.
(2) Ensure that the news-items relating to disaster present accurate picture of the actual position
and do not create undue panic.
(3) Disseminate information about the short/long term measures initiated by different ministries
and departments for relief and rehabilitation of affected people.
(4) Curtail normal programmes to broadcast essential information on disaster if requested by the
Chairman NDMA/DG PDMA.
(5) Take steps for projection of news and directives relating to the situation issued by relevant
Federal Government agencies including NDMA.
(6) Organize visits by local/foreign journalists to affected areas to prevent
misrepresentation/misreporting.
16. Mines and Minerals Department
(1) Assess the situation.
(2) Deploy search and rescue team.
(3) Initiate search and rescue operation.
(4) Provide first aid to the rescued workers and shift them to hospital.
(5) Coordinate with PDMA and DDMAs for further assistance
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APPENDIX D NATIONAL/FEDERAL LEVEL SOPs FOR RESPONSE
PHASE
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1. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
(1) Activate NEOC
(2) Organize initial and subsequent assessment of disaster affected areas and determine the
extent of loss damage and volume and relief required.
(3) Coordinate and inform all concerned departments to get prepare for emergency response.
Keep inform print and electronic media on regular basis.
(4) Coordinate with Armed Forces through JS HQ and Service HQ.
(5) Prepare detailed plan for the resources require for full relief operation.
(6) Coordinate with I/NGOs, UN bodies and philanthropists organizations for resource
mobilizations.
(7) Mobilize and deploy resources e.g. search and rescue medical teams in the affected areas.
(8) Supply of food, drinking water, medical supplies and non food items to the affected
population.
(9) Organize details assessment for the early recovery programme and prepare proposal and
circulate it to the NMDC, Multi and bilateral donors, UN, I/NGOs and philanthropists.
(10) Prepare a transition plan from relief to recovery programme.
(11) Organize regular media and public information briefings.
(12) Prepare situation Report (SITREP) on daily and weekly basis and circulate to the Prime
Minister, NDMC members, PMDC members, P/R/SDMAs, Armed Forces etc.
2. Ministry of Health
(1) Designate a representative in National Emergency Operations Centre during the emergency
period.
(2) Alert and deploy medical teams and paramedic staff in the affected areas for rapid assessment
and emergency response.
(3) Exercise vigilance about possibility of any epidemic /outbreak and take effective measures
against it.
(4) Provide technical support to PDMA including Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK in carrying out
smooth health services in emergency response.
(5) Ensure that WHO protocols on quality and Sphere Minimum Standards are followed by
medical professionals in the field.
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(6) Coordinate and facilitate with WHO/UNICEF and other humanitarian\ organizations working
in health sector in affected areas.
(7) Monitor health situation in the affected areas.
(8) Document the lesson learnt from the response experiences and incorporate same in future
planning.
3. Ministry of Education
(1) Designate a representative to the National Emergency Operations Centre.
(2) Make arrangements to deploy teachers and students for voluntary assistance in assessment
and distribution of relief goods in the affected areas.
(3) Provide support to PDMAs in education sector assessment.
(4) Support PDMA and provincial education authorities to run emergency mobile schools and
provide teaching material to continue education during the emergency.
(5) Determine the extent of loss in educational institutions and prepare plans for their
rehabilitation.
(6) Prepare a report on the experience and share it with provincial education departments,
PDMAs and NEOC.
(7) Document the lesson learnt from the response experiences and incorporate same in future
planning.
4. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
(1) Designate a representative to the National Emergency Operations Centre.
(2) Conduct initial rapid assessment to assess the damage to crops and livestock.
(3) Provide agricultural machinery and necessary tools to the farmers to protect their crop during
flood season.
(4) Prepare and release messages and advices for farmer community through NEOC, PEOCs,
provincial agriculture departments, print and electronic media to protect standing crops.
(5) Vigilant about pest attack on the crop and take effective measure.
(6) Provide technical advice to the farmer community to protect standing crop during heavy
rains, wind storm, flood and cyclone situations.
(7) Support provincial livestock department, for the provision of fodder, de-worming medicines
and vaccine for the animals during the drought period.
(8) Coordinate with Federal Flood Commission and NDMA in relation emergency response.
(9) Develop plan for agriculture sector for early recovery phase if needed.
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(10) Prepare a detail report and disseminate it to all stakeholders. Document the lesson learnt
from the response experiences and incorporate same in future planning.
5. Ministry of Housing and Works
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Carry out detailed technical assessment of damaged public infrastructure.
(3) Support provincial governments in conducting of damage and loss assessment to
infrastructure and housing.
(4) Coordinate with FWO/Armed Forces to get their help in clearing land slides, removing road
blocks and restoration of infrastructure e.g. bridges.
(5) Provision of heavy machinery to the district department and district administration for
clearing roads, debris etc.
6. Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Conduct damage assessment of the water/sanitation and rural infrastructure schemes damages
within jurisdiction.
(3) Support NDMA and PDMAs in assessment and provide technical support for water/sanitation
activities in emergency response.
(4) Ensure that Sphere Project Minimum Standards are followed in water and sanitation schemes
in emergency response.
(5) Introduce simple and cost effective water purification technology in emergencies.
(6) Promote indigenous water purification methods.
(7) Coordinate with NDMA, PDMA and provincial LG&RD Department.
7. Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Conduct assessment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp situation and share it with
humanitarian organizations working in this area.
(3) Register all affected people living in the camp, arrange distribution of relief material and
provide medical facilities in the camp.
(4) Work out measures for protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), especially women
and children.
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(5) Ensure that guidelines mentioned above are followed by government authorities and
humanitarian organizations.
(6) Provide technical support to provincial social welfare departments in managing social welfare
issues e.g. orphanage centres, safe play areas for children etc.
(7) Coordinate and facilitate humanitarian organizations working on child protection issues,
disability, orphanages and separated children.
8. Ministry of Interior
(1) Carry out search and rescue with the help of Armed Forces.
(2) Support district administration in evacuation of affected people and transport them to the
camp sites.
(3) Protect life and property.
(4) Maintain law and order situation in relief centres and shelter sites.
(5) Provide security in relief centres, shelter sites and warehouses set up by the government in
disaster affected areas.
(6) Arrange security for government property and installations damaged in disaster.
(7) Provide security to the foreign dignitaries, donors, UN agencies, and humanitarian
organization visiting and engaged in relief operations.
(8) Keep close watch for any criminal and anti state activity in the affected area.
(9) Manage traffic during disaster situation in the affected area.
9. Ministry of Information Technology
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Ensure that IT and telecommunication system functions well during disaster times for
effective emergency response.
(3) Engage private sector IT firms to provide support during disaster.
(4) Deploy technical staff to support EOCs and PDMAs in disaster situation.
(5) Monitor situation and ensue that communication and IT System function smoothly to carry
out emergency response.
(6) Document the lesson learnt from the response experiences and incorporate same in future
planning.
10. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
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(1) Ensure that the news-items relating to disaster reflect accurate picture and do not create
undue panic.
(2) Take steps for due projection of news directives relating to the situation issued by the Federal
Government agencies concerned with response, including NDMA.
(3) Disseminate information about the short/long term measures initiated by different ministries
and departments for relief and rehabilitation of affected people.
(4) Curtail normal programmes to broadcast essential information on disaster, if requested by the
Chairman NMDA.
(5) Arrange comprehensive media rebuttal in events of any distorted news projections by
segment of local/foreign media, in concert with NDMA.
11. Ministry of Railways
(1) Designate a focal person in National EOC if and when needed.
(2) Transport relief material from ports and airports to the disaster affected areas.
(3) Monitor the situation of railway tracks and update NDMA on regular basis particularly in
earthquake, floods and cyclone situations.
12. Ministry of Youth Affairs
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC, if and when needed.
(2) Deployment of volunteers with consultation of NEOC, PEOCs for emergency.
(3) Prepare report and share it with NDMA.
(4) Document the lessons learnt from the response experience and widely share with
stakeholders through NDMA.
(5) Incorporate same in future planning.
13. Ministry of Water and Power
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC, if and when needed.
(2) Keep update on river water flow situation to NDMA and provinces.
14. Ministry of Defence
(1) Designate a representative in NEOC, PEOCs and DEOCs (as applicable).
(2) Conduct survey in affected areas and assess requirements of relief and recovery needs.
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(3) Provide helicopters, aircrafts, ships etc for assessment, search and rescue and evacuation in
complex emergencies, when required.
(4) Support NDMA, PDMAs, DDMAs in emergency response e.g. search and rescue,
evacuation, distribution of food, non food items, tent village, medical camps, debris clearance,
transportation of injured and dead bodies etc.
(5) Deploy professional teams e.g. medical doctors (for health services) engineers (to restore the
communication and infrastructure network, breach filling) and manpower (to clear roads, lift
debris, control traffic on main roads, maintain law and order, help in the camp site management,
provision of drinking water supply etc).
(6) Close coordination with NDMA, PDMAs during emergency response.
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC, if and when required.
(2) Work as focal point for the deployment of aid workers in the region, in case of major disaster,
and coordinate support given by the Government of Pakistan.
(3) Facilitate issue of visas to foreign humanitarian relief workers so that they can promptly
access the affected areas.
(4) Coordinate with foreign countries to obtain aid in case of major disaster.
(5) Coordinate with NDMA on issue of foreign humanitarian aid.
16. Federal Flood Commission
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Update NEOC on river water flow in flood situation on daily basis.
(3) Coordinate with provincial irrigation departments and get update.
(4) Prepare updates on flood protection bunds, canal system and share it with NDMA, PDMAs.
17. Civil Defence
(1) Designate a representative to the NEOC/PEOCs/DEOCs (as applicable).
(2) Assist NDMA, PDMAs, DDMAs in search and rescue and evacuation in different kinds of
disasters.
(3) Divide potential affected sites in various zones. Each zone to be controlled by designated
appointment in case of major disaster. Alternatives to be nominated by therein.
(4) Provide first aid to injured persons and transport them to nearest hospital.
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(5) Assist fire brigade staff in search and rescue and first aid operations related to fire and other
incidents.
(6) Assist health department in treatment of injured victims, load dead bodies in the ambulance
and disposal of dead bodies.
(7) Organize vehicle parking arrangements with help of traffic police at district level.
(8) Assist DEOCs and police department in setting up of information system for members of
public, whose relatives, friends and family members are lost or missing.
18. Coast Guards
(1) Designate a representative in NEOC/PEOCs/DEOCs particularly in cyclone season and
monsoon period.
(2) Assist DDMAs in relief operation.
(3) Assist DDMA in assessment of damage and losses of the coastal public property and prepare
a report and share it with DDMAs, PDMAs, NDMA.
(4) Assist DDMAs, PDMAs and NDMA to evacuate communities from the coastal areas in case
of cyclone or another sea related hazard.
(5) Coordinate and closely work with NDMAs, PDMAs, DDMA in case of any coastal area
disaster.
19. Emergency Relief Cell
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Immediately release relief goods in case of disaster.
(3) Coordinate international relief assistance in case of major catastrophe in consultation with
NDMA.
(4) Closely work and coordinate with NDMA.
20. Fire Services
(1) Deploy fire fighting teams.
(2) Rescue people.
(3) Coordinate with NDMA/PDMAs/DDMAs.
21. National Logistics Cell (NLC)
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC, if and when needed.
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(2) Provide vehicles to transport relief goods.
(3) Act as coordinator of road transport agencies during disaster.
(4) Ensure smooth transportation of relief goods in the affected areas.
(5) Support government in technical appraisal of projects/programmes pertaining to roads, road
transport, railways, ports and shipping.
(6) Liaise with private transport agencies on behalf of NDMA if needed.
22. Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)
(1) Provide remote sensing and satellite maps.
(2) Prepare post disaster imagery maps.
23. Pakistan Meteorological Department
(1) Inform public on the weather forecast and issuing warning in case of potential threat.
(2) Disseminate flood information to the provinces and districts heads by phone and fax on daily
basis during flood season.
(3) Share weather forecasts and early warning information with NDMA, PDMAs on regular
basis in monsoon period.
(4) Coordinate with Federal Flood Commission, Flood Warning Centre in monsoon period.
(5) Collect rain data on regular basis, consolidate it and share it with NDMA.
24. Capital Development Authority
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC, if and when needed.
(2) Provide fire fighting vehicles, cranes, dumpers, loaders, shovels, excavators, road cutters etc.
(3) Coordinate with NDMA/PDMAs.
25. Media
(1) Provide public timely and provide factual information during emergency response.
(2) Influence decision makers to take immediate and appropriate action for emergency response.
(3) Relay public awareness messages on health and other issues which help to reduce the human
losses.
(4) Highlight needs and issues of survivors during the disaster time.
(5) Curtail normal programme to broadcast essential information on emergency response.
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26. Civil Aviation Authority
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC and PEOCs, if and when needed.
(2) Keep airport staff alert.
(3) Designate focal person during disaster time.
(4) Facilitate humanitarian organizations, embassies and other bilateral organizations for relief
material during the disaster period.
(5) Facilitate humanitarian organizations, UN air charters for landing and take off for relief
activities.
(6) Provide space for storage relief goods during disaster time.
27. Rescue 1122 Services
(1) Deploy fire fighting teams.
(2) Cordon the area.
(3) Immediately send ambulances and search and rescue teams after receiving phone call.
(4) Rescue people.
(5) Provide first aid.
(6) Evacuate seriously injured people to hospital for further assistance.
(7) Transport dead bodies and transfer to the government authorities/hospitals.
(8) Coordinate with NDMA/PDMAs/DDMAs.
28. Edhi Foundation
(1) Provide ambulance service for the transportation of injured and dead bodies to the hospital.
(2) Provide first aid to the injured people.
(3) Provide relief items e.g. food, clothes, kitchen sets etc.
(4) Provide rescue and medical services.
29. Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF)
(1) Designate a representative in the NEOC, if and when needed.
(2) Organize/conduct joint assessment and share report with PHF members, NDMA, PDMAs
and DDMAs.
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(3) Assist DDMAs in emergency response. Provide relief support food and non food items to the
affected population.
(4) Ensure that PHF members follow the Sphere Project Minimum Standards in disaster
response.
(5) Design a coordinated joint response in the light of the assessment report findings.
(6) Closely work with NDMA, PDMAs and DDMAs during the disaster time.
30. Pakistan Red Crescent Society
(1) Designate a representative to the NEOC, PEOCs and DEOCs (as applicable).
(2) Assist DDMAs in evacuation process in the affected area.
(3) Provide ambulance for rescue and transporting injured people.
(4) Provide medical services to the affected population.
(5) Coordination with NDMA, PDMAs, DDMAs, NGOs, INGOs, relief agencies for emergency
response.
(6) Coordinate operations of national and international components of Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movements, operating in disaster affected areas.
(7) Coordinate with DM authorities and UN agencies for post disaster relief work.
31. United Nations Agencies
(1) Designate a representative to the National EOC.
(2) Provide relief goods through government and partner organizations.
(3) Form thematic clusters according to the expertise and capacity of the humanitarian agency
and organize cluster weekly meeting and update NDMA, PDMAs and DDMAs accordingly.
(4) Conduct assessment in specific areas e.g. water/sanitation health, child protection, women
issues in camps management, shelter, security, water and sanitation food security and response
accordingly.
(5) Organize and facilitate weekly coordination meetings for effective response.
(6) Coordinate with NDMA and PDMAs and update them about the progress.
(7) Conduct assessment for early recovery programme and share it with NDMA.
(Source: NDMA, 2010)
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APPENDIX F: EXPLANATION FOR EXEMPT
RESEARCH
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EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH

Title of Project: Multi-level and Interorganizational Collaborative Response to Disasters: The
Case of Pakistan Floods 2010
Principal Investigator: Sana Khosa
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Naim Kapucu
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that facilitate and hinder interorganizational
collaborative response in disasters and in particular the Pakistan Floods of 2010. The identification
and understanding of these factors is important to ensure that current interorganizational response
is improved so that future disasters can be tackled and addressed in better and more collaborative
ways.
You will be asked to narrate your collaborative experience in the 2010 Floods and the role your
organization played. You will be also asked about the agencies you partnered with to respond
effectively to the floods. This interview will take place via telephonic conversation and if that is not
possible then a short questionnaire will be emailed with interview questions. The interview will not
take more than 30 mins. In case an interview is not possible a response to an email will be
expected within a week.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints you may contact: Sana Khosa, Doctoral Student, Public Affairs, College
of Health and Public Affairs, (407) 446 -8314 or by email at sanakhosa@knights.ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:
Research at the
University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the
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Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the IRB.
For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional
Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201
Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.
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APPENDIX G SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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1. Was your organization collaborating and cooperating with multiple organizations
during response?
2. What was the nature of collaboration with other organizations? Which were your
closest partners in responding to floods (international agencies, federal, provincial
and district level departments)?
3. Does your organization, on a regular basis, engage in relationship-building activities
with other agencies such as training drills and exchange of ideas?
4. Do you engage in and avail opportunities to form newer partnerships with other and
newly formed agencies working in the community? If not, why not?
5. What type of institutional (plans, policies, response systems) support was available in
responding to the floods?
6. Do you think there is local capacity for responding effectively? If not, what is
required to build capacity?
7. What are the main factors facilitating effective response?
8. What are the key factors hindering effective response?
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APPENDIX H ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DISTRICT PLANNED
RESPONSE NETWORK
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Agriculture Department
Armed Forces
Community Based Organizations
Charity and Donor Agencies
Culture, Social Welfare and Tourism Department
District Coordination Officer
District Disaster Management Authority
District Emergency Operations Center
Education Department
Embassy Officials/United Nations Officials
Farmer's organization
Firefighting teams
Food Department
Forest and Wildlife Department
Health Department
Humanitarian Organizations
Industries Department
International Non-governmental Organizations
Irrigation Department
Livestock Department
Local Mosques
Local Newspapers
National Disaster Management Authority
National Emergency Operations Center
Nongovernmental Organizations
Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd
Provincial Disaster Management Authority
Provincial Emergency Operations Center
Police Department
Provincial Culture Social Welfare and Tourism Dept
Provincial Health Department
Provincial Police Department
Provincial Irrigation Department
Public Health Engineering Department
Secretary Food Department
Social Welfare Humanitarian Organizations
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Agri Dept
Armed Forces
CBOs
Charity and Donor Agencies
CSW & T Dept
DCO
DDMA
DEOC
Edu Dept
Emb and UN Officials
Farmer's org.
Firefighters
Food Dept
F & W Dept
Health Dept
HOs
Industies Dept.
INGOs
Irrigation Dept
Livestock Dept
Local Mosques
Local Media
NDMA
NEOC
NGOs
Private Telecom
PDMA
PEOC
Police Dept
Provincial CSW & T Dept
Provincial Health Dept
Provincial Police Dept
Provincial Irrigation Dept
PHED
Secretary Food Dept
SW HOs

Tehsil Municipal Administration
United Nations Agencies
Union Council
Volunteers
Water and Sanitation International NGOs
Works and Services Department

TMA
UN Agencies
UC
Volunteers
WASH INGOs
W & S Dept
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APPENDIX I ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROVINCIAL PLANNED
RESPONSE NETWORK
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Agriculture Department
Agriculture Extension Workers
Armed Forces
Community Based Organizations (CBOs)
Charities
Chief Minister (CM)
Culture, SW and Tourism Department
DCOs
DDMAs
DEOCs
District Edu Depts
District level PHEDs
District LG & RD Depatments
District Livestock Depts
District SW deparments
District W and SD
Education Department
Farmers
Federal Agencies
Firefighting Units
Forest, Wildlife and Fisheries Dept
Governor
Health Department
Health HOs
Home Department
HOs
Industries Commerce Transport and Labor
Dept
Information and Archives Dept
INGOs
Irrigation Department
IT Department
Livestock Department
Livestock HOs
Local Govt Rural Development
Local WASH NGOs
Media
Medical Teams
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Mines and Minerals Dept
NDMA
NEOC
NGOs
PDMA
PDMC
PEOC
Private sector Agencies
Pronvincial Ministries
Public Health Engineering Department (PHED)
Social welfare Cente
SW HOs
UN Agencies
UNICEF
USAR teams
WASH INGOs
Works and Services Department
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APPENDIX J ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NATIONAL PLANNED
RESPONSE NETWORK
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Armed Forces
Army
Army Engineers
Capital Development Authority
Charities
Civil Aviation Authority
Civil Defense
Coast Guards
Components of Red Cross/ Red Crescent
Movements,
DCOs
DDMAs
DEOCs
District Departments
DM Authorities
Donors
Edhi Foundation
Embassies,
Emergency Relief Cell
Farmers Community
Federal Flood Commission
Fire Departments
Fire Services
Flood Warning Center (FWC)
Foreign Countries
GoP
Health Departments
Health sector Humanitarian Agencies
HOs
INGOs
Local hospitals
Media Agencies
Medical Doctors
Medical Teams
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Education

Armed Forces
Army
Army Engineers
CDA
Charities
CAA
Civil Def
CGs
Red Crescent Movements,
DCOs
DDMAs
DEOCs
DDs
DM Authorities
Donors
Edhi
Embassies
ERC
Farmers
FFC
Fire Depts
Fire Services
FWC
Foreign Countries
GoP
Health Depts
Health HOs
HOs
INGOs
Local hospitals
Media
Medical Doctors
Medical Teams
M of D
M of Edu
225

Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Housing and Works
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of IT
Ministry of Local Government and Rural
Development
Ministry of Railways
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education
Ministry of Water and Power
Ministry of Youth Affairs
National Highway Authority
National Logistics Cell (NLC)
Navy
NDMA
NEOC
NGOs
NMDC
Other bilateral Agencies
Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF)
Pakistan Meteorological Dept
Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS)
PDMAs
PEOCs
PIA,
PM
PMDC
Police Departments
Private Sector IT Firms
Private Transport Agencies
Provincial Agri Depts
Provincial Educational Departments
Provincial govts
Provincial Irrigation Departments
Provincial LG & RD department.
Provincial Livestock Department
Provincial SW Depts
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M of FAL
M of FA
M of Health
M of HW
M of IB
M of Interior
M of IT
M of LGRD
M of R
M of SWSE
M of WP
M of YA
NHA
NLC
Navy
NDMA
NEOC
NGOs
NMDC
Other bilateral Agencies
PHF
MET
PRCS
PDMAs
PEOCs
PIA
PM
PMDC
PDs
Private Sector IT Firms
Private Transport
Provincial Ads
Provincial Eds
Provincial govts
Provincial IDs
Provincial LG & RD
Provincial LDs
Provincial SW Depts

Rescue 1122 Services
Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO)
SW Humanitarian agencies,
Traffic Police
UNICEF
United Nations Agencies
USAR Teams
Volunteers
WHO

Rescue 1122
SUPARCO
SW HOs
Traffic Police
UNICEF
UN
USAR
Volunteers
WHO
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APPENDIX K ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DG KHAN RESPONSE
NETWORK
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All Pakistan Textile Mills Association
Amir Welfare Foundation
Army and Rangers
Army Engineers
Chief Secretary Punjab
CM Punjab
DCO DG Khan
DG Khan Commissioner
Helping Hands for Relief and Development (HHRD)
Irrigation and Power Department
ISPR
National Highway Authority
NDMA
Nespak (National Engineering Services Pakistan)
Pakistan Air Force(PAF)
Pakistan Army’s Lahore Corps
PML-Q Leader (Pervaiz Elahi)
PRCS

APTMA
AWF
Army
Army Engineers
CS Punjab
CM Punjab
DCO DGK
DGK Comm
HHRD
Irrigation Dept
ISPR
NHA
NDMA
Nespak
PAF
Lahore Corps
PML-Q
PRCS

Punjab Ministry for Human Rights
Punjab Health Department
Punjab Information Dept
Punjab Police

PMHR
PHD
PID
Ppolice
DCO
Sheikhupura
SWS Sheikupura
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
Local NGOs
QMC
BV Hospital
PARCO

DCO Sheikhupura
Social Welfare Society Sheikhupura
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
local NGOs DG Khan
QuaideAzam Medical College
BV Hospital Bahawalpur
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APPENDIX L ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MUZZAFARGARH RESPONSE
NETWORK
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Army (Including Corps/Army camps/Amry
Engineers/ISPR/ COAS)
Army Medical Doctors (doctors and paramedical
officers)
CM Punjab
MG Commissioner
Edhi
UNICEF
Punjab Health Department
Nishtar Hospital
Allama Iqbal Medical College
Jinnah Hospital/ KEMU/Medical Teams
EDO (H) Office Multan
Helping Hands for Relief and Development (HHRD)
Irrigation Department
Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry
Met Office
Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis
MSB (SIDA) ( Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency)
Muzaffargarh District Administration
National Logistics Cell
Pakistan Medical Association (PMA) Lahore
Services Hospital
Mayo Hospital
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
Plan International
PM Gillani
PML (N) Flood Relief Committee
Punjab Industrial Estates
PRCS
Punjab Governor Salman Taseer
Provincial Monitoring Cell
Rescue 1122
Saudi Arabia
Social Welfare Department
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Army
Army Medical Docs
CM
Commissioner
Edhi
UNICEF
Punjab Health Dept
Nishtar Hospital
AIMC
Medical Teams
EDO (H)
HHRD
Irrigation Dept
LCCI
MET
Ministry for OP
SIDA
Muzaffargarh District
Administration
NLC
PMA
Services Hospital
Mayo Hospital
PPAF
Plan Int
PM
PML (N)
Punjab Industrial
Estates
PRCS
Governor
PMC
Rescue 1122
Saudi Arabia
SW Dept

UAE
UNFPA
University of Health Sciences (UHS)
WFP
Local NGOs
WHO

UAE
UNFPA
UHS
WFP
Local NGOs
WHO
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LEVEL OF RESPONSE
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All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA)
American Red Cross,
Austrian Red Cross
Bank of Punjab
Board of Revenue Punjab
Canadian Red Cross,
Caritas
Chief Secretary Punjab
CM Punjab
Danish Red Cross
Department of Livestock
Developers Association Fsd
DHQ hospitals
Falah- e-Insaniyat
Farmers Associates of Pakistan (FAP)
Flood Forecasting Division
Food and Agriculture Organization
German Red Cross
GoP
Governor Flood Relief Fund/ Governor Punjab
Guard Group
Helping Hands for Relief and Development (HHRD)
ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross)
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies
IOM
Iranian Consul General
Jammat-ud-Dawa
Lahore Chamber of Commerce
LAHORE Gymkhana Club
Mayo Hospital Lahore
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs
Minstry of Finance, Punjab
Mobile Medical Teams
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APTMA
American RC
Austrian RC
BoP
BoR Punjab
Canadian RC
Caritas
CS Punjab
CM Punjab
Danish RC
Livestock Dept
DAF
DHQ hospitals
FeI
FAP
FFD
FAO
German RC
GoP
Governor Punjab
Guard Grp
HHRD
ICRC
IFRC
IOM
Iranian Consul
JuD
Lhr CoC
Lhr Gym
Mayo Hosp
MoFA
MoH
MoLPA
MoF
MMTs

NDMA
OCHA
Oxfam Novib
Packages Group
Pakistan Army
Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD)
Pakistan Navy
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
Pakistan Rangers
PDMA/Punjab’s Relief and Crisis Management Department
People’s Lawyers Forum (PLF) Punjab
PM Gillani
PML-Q
PRCS (Pakistan Red Crescent Society)
Presbyterian Disaster Assistance (PDA)
Principal Institute of Ophthalmology
Public Health Engineering Department Punjab
Punjab Agriculture Department
Punjab Board of Investment and Trade (PBIT)
Punjab Cabinet
Punjab Department of Food
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)
Punjab Environment Protection Department (EPD)
Punjab Flood Relief Commission
Punjab Governor
Punjab Goverrment's Relief Fund
Punjab Health Department
Punjab Irrigation Department
Punjab Ministry for Finance and Planning & Development
Punjab Police
Punjab Relief Dept
Punjab Revenue Department
Punjab Water Council
Quaid-e-Azam Industrial Estate (QIE)
Rajanpur Relief Operation Director
Relief and Crisis Management Punjab
Rescue II22
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NDMA
OCHA
Oxfam
Packages Grp
Army
MET
Navy
PPP
PPMA
Rangers
PDMA
PLF
PM
PML-Q
PRCS
PDA
PIO
PHED
Agri. Dept.
PBIT
Punjab Cabinet
Food Dept.
PEF
EPD
FRC
Governor Punjab
Punjab Goverrment's
Relief Fund
Health Dept
Irrigation Dept
PMFPD
PP
Relief Dept
Revenue Dept
PWC
QIE
Rajanpur ROD
R&CMgt
Rescue 1122

Sheikhupura Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Social Welfare Department, Punjab
Spanish Red Cross
Special Support Group (SSG)
Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd (SNGPL)
Swedish Red Cross
THQs
TMAs
Turkish Red Crescent
UK govt
UN
UNDSS/OCHA

Sheikhupura CoCI
SWD
Spanish RC
SSG
SNGPL
Swedish RC
THQs
TMAs
Turkish RC
UK govt
UN
UNDSS

UNFPA
UNICEF
US Consul General in Lahore
US govt
USAID/OFDA
WFP
WHO

UNFPA
UNICEF
US consul Lhr
US govt.
USAID/OFDA
WFP
WHO
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APPENDIX N ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING AT THE
NATIONAL-INTERNATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONSE
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Azerbaijan Embassy
Ansar Burney Trust International
Abaseen Foundation UK
ACF International ( Action Against Hunger)
ACT Alliance Pakistan
ACTED
ActionAid International
Asian Development Bank
AECID
Afghanistan government
Age International
Al-Bario Engineering
All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA)
American Red Cross
Pakistan Army
Australian government
Australian Red Cross
Austrian Red Cross
Aware Girls
British Charities
British Conservative Party
Belgium Red Cross
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) / GoP
Bank of Punjab
BRAC Pakistan
Brazil government
British Red Cross
Brooke International
BRSP
CAFOD
Canadian govt
Canadian Minister for International Cooperation
Canadian Red Cross
Care International
Caritas
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AB Embassy
AB Trust
Abaseen
ACF Int
ACT
ACTED
ActionAid
ADB
AECID
Afg gov
Age Int
Al-Bario
APTMA
ARC
Army
Australian gov
Australian RC
Austrian RC
Aware Girls
BC
BCP
Belgium RC
Bill and Melinda
BISP
BoP
BRAC
Brazil gov
British RC
Brooke
BRSP
CAFOD
Canadian Gov
Canadian MIC
Canadian RC
Care
Caritas

Construction Company of Germany
Construction Companies of Canada
CDO
CERD
United Nation’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
China government
Christian Aid
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
CM Punjab
Coca Cola
Concern Worldwide
Church World Service
Danish embassy
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)
Department of Agri
UK Department of International Development
Danish Red Cross
Economic Affairs Division
The European Commission
The Edhi Foundation
Government of Egypt
Environment Consultancies & Options
Emergency Relief Cell (ERC), Islamabad
Pakistan Emergency Response Fund (ERF)
Evacuee Trust Property
Finnish Red Cross,
Flood Emergency Cell
Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation
Federal Flood Commission (FFC)
French Foreign Ministry
German Foreign Minister
Foreign Ministry of Malaysia
Federal Board of Review (FBR)
French government
French Red Cross
Federal Shariat Court (FSC)
Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists
German Embassy
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CC Germany
CCs Canada
CDO
CERD
CERF
China gov
Christian Aid
CIDA
CM Punjab
Coca Cola
CW
CWS
D Embassy
DEC
Dept of Agri
DFID
DRC
EAD
EC
Edhi
Egypt gov
Env Con
ERC
ERF
ETP
F RC
FEC
FeI
FFC
FM French
FM German
FM Malaysia
FRB
French gov
French RC
FSC
FUJ
G Embassy

General Electric
Geo Network
German government
Glascow City Chambers
GoP
Punjab Governor
Global Peace and Security Fund
German Red Cross (GRC)
Handicap International
Helping Hand for Relief and Development (HHRD)
Help in Need
HUMAN Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Industrial Alliance
Islami Center Boston
InternationalCrisisGroup
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Islamic Development Bank
IFRC
Imran Khan Flood Relief (IKFR)
Indian Ministry for External Affairs
IMF
Indian government
Government of Indonesia
International Organisation for Migration
Islamic Relief
Iranian Consul General
International Rescue Committee
Indus River System Authority
Insaaf Student Federation (ISF)
Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)
Government of Italy
Government of Japan
Johanniter
Japan Platform
Japanese Red Cross
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Kabani & Company
Kissan Board Pakistan (KBP)
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GE
Geo
German gov
Glascow CCs
GoP
Governor
GPSF
GRC
Handicap
HHRD
HIN
HRCP
IA
ICB
ICG
ICRC
IDB
IFRC
IKFR
IMEA
IMF
Indian gov
Indo gov
IOM
IR
Iranian CG
IRC
IRSA
ISF
ISPR
Italy gov
Japan gov
Johanniter
JP
JRC
JuD
K&C
KBP

Republic of Korea
Kuwait Red Crescent Society (KRCS)
Kuwait government
Levis Strauss Pakistan
The Labour Party Pakistan
Lahore Electric Supply Company
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry for Communications
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Finance, Revenue, Economic Affairs
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Housing and Works
Ministry of Human Rights
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs
Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis
Ministry for Pakistan railways
Ministry of State for Finance and Economic Affairs
Ministry of State for Information
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education
Ministry of Water and Power
Malaysian Government
Monsanto AgriTech
Merlin
MET Office
Pakistan Military
Mir Khalilur Rehman Foundation (MKRF)
Medecins Sans Frontieres
Muslim Aid
Minhaj Welfare Foundation (MWF)
NADRA
Deputy Speaker National Assembly
NATO
Pakistan Navy
National Bank of Pakistan
NCHC
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Korea
KRCS
Kuwait gov
Levis
LP
LRSC
M o FA
M of C
M of FA India
M of FAL
M of Finance
M of H
M of H&W
M of HR
M of I
M of IB&N
M of L&PA
M of OP
M of PR
M of SF&EA
M of SI
M of SW
M of W&P
Malaysian gov
MAT
Merlin
MET
Military
MKRF
MSF
MuslimAid
MWF
NADRA
National Assembly
NATO
Navy
NBP
NCHC

NDMA
National Disaster Management and Logistics Cell,
Nespak (National Engineering Services Pakistan)
NetSol Technologies
National Highways and Motorway Police (NH & MP)
National Highway Authority
Norweign Government
Norweign Red Cross
National Press Club (NPC)
Netherlands Red Cross
National Weather Forecasting Centre
New Zealand Red Cross
OCHA
Islamic Conference Organisation (OIC)
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC)
OM
Orascom Telecom Holding /Mobilink
Orient Electronics
Open Society Institute
Oxfam
Pakistan Association in Dubai (Pad)
Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
Pakistan Association of Greater Boston (PAGB)
Embassy of Pakistan in US
Pampers Pakistan
PARCO
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement
Authority (PaRRSA
Pakistan Board of Investment
Planning Commission
Punjab Cabinet
Pakistan Census Commission
Pakistan Cotton Ginners’ Association
Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR)
Presbyterian Disaster Assistance (PDA)
PDMA Punjab
Pakistan Embassy in China
Pakistan Embassy in the US
Pentagon
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NDMA
NDMLC
Nespak
NetSol
NH & MP
NHA
Norweign gov
Notweign RC
NPC
NRC
NWFC
NZRC
OCHA
ICO
OIC
OM
Orascom
Orient
OSI
Oxfam
Pad
PAF
PAGB
Pak Embassy US
Pampers
PARCO
PaRRSA
PBOI
Pcom
PC
PCC
PCGA
PCRWR
PDA
PDMA
PE in China
PE in US
Pentagon

Pakistan Electric Power Company (Pepco)
Pakistan Foreign Office Women’s Association (PFOWA)
Parks and Horticulture Authority(PHA)
Pakistani High Commission in London
Pakistan High Commission Malaysia
Pakistan High Commission in UK
Punjab Health Department
People in Need
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Plan UK
People’s Lawyers Forum (PLF) Punjab
PM
PML Unification Group
PML-N
PML-Q
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
PPP
Pakistan Red Crescent Society
President Pakistan
Pakistan Rural Support Program
Population Services International (PSI)
Pakistan Trader Front
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)
Pakistan Unilever
Qatar Charity
Pakistan Railways
Pakistan Rangers
Relief International
Royal Saudi Air Force
Embassy of Spain
South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA)
Salik Foundation
Saudi Embassy in Pakistan
Saudi government
State Bank of Pakistan
Supreme Court
Saudi Development Fund (SDF)
Secours Islamique
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Pepco
PFOWA
PHA
PHC in London
PHC in Malaysia
PHC in UK
PHD
PIN
PLA
Plan
PLF
PM
PML UG
PML-N
PML-Q
PPAF
PPP
PRCS
President
PRSP
PSI
PTF
PTI
PU
QC
Railways
Rangers
RI
RSAF
S Embassy
SAFMA
Salik
Saudi Embassy
Saudi gov
SBP
SC
SDF
Secours

MSB (SIDA) (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency)
Singapore Red Cross
Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd (SNGPL)
Spanish Red Cross
Special Support Group (SSG)
Save the Children
Social Welfare Department
Swedish Red Cross,
Tear fund
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
(TIKA)
Tehreek Minhaj-ul-Quran
Turkish Red Crescent (TRC)
Trocaire
Turkish government
UAE
United Arab Emirates Red Crescent Authority (UAE-RCA)
UK government
United Nations (UN)
United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization ( UN
FAO)
UNDAC
United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UNFPA
UN-Habitat
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UN HRD
UNICEF
UNPCT,
Rawalpindi-Islamabad Union of Journalists
US Army
US Consulate Lahore
US Department of Defence (DoD)
US Embassy
US Foreign Relations Committee
US govt
US Military
US Navy
US National Security Council
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SIDA
Singapore RC
SNGPL
Spanish RC
SSG
STC
SWD
Swedish RC
Tearfund
TIKA
TMuQ
TRC
Trocaire
Turkish gov
UAE
UAE-RCA
UK gov
UN
UN FAO
UNDAC
UNDSS
UNFPA
UNHABITAT
UNHCR
UNHRD
UNICEF
UNPCT
UoJ
US Army
US Consulate
US DoD
US Embassy
US FRC
US gov
US Military
US Navy
US NSC

US State Department
USAID
Ummah Welfare Trust (UK)
WAPDA
World Bank
WFP
WHO
World Vision
Federal Cabinet

US State Dept
USAID
UWT
WAPDA
WB
WFP
WHO
WV
Fed Cab
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